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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three essays that examine various problems in empirical 
derivatives. In the first essay, we use “tick-by-tick” quote data for 39 liquid U.S. stocks and 
options on them, and focus on events when the two markets disagree about the stock price in the 
sense that the option-implied stock price obtained from the put-call parity relation is inconsistent 
with the actual stock price.  Option market quotes adjust to eliminate the disagreement, while the 
stock market quotes behave normally, as if there were no disagreement.   The disagreement 
events are typically precipitated by stock price movements, and display signed option volume in 
the direction that tends to eliminate the disagreements.  These results show that option price 
quotes do not contain economically significant information about future stock prices beyond 
what is already reflected in current stock prices, i.e. no economically significant “price 
discovery” occurs in the option market.  We also find no option market price discovery using a 
much larger sample of disagreement events based on a weaker definition of a disagreement, 
which verifies that the findings for the primary sample are not due to unusual or unrepresentative 
market behavior during the put-call parity violations.   
The second essay examines trading costs and price impact in the options market. 
Conventional measures of trading costs and price impact rely on the quote midpoint as an 
estimate of a true security value. However, investors use a more precise estimate of the true 
value which takes advantage of public information as well as best quotes. Investors buy when the 
public information midpoint is above the quote midpoint and vice versa. As a result, 
conventional measures have a substantial upward bias. The execution timing bias is particularly 
large in the options market. Effective and average quoted spreads overestimate actual trading 
costs by 50% and 100% respectively.  Less than half of the price impact is caused by trades; the 
remainder is expected changes in the quote midpoint. The timing bias varies across stocks and 
has been increasing over time. Trades of non-round size pay smaller spreads. We suggest a 
general approach to adjusting conventional measures for the timing bias. Our results indicate that 
the usage of the adjusted measures is crucial for making inferences about liquidity and informed 
trading. 
The third essay shows that inventory considerations play a first order role in determining 
expected option returns. This point is supported by three main results. First, position rollover 
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during the expiration period creates large selling pressure which leads to a 5.7% drop in prices 
for non-expiring options. Expiration dates create exogenous variation in order imbalance, which 
in turn can explain the “abnormal” expiration returns. Second, as implied by the inventory 
channel, individual and market-wide order imbalances predict future option returns primarily 
through future order imbalances. The past imbalances are the most significant predictors of 
future returns controlling for a large battery of observable variables. One standard deviation 
increase in the inventory-related order imbalance corresponds to 1% higher expected option 
returns on the next day. Finally, we develop a microstructure method to decompose the price 
impact of trades into inventory and information components. Inventory has a bigger price impact 
than information for any trade size. 
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my wife, Tanya, and my mother, Ludmila. 
v 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
 
 
I couldn‘t have done it alone. I am indebted to my advisor, Neil Pearson, for his support, 
wisdom and extensive discussions we had. I thank the members of my dissertation committee: 
Tim Johnson, Mao Ye and Prachi Deuskar. I would also like to thank all other members of the 
Department of Finance at the University of Illinois for their assistance and mentoring. I learned a 
lot from the wisdom of the Web: online communities and blogs. Special thanks to my wife, 
Tanya, who has patiently endured this long process with me. Thanks to my mother and my 
farther for encouraging independent thinking. I gratefully thank Nanex and Eric Hunsader for 
providing the trade and quote data for the options and their underlying stocks and ISE for 
providing the option open/close data. Financial support from the Irwin Fellowship is gratefully 
acknowledged.  
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1: Is There Price Discovery in Equity Options?................................................................1 
1.1 Introduction …………………………………………………….………………………..1 
1.2 Literature Review……………………………………………………….………….…….6 
1.3  Data Description……………………………………………………….….………..……7 
1.4  The Disagreement and Matched Control Samples…………………….…….…………..8 
1.5  Hypotheses and Main Results…………………………………………….…….………17 
1.6  Analysis of Various Subsamples……………………………………………………….26 
1.7 Results for the Hasbrouck Information Share Measure of Price Discovery………….…32 
1.8  Conclusion...……………………………………….…………………………………...34 
1.9  Figures and Tables……………………………….……………………………………..36 
Chapter 2: Execution Timing in Equity Options...........................................................................50 
2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..50 
2.2 Data and Methodology………………………………………………………………….54 
2.3 Empirical analysis of the Bid-Ask Spreads and Price Impact…………………………..57 
2.4  Figures and Tables……………………………….……………………………………..62 
Chapter 3: Order Flow and Expected Option Returns…………………………………………...76 
3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..76 
3.2 Connection to the Literature………………………………………………………….…80 
3.3 Data Description………………………………………………………………………...84 
3.4 Variation in Expected Option Returns around Expiration Dates…………………….....86 
3.5 Instrumental Variable Approach for Daily Returns Panel………………………………95 
3.6 Return Predictability: Inventory versus Other Factors………………………………...101 
3.7 Microstructure Method to Decompose Price Impact of Trades……………………….107 
3.8 Summary and Conclusion……………………………………..……………………….116 
3.9 Figures and Tables ……..……………………………………..……………………….117 
Appendix A: Additional Results…………………………..……………………………………133 
Appendix B: Variable Description………………………...........................................................147 
References………………………………………………………………………………………150  
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Is There Price Discovery in Equity Options? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 This paper addresses the fundamental economic question of identifying information flows 
between the option and stock markets:  Do price quotes for equity options contain important 
“directional” information about the future level of the underlying stock price that is not yet reflected in 
stock price quotes?   Using a dataset that contains more than three years of “tick-by-tick” trade and 
quote data for 39 liquid U.S. stocks and options on them, we address this question by focusing on 
events when the two markets disagree about the stock price in the sense that the bid-ask range of the 
option-implied stock price quotes obtained from combining the put-call parity relation with bid and ask 
option price quotes does not overlap with the actual stock bid-ask range.  During these events the 
option market adjusts bid and ask prices to eliminate the disagreement between the option-implied 
stock price and the actual stock price.  In contrast, the disagreement does not affect the stock market; 
the behavior of stock price changes conditional on a disagreement event cannot be distinguished from 
the behavior of stock prices in otherwise similar situations without disagreement.    These results 
indicate that when the option price quotes are inconsistent with stock price quotes, the option quotes do 
not contain any economically significant information that has not already been reflected in the stock 
market.  In this sense, option price quotes do not participate in the price discovery process for the 
underlying stock price. 
We obtain these results using an approach that involves two main components.  First, we 
identify disagreement events in which the stock prices implied by the option price quotes are 
inconsistent with the actual stock price quotes.  In our primary sample of 81,024 disagreement events 
we use the put-call parity relation to compute option-implied stock prices, explicitly taking account of 
the large bid-ask spread in the option market to compute option-implied bid and ask prices for the 
stock.  We identify disagreement events only when the actual bid-ask range of the stock does not 
overlap with the option-implied bid-ask range, and we require that the difference between the closest 
points of the bid-ask ranges equals or exceeds a threshold.  Thus, the price disagreement events in our 
primary sample are violations of the law of one price.  Violations of the law of one price have received 
attention in other contexts because they are viewed as providing particularly useful information about 
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the functioning of financial markets.1  Setting aside execution risk and other impediments to 
arbitrage,2 the price disagreement events in our primary sample are potentially profitable opportunities 
for exchange members.  These violations are interesting and informative because they are cases in 
which it is clear that the option and stock markets disagree about the value of the underlying stock,3 
and thus are important cases in which one can be confident that trading activity and price changes 
contain information about the markets’ responses to the disagreement.    
Violations of the law of one price are also useful in assessing the economic significance of price 
discovery in the options market.  If one finds (as we do) that no economically significant option market 
price discovery occurs during violations of the law of one price, then it seems unlikely that smaller 
disagreements with the option market will cause economically significant changes in stock price 
quotes.  We confirm this by studying a much larger sample constructed using a broader definition of a 
disagreement, and find that in the larger sample stock price quote changes during disagreements also 
are not different from their changes in otherwise similar situations that do not involve disagreements.  
These results confirm that the results from the primary sample are not an artifact created by unusual or 
unrepresentative market behavior during violations of the law of one price.  The larger sample includes 
a total of almost 4.5 million events, about 55 times as many as in the primary sample.  Disagreements 
in this larger sample occur on average more than 130 times per stock, per day, indicating that price 
disagreements between the option and stock markets are common. 
Second, we compare the changes in both the actual and option-implied stock price quotes in the 
“treatment” sample of price disagreement events to the quote changes in a matched sample of 
otherwise similar observations for which there is no disagreement about the underlying stock prices.  
The use of the matched sample is necessary because stock and option price quotes can change for 
reasons other than the price disagreement.  Using both a classical average treatment effect analysis and 
also examining average effects conditioned on control variables, we find that option-implied stock 
prices move toward the actual stock prices, but actual stock prices do not move toward the option-
implied prices.  Rather, the behavior of the actual stock prices when there is a disagreement cannot be 
distinguished from their behavior in the absence of a disagreement.  Examination of histograms 
summarizing the distributions of changes in option-implied and actual stock price changes reveal that 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Lamont and Thaler (2003a) for an important contribution to this literature, and Lamont and Thaler, (2003b) for a 
survey.  In the option market, Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004), Battalio and Schultz (2006), and Cremers and 
Weinbaum (2010) have studied put-call parity violations. 
2 These include latency (which contributes to execution uncertainty), price impact, short-sale costs, and margin 
requirements. 
3 If the bid-ask ranges for the actual and option-implied stock prices overlap the two markets potentially agree about the fair 
price of the stock. 
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the disagreement events involve a shift in the distribution of option-implied quotes, and essentially no 
alteration in the distribution of actual stock prices.  As indicated above, we obtain similar results using 
the much larger sample constructed using a broader definition of a disagreement. 
Consistent with our findings that option quotes either agree with or lag stock price quotes, the 
violations of the law of one price are typically precipitated by stock price moves.  This is inconsistent 
with the potential explanation that the violations of the law of one price are created by anomalous 
changes in option price quotes, which then revert to their previous level.  In addition, the disagreement 
events often exhibit signed option volume providing pressure in the direction that will tend to move 
option price quotes to eliminate the disagreement, but no unusual signed volume in the stock market. 
This is consistent with stock prices leading option prices, with the stock price being “right” and the 
option price being “wrong.”   This finding regarding signed option volume during the disagreement 
events is also evidence that the events are not an artifact of data problems.  In the larger sample based 
on a broader definition of a disagreement we also find signed volume in the direction that tends to 
move the option price quotes toward the stock price quotes, but the average signed volume is not as 
large.  This is to be expected because the disagreements in the broader sample are not clear violations 
of the law of one price.     
Our approach is complementary to the large literature following Hasbrouck (1995) that uses the 
Hasbrouck “information share” and other measures based on vector error correction models 
(VECMs).4   This literature has generally focused on summary statistical measures that indicate the 
proportions of price discovery that occur in different markets, e.g. the Hasbrouck information share and 
the “component share” proposed by Harris, McInish, and Wood (2002a, 2002b).  Chakravarty, Gulen, 
and Mayhew (2004) is a notable contribution to this literature, finding that the information share of the 
option market is 17% using data from 1988 to 1992.  Papers using more recent data include 
Holowczak, Simaan, and Wu (2006) and Dong and Sinha (2011), who find option market information 
shares that are smaller and larger, respectively, than those found by Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew 
(2004).    
Our findings about both the magnitudes of the quote changes during disagreement events 
provide information about the economic significance of the statistical predictability found in the 
literature using VECMs, and therefore complements this literature.   In a different context, there is a 
long tradition in that part of the empirical asset pricing literature devoted to predictability and market 
                                                 
4 The information share of a market is introduced by Hasbrouck (1995) as “the proportional contribution of that market's 
innovations to the innovation in the common efficient price,” and is computed by decomposing the variance of the 
innovations to the long run or “efficient” price into the components due to the two markets.  See also Hasbrouck (2002, 
2003). 
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efficiency that emphasizes the importance of considering the economic as well as the statistical 
significance of findings of predictability (see, e.g. Jensen (1978) and Fama (1991)).   
We also compute the option market information share for our sample and find that the option market 
information share is consistently in the single digits, i.e. less than 10%.  This evidence of  limited 
option market price discovery using a statistical metric, the Hasbrouck information share, seems 
consistent with our finding of no economically significant option market price discovery, as it is not 
unusual for finance researchers to find financial market predictability that is statistically but not 
economically significant.   The single-digit estimates of option market information share also indicate 
that option market price discovery appears to have declined since the sample period used in some of the 
earlier literature, e.g. Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004), and thus help reconcile our results with 
those in the earlier literature.  
In interpreting our results within the context of the existing literature, it is important to 
distinguish between the question of whether some option trades are based on information about 
underlying stock prices, and the question of whether option quotes contain information about 
underlying stock prices in addition to that already reflected in the stock price quotes.  There are reasons 
to think that some option trades are executed by informed investors.  Black (1975) argues that the 
embedded leverage and lack of short-sale restrictions make options attractive for traders with 
information about future stock prices.  Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas (1998), using a sequential trade 
model, show that a pooling equilibrium with informed trading in both markets can occur.   On the other 
hand, many of the market participants who are most likely to possess valuable information about future 
stock prices, e.g. hedge fund managers, have access to actual leverage and thus do not need the 
synthetic leverage available via options. 
On the empirical side, Amin and Lee (1997) and Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005) find evidence of 
some informed trading in the options market prior to earnings and takeover announcements, 
respectively.  The most convincing evidence comes from Pan and Poteshman (2006), who document 
that stocks with low put-call ratios computed from the option trades that open new option positions 
outperform stocks with high put-call ratios computed from opening trades by more than 40 basis points 
on the next day. 5  (The magnitudes are smaller if only public information on signed volume is used to 
                                                 
5 In addition, Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) present evidence indicating that options trading volume leads stock 
trading volume.  Enforcement actions by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission provide evidence that at least some 
investors occasionally use options for illegal informed trading.  This evidence, as well as that in Amin and Lee (1997), Cao, 
Chen and Griffin (2005), and Pan and Poteshman (2005), uses data from sample periods prior to the structural changes in 
option trading. 
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compute the put-call ratios.)  Recent work by Chan, Kot, and Ni (2010) finds that option opening trades 
contain information about future stock returns out to horizons of several months.   
Our finding that options quotes do not contain incremental information relative to stock quotes 
might seem surprising because it implies that option quotes are not adjusted immediately in response to 
possibly informative option trades.  But there is a large literature (e.g., Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, 
and Sloan (2001), Jones and Lamont (2002), Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002), 
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), Nagel (2005), Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008), Diether, Lee, 
and Werner (2009), Boehmer, Jordan, and Huszar (2010), and others) providing evidence that short 
interest predicts stock returns out to horizons of months, i.e. that stock quotes are not adjusted 
immediately to reflect the information in some stock trades.   Chan, Kot, and Ni (2010) and Blau and 
Wade (2011) find that option trades contain less information about future stock returns than short 
selling ratios.   Seen in this light, our findings that option quotes do not contain incremental 
information relative to stock quotes while some option trades appear to contain information is not 
puzzling, or at least is less puzzling than the well-established finding that stock quotes are not adjusted 
immediately in response to some stock trades. 
During our sample the overwhelming bulk of option trading was electronic, with market makers 
generally using “auto-quoting” algorithms and quotes and trades disseminated almost instantly to 
participants in both the option and equity markets.  In contrast to the previous option market structure 
in which trading occurred on exchange floors, in the current market structure an option market maker 
on the exchange where trade occurs does not have any informational advantage relative to other market 
participants, including market makers on the equity exchanges.  This helps explain our findings that 
option quotes do not contain information not already reflected in stock quotes. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the related 
literature.  Section 3 describes the novel data employed in the paper, while Section 4 describes how we 
define and identify the disagreement events and the construction of the matched control sample, and 
then presents some relevant summary statistics about the disagreement events.  Section 5 contains the 
main results of the empirical analysis of quote changes. Section 6 presents results showing that the 
main results are also found in various subsets of the data, which serve to show that the results are 
robust and not an artifact stemming from possible data problems.  Section 7 reports the estimates of the 
Hasbrouck (1995) option market information shares for our sample, and Section 8 briefly concludes. 
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1.2 Literature Review 
  Our results are most related to the long-standing literature on the lead-lag relation between 
stock and options markets. 
The evidence on whether option price quotes react to potentially informed trading is mixed. 
Amin and Lee (1997) show that option bid-ask spreads do not increase during periods of plausibly high 
information asymmetry, such as prior to earnings announcements,6 and Vijh (1990) points out that 
option price quotes do not change after large trades.  On the other hand, Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) 
extend the approach of Hasbrouck (1991) to multiple markets and find that new information in the 
options market comes in the form of quote revisions rather than trades.  
Research on the lead-lag behavior between stock and options markets was started by Manaster 
and Rendleman (1982), who used end-of-day trade prices to show that option prices lead stock prices. 
However, during that paper’s sample period options trading continued for ten minutes after the stock 
market close, raising the possibility that the result stems from the asynchroneity in the quotes.  
Bhattacharya (1987), who examines the findings of Manaster and Rendleman (1982), does not rely on a 
specific econometric model and is the closest study to ours.  Using 15-minute quote snapshots for 32 
stocks and options on them, he simulates a trading strategy in which stock is bought (sold) when it is 
quoted below (above) the option-implied stock price by at least a threshold amount.  The position is 
held open for 15 minutes, and then closed.  The average profitability from this strategy is close to zero 
and becomes negative after bid-ask spread costs are considered, providing no evidence that options 
lead stocks.  However, a critical aspect of Bhattacharya's test design is that it can only detect whether 
the option market leads the stock market and not vice-versa.  
Subsequent literature focused on refining the econometric methodology, starting with simple 
causality tests by Anthony (1988) and evolving to the vector error correction models estimated by 
Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) and Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004).  Other related literature 
includes Stephan and Whaley (1990), Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993), DeJong and Donders (1995), 
Finucane (1999), Diltz and Kim (2005), O’Connor (2005), and Wen-Liang, Chin-Shen, and Shu-Fang 
(2008).  A  recent literature review is provided by Ansi and Ben Ouda (2009).  Finucane (1991) was the 
first to apply call-put parity to study lead-lag behavior between the option and stock markets. 
Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) compute option-implied stock prices from call option 
prices using the binomial model and lagged implied volatilities.  Estimating a VECM for the actual and 
                                                 
6 A possible explanation for this is that prior to 2002, option market quotes were not firm for professional traders and were 
firm for retail investors only during “normal market conditions” (Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (2004)). 
7 
 
option-implied stock prices with daily data from 1988 to 1992, they find that the Hasbrouck (1995) 
“information share” of option quotes is 17%.  Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) and the other 
papers mentioned above use samples that pre-date the transformation in option market structure that 
began in 2000. Thus their findings might not be relevant to the current market. 
Holowczak, Simaan, and Wu (2006) use data from 52 trading days during the spring and 
summer of 2002, the put-call parity relation, and bid-ask midpoints to compute the option-implied 
stock price, and then estimate the Hasbrouck (1995) information shares for a sample of stocks and 
options on them.  They obtain somewhat smaller estimates of the information share of option quotes 
than did Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004), which they attribute to the change in the option 
market structure that began in 2000.7  Additional results in Holowczak, Simaan, and Wu (2006) show 
that the options quotes become more informative when there are large price movements, large numbers 
of options trades, or significant signed order flow in the options market.  Dong and Sinha (2011) apply 
a similar approach to data from the Dow 30 stocks and options on them from 2003 to 2009, and obtain 
estimates of the Hasbrouck information share for options quotes somewhat greater than those in 
Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004).  They also present evidence that the option market 
information share of financial stocks increased during the short-sale ban of 2008.  
1.3  Data Description  
The primary data used in this research are tick-by-tick trade and quote data for 36 liquid U.S. 
stocks and 3 ETFs along with their options from April 17, 2003 to October 18, 2006, a total of 882 
trading days.8  This is a larger and more recent sample than used in previous studies of the lead-lag 
relation.  The data were obtained from Nanex, which provides real-time option and stock price data to 
its customers via its NxCore product. The data were archived by Nanex as they arrived from the 
exchanges at Nanex’s server, and time-stamped by Nanex to 25 millisecond precision as they arrived. 
The data come from all U.S. exchanges where a given contract is traded.  For trades, transaction price, 
size, exchange code, and some other information are available.  For quotes, exchange-level best quotes 
and volumes are available.  That is, the data include each instance when any exchange adjusts its best 
quote or quoted volume, even if it this change does not change the national best bid and offer (NBBO).  
The main reason for limiting the sample size to 39 stocks and ETFs was a data storage limitation.  The 
size of the compressed database exceeds 1,400 GB.  
                                                 
7 Holowczak, Simaan, and Wu (2006) also estimate the “component share” of Harris, McInish, and Wood (2002a, 2002b).  
For their sample of stocks, the average option market component share is larger than the Hasbrouck information share.  
8 Data are not available for several days during the period, so the total of 882 days does not match the number of trading 
days from April 17, 2003 to October 18, 2006, inclusive. 
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The sample stocks were those with the highest option market volume during March 2003. The 
underlying stocks are listed in Table 1.1.  They consist of a number of stocks, e.g. large-capitalization 
technology stocks, that have persistently high option volume, along with a few smaller-capitalization 
stocks that happened to be of trading interest during the spring of 2003.  The sample stocks cover a 
significant share of total volume in the options market.  Some of the stocks merged, e.g. America 
Online, or changed a ticker, e.g. Morgan Stanley.  For these stocks, data are available only up to the 
date of the ticker change. This resulted in five stocks (AOL, CPN, MWD, SBC, and NXTL) dropping 
from the sample prior to the end date.  In addition, the QQQ ticker for the NASDAQ 100 ETF dropped 
from the sample when it was replaced by the QQQQ ticker. 
Dividend and split data are taken from the Ivy DB database available from Option Metrics LLC. 
The Ivy DB database includes dividend amounts as well as declaration, ex-dividend, and payment 
dates. The risk-free rates are also from Option Metrics, which compute them from “cash” LIBOR 
quotes and LIBOR forward rates estimated from the prices of Eurodollar futures contracts.  
Some analyses use estimates of signed volume for the options or their underlying stocks, and 
some use estimates of the delta-equivalent signed volume of the options transactions. For stocks, the 
trade direction is inferred using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.9 For options, trade direction is 
inferred by first applying the quote rule to the NBBO.  If the trade is at the midpoint of the NBBO, the 
quote rule is applied to the BBO from the exchange at which the trade occurs.  Based on six months of 
data from 1995, Savickas and Wilson (2003) show that for options the quote rule works better than 
other common algorithms.  Also, unlike stocks, in our data approximately 80% of the options 
transactions occur at the best bid or ask, which suggests that the quote rule will provide reasonable 
results for the options. Options delta, needed to estimate delta-equivalent signed volume, is computed 
using the Black-Scholes-Merton formula and the previous days’ implied volatility estimates from 
Option Metrics. 
Earnings announcement data are needed for one analysis.  Earnings announcement dates are 
taken from First Call, and the times of the earnings announcements are hand-checked using 
LexisNexis. 
1.4  The Disagreement and Matched Control Samples 
The primary sample consists of “disagreement” events in which the stock and options markets 
disagree about the stock price in the sense that the option-implied stock price quotes obtained from the 
                                                 
9 Focusing on short sales, Chakrabarty, Moulton and Shkilko (2011)  use recent data and present evidence that the Lee-
Ready (1991) algorithm correctly classifies trades. 
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put-call parity relation are inconsistent with the actual stock price quotes.  We compare the movement 
of the actual and option-implied stock price quotes during disagreement events to their movement 
during otherwise similar “control” events during which there is no disagreement about the underlying 
stock prices.  Differences in the movement of the quotes between the disagreement and matched 
control events allow us to draw inferences about the markets in which economically significant price 
discovery occurs.   
1.4.1 Price Disagreement Events 
 Let St be the stock price at time t, Ct(K,T) and Pt(K,T) be the prices of call and put options with 
strike K and expiration date T, PVt(D(t,T)) be the present value as of time t of the dividends with ex-
dividend dates falling between the current date t and the option expiration T , and r(t,T) be the interest 
rate for the period from t to T.  We must first deal with the fact that U.S.-traded options on individual 
equities have American rather than European-style exercise.  For this reason, the European put-call 
parity relation 
))(,()),((PV),(),( tTTtrtttt KeTtDTKPTKCS
−−
++−=  
will not be exactly satisfied.  Rather, for American options we expect a relation of the form 
))(,()),((PV),(),(),( tTTtrttttt KeTtDTKPTKCTKvS
−−
++−=+ , 
where vt(K,T) is the difference between the early exercise premium of the American call and the early 
exercise premium of the American put.10  For each date and call-put pair defined by K and T, we 
exploit the high-frequency data to estimate vt(K,T) in the following model-free way. 
 During each day, for each call-put pair, at every quote update (either bid or ask) for either the 
call, the put, or the stock, we use quote midpoints to estimate the “error” from the European put-call 
parity relation as 
t
tTTtr
tttj SKeTtDTKPTKC −++−=
−− ))(,()),((PV),(),(ε . 
The estimate of vt(K,T) used on day t is then the average of the εj, that is 
∑
=
=
N
j
jt TKv
1
),( ε , 
where N is the number of option quote updates on day t. This approach assumes that the difference 
vt(K,T) between the call and put early exercise premia is constant during each day.  Given the estimate 
of the difference vt(K,T),  the term ),(),(),( TKvTKPTKC ttt −−  is an estimate of the difference 
                                                 
10 The term vt(K,T) also absorbs any differences that might arise because the dividend estimates or LIBOR-based interest 
rates we obtain from Option Metrics are different from those implicit in market prices. 
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between European option prices, and can be used in the European put-call parity formula in place of 
the difference between European option prices.11 
Doing this, for the primary sample we define a disagreement event by first constructing option-
implied bid and ask prices for the underlying stock using the adjusted option prices and the put-call 
parity relations 
))(,(askbid )),((PV),(),(),(),(Bid Implied tTTtrttt KeTtDTKvTKPTKCTK tt
−−
++−−=           (1.1) 
and 
))(,(bidask )),((PV),(),(),(),(Ask Implied tTTtrtttt KeTtDTKvTKPTKCTK t
−−
++−−= ,         (1.2) 
where  Implied Bidt and Implied Askt are the option-implied bid and ask quotes of the underlying stock 
and the superscripts indicate whether the quote is a bid or an ask.  We use equations (1.1) and (1.2) 
only with short-term, near-the-money options on stocks for which ex-dividend dates of large dividends 
do not fall during the lives of the options.  For these options the early exercise premia are likely to be 
small, reducing the importance of any errors in our estimate of vt(K,T). 
 Specifically, we use only options that satisfy the following criteria: 
(a) The remaining time to expiration T – t is between 10 and 70 calendar days, inclusive. 
(b)  The option is within 6% of being at-the-money, i.e. the option moneyness ln(S /K) satisfies 
|ln(S/K)| ≤ 0.06, where S is the average of all trade prices during the day. 
(c) The present value of the dividends with ex-dividend dates during the remaining life of the 
option satisfies PVt(D (t,T)) < 0.05.  
(d) The bid price of the option is greater than or equal to 15 cents.  
If more than one put-call option pairs satisfies the moneyness criterion (b) all of them are 
considered independently, potentially resulting in the identification of more than one disagreement 
event in an underlying stock at a given time t.  About 8.6% of the disagreement events have another 
event (for a different call-put pair based on the same underlying stock) within the next 10 seconds, and 
about 14% have another event for a different call-put pair within the next two minutes.  These 
percentages would be higher, but for the fact that often only one strike price satisfies the moneyness 
condition (b).  
The first two criteria (a) and (b) limit the value of the early exercise premia of both puts and 
calls, while (c) has the effect of including in the sample only the call options for which the call early 
exercise premium is small.  Criterion (a) also greatly reduces the uncertainty about the dividend 
                                                 
11 This adjustment for the early exercise premia is not crucial.  An earlier version of this paper constructed the sample of 
disagreements using the European put-call parity relation without any adjustment, and obtained similar results leading to 
identical conclusions about price discovery. 
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estimates used in (c), because dividends typically are announced about a month before the ex-dividend 
date and do not change from quarter to quarter.  The criteria (a) and (b) also have the effect of 
eliminating many of the less liquid options from the sample, which is desirable.  
Criterion (d) screens out many cases in which the option bid price becomes unavailable during 
the evaluation period.  Such cases prevent us from computing the change in the option price.  This 
criterion also contributes to screening out less liquid options. 
For each underlying stock and ETF, we search for price disagreement events by comparing the 
option-implied stock bid and ask prices computed using equations (1.1) and (1.2) to the actual bid and 
ask prices.  In this process, we do not consider the quote updates from the first and last 5 minutes of 
each trading day.  Skipping the first five minutes of the trading day avoids opening rotations and also 
allows the markets some time to aggregate information accumulated from previous close, while we 
cannot use disagreements that begin near the close of trading because we are interested in quote 
changes subsequent to the disagreements.   For all other quote updates in the sample, a potential price 
disagreement event is identified at time t if there is a call-put pair that satisfies criteria (a)-(d) above 
and also: 
(i) bidtS  – Implied Askt ≥ $0.02 and (
bid
tS  – Implied Askt)/
bid
tS  ≥  0.05%; or 
(ii) Implied Bidt – 
ask
tS  ≥ $0.02 and (Implied Bidt – 
ask
tS )/
ask
tS  ≥  0.05%. 
These conditions imply that the bid-ask ranges of the actual and option-implied stock prices do not 
overlap, but rather are separated by a distance that is at least the greater of $0.02 and 0.05% of the 
stock price.  The absolute threshold $0.02 is relevant for low-price stocks, while the relative threshold 
0.05% is relevant for high-priced stocks.12  In (i) the price is greater than the implied price, and we call 
such events {P >IP}-type disagreements; in (ii) the implied price exceeds the price, and we call such 
events {IP > P}-type disagreements.  In the {P >IP}-type disagreements, the actual stock price should 
decrease and/or the option-implied price should increase to eliminate the disagreement, while in the {IP 
>P}-type the stock price should increase and/or the implied price should decrease.  
We construct the final sample by applying several filters to the events that satisfy (i) and (ii). 
Any potential disagreement that is triggered within a 5-minute period following the start of any 
previous disagreement event is discarded.   Events in which the bid-ask spread for the stock, call 
option, and put option are not all strictly positive are discarded, and all events with duration of less than 
half a second are discarded.13   These filters ensure that the disagreement events that appear in the 
                                                 
12 We obtain similar results and identical conclusions if we use a threshold of the greater of 4 cents or 0.1% of the stock 
price. 
13The number of these is about 10% of the sample size.  Including them in the analysis will strengthen the results. 
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sample are not merely market “locks,” caused by differences in latency, or “blinking” limit orders that 
are displayed for only a few milliseconds, or otherwise so short-lived that investors are unable to trade 
on them.  Finally, as indicated above we do not search for disagreement events during the first and last 
five minutes of each trading day.   
Our approach involves comparing the movement of both the actual and option-implied stock 
price quotes following the beginning of a disagreement event to the movement of the corresponding 
quotes following otherwise similar “control” events during which there is no disagreement about the 
underlying stock prices.  In doing this we examine the quotes either 30 or 60 seconds after the 
beginning of the events, which we refer to as the evaluation period.  Thus, we also associate with each 
disagreement event the stock and option-implied quotes prevailing 30 and 60 seconds subsequent to the 
beginning of the event. 
 Figure 1.1 illustrates the quote dynamics during a disagreement event.  Through the time 
10:00:36.200 ABC’s ask price is greater than or equal to $60.00 and the option-implied quotes are 
$60.00 / $60.10.  The relative threshold is 3 cents (the absolute threshold is 2 cents), and is the relevant 
one.  At the quotes prevailing through 10:00:36.200 the mispricing is only one cent and the 
disagreement event is not triggered.  Then, 200 milliseconds later, at 10:00:36.400, the actual ask quote 
changes from $59.99 to $59.98. The threshold of 3 cents is met, an {IP>P}-type price disagreement 
event is triggered, and the time and quotes are stored.  In addition, the quotes at 10:01:06.400 and 
10:01:36.400 (30 and 60 seconds after the beginning of the disagreement event) are stored for the 
analysis of quotes changes subsequent to the disagreement event.   
1.4.2 Matched Control Sample 
 We need to use a matched control sample for two reasons.  First, during the evaluation period 
new information might arrive, causing prices to change. For example, does a stock price change during 
a disagreement event mean that the stock market has taken into account the option-implied stock 
prices, or is it simply that new information has arrived and been reflected in the stock price?  A natural 
way to control for the arrival of new information and thus distinguish between these two explanations 
for the stock price movement is to compare the stock price changes during disagreement events to the 
stock price changes during a matched sample of otherwise similar market conditions for which there is 
no disagreement.    
 The same issue is relevant for the option market.   Perhaps options quotes always move in a 
particular fashion, even absent price disagreement.  For example, during disagreement events the 
option-implied bid-ask spread is usually smaller than its full sample average, and its reversion toward 
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the full sample mean mechanically reduces the magnitude of the disagreement.  Thus, at least part of 
the decrease in the disagreement is due to mean reversion in the bid-ask spread and not due to the 
options market following the stock market. Therefore, it is necessary to assess what are the “normal” 
changes in the option-implied quotes during the evaluation period. As in the previous case, a solution is 
to compare option dynamics under similar market conditions with and without disagreement.  The 
question, then, is what variables should be used for matching?  
Based on event mechanics, the option-implied bid-ask spread and pre-event stock returns are 
good candidates.  Figure 1.1 illustrates this.  The actual stock bid-ask spread is narrow, consistent with 
the data. Thus, the stock price drifts inside a wide stripe of option-implied quotes, and a disagreement 
occurs when it gets outside the stripe. The disagreement is more likely to occur when the option-
implied bid-ask spread is smaller than its average, because the stock has to move a smaller distance to 
get outside the option-implied quotes. Thus, the option-implied spread is an important variable to use in 
matching.  As for additional variables, in our data most of the disagreement events are initiated by pre-
event stock market returns. Because large stock price returns might by themselves predict subsequent 
movements in stock or option prices, we also use stock returns in both the two minutes and 10 seconds 
prior to the beginning of the event.  These pre-event returns are also proxies for stock volatility at the 
time of the event.    
To facilitate identification of the matching observations, the sample period is divided into 40-
day periods.  For each disagreement event, a sample of potential matches from that underlying stock is 
constructed based on quote snapshots at one-minute frequency from the 40 trading day period that 
contains the disagreement event.  We exclude potential matches in which the stock, call, and put bid-
ask spreads are not strictly positive, and also exclude potential matches that occur within 5 minutes of 
the start of any of the disagreement events.  Finally, we require that matches for the {P>IP}-type have 
an actual quote midpoint greater than the midpoint of the option-implied quotes, and vice-versa for the 
{IP>P}-type.  
Each disagreement event is matched with exactly three observations from the set of potential 
matches.  Selecting three matches for every disagreement event reduces sampling variation in the 
control sample. We use the Mahalabonis metric to select the matches. 
Panel A of Figure 1.2 shows the behavior of normalized option-implied bid and ask prices and 
actual stock midpoint for both the disagreement and control samples during a 400-second window 
surrounding the triggering of the {P>IP}-type disagreement events and the start of the corresponding 
control events, respectively.  The prices are normalized by dividing each price by the overall mean of 
the implied bid, implied ask, and stock midpoint observed at 20-second intervals during the window, so 
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that a normalized price of 1 means that the price is equal to the overall mean price.   Red lines are for 
the price disagreement sample and blue lines are for the control sample, while dashed lines are the 
option-implied bid and ask prices and solid lines are the actual stock bid-ask midpoints.  Focusing on 
the red solid line (the actual stock price for the disagreement events), note that it rises very rapidly 
before time 0, the beginning of the disagreement event, and crosses above the dashed red line (the 
option-implied ask) shortly before the disagreement event. At time 0 it equals or exceeds the option-
implied ask plus the threshold, triggering the disagreement event.  Note that the figure shows that the 
disagreement is typically triggered by the rapid increase in the actual stock price relative to the option-
implied ask, and not by a decline in the option-implied ask.  The disagreement is then closed shortly 
after time 0 when the option-implied ask “catches up” with the stock price and returns to its typical 
position above the actual stock price.   
The behavior of the stock price in the control sample is similar to the behavior in the 
disagreement sample, because matching on both 2-minute and 10-second pre-event returns captures the 
convexity of the stock price trajectory in the pre-event period.  The main difference between the control 
and disagreement samples is that the control sample option-implied bid and ask prices increase more 
quickly, so a disagreement is not triggered.   
Panel B shows that the average dynamics during the {IP>P}-type events are almost a “mirror” 
of the {P>IP}-type events. The disagreement events are triggered by stock price movements in which 
the solid red line (the actual stock midpoint) declines more rapidly than the implied bid and ask. 
Subsequent to the triggering of the event the option market “catches up.”   
1.4.3 Broader Sample and Matched Control Sample for the 
Broader Sample 
 In order to address the potential concern that the results based on the primary sample are due to 
anomalous option market behavior during violations of the law of one price, we also construct and use 
a much larger sample based on a broader definition of a disagreement.  For this sample we do not use 
the filters described above, but instead include every option for which: (i) the bid-ask spread was 
strictly positive at the time the disagreement is triggered; and (ii) the absolute value of delta (as 
computed by OptionMetrics) as-of the close of trading on the previous day was between 0.1 and 0.9, 
inclusive.  By including options relatively far away from the money, this broader sample also addresses 
the potential concern that we fail to find meaningful price discovery in the primary sample because 
price discovery occurs in out-of-the-money options and the primary sample includes only near-the-
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money options.   
For the broader sample, a disagreement occurs when the model value of an option computed 
using the current stock price and a lagged estimate of the implied volatility is at least one penny outside 
the option’s bid-ask range.  Specifically, as a preliminary step for each option every two minutes we 
compute the Black-Scholes-Merton implied volatility using the current option and stock bid-ask 
midpoints.  Given this set of implied volatilities for each option at two-minute frequency, every time 
one of the stock or option bid or ask quotes changes we use the current stock bid-ask midpoint and the 
average of the implied volatilities for the preceding 15 two-minute intervals to compute the Black-
Scholes-Merton value of the option.14  If the computed model value is outside the quoted bid-ask range 
by at least one penny we trigger a disagreement event.  This broader sample includes almost 55 times 
as many disagreement events as the primary sample. 
 To construct the control sample for the broader sample we match on the option bid-ask spread, 
the 2-minute pre-event stock return, the square root of the days remaining to expiration, and the 
absolute value of the option delta, and use the Mahalabonis metric.  We exclude potential matches that 
fall within a 5-minute window surrounding the beginning of the disagreement event. For more than 
85% of the events in the broader sample the matched option is the same option as the one that triggered 
the disagreement event, in 50% of the events the matched observation is from same trading day, and in 
48% of the cases the matched observation is both the same option and from the same trading day.  
1.4.4 Summary Statistics  
Table 1.1 presents some summary information about the primary sample disagreement events, 
on a stock-by-stock basis. The first column shows the stock ticker symbol. The second through sixth 
columns are for the {P>IP}-type disagreement events, while the seventh through eleventh are for the 
{IP>P}-type events.  The last row shows either the sum or mean of the stock-by-stock quantities, as 
appropriate. 
There are 38,979 events of the {P>IP}-type and 42,045 of the {IP>P}-type in the primary 
sample, a total of 81,024 events.   The largest event suppliers are eBay and Amazon, with more than 
8,000 events each. Some of the stocks (e.g., America Online and Calpine) dropped from the sample 
before the end of the sample period; thus there are few events for them.  The broader sample, for which 
summary statistics are not tabulated, contains 2,315,862 {P>IP}-type events and 2,132,490 {IP>P}-
                                                 
14 This exploits the slow-moving nature of implied volatilities, i.e. there is little high-frequency movement in implied 
volatilities.  Because we ignore the American feature in both computing the implied volatilities and in using them to 
compute the model values, the errors from ignoring the early exercise premia at the two steps will offset each other.  Even 
using the Black-Scholes-Merton formula, the computation of the implied volatilities at high frequency is burdensome. 
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type events, a total of 4,448,352 events.  eBay and Qualcomm are the leading events suppliers in the 
broader sample, and Amazon is the third leading supplier. 
The primary sample disagreements occur on average more than twice per stock, per day.  The 
disagreement frequency falls from about four per day in the beginning of the sample period to less than 
one per day at the end, with an overall average of more than two per stock per day. There are two 
possible drivers for this trend. First, volatility as measured by the VIX was falling steadily from 25% in 
April 2003 to 12% in October 2006. Next, improvements in technology may have made it easier for 
option market makers to avoid price disagreements.   Based on the broader definition of a disagreement 
event that results in a sample of about 4.5 million events, disagreements occur on average more than 
130 times per stock, per day.  These disagreement events are important for the option market.  Using 
the broader definition of a disagreement event, 4.5 percent is a lower bound on the fraction of total 
(across all options) option trading volume that comes from trades in the option suffering a 
disagreement that occur within 30 seconds of the triggering of the disagreement event. Using a 60 
second window, 6.7 percent is a lower bound on the fraction of total option trading volume occurs 
during the disagreement options.15   
The third and eighth columns show the median event durations (in seconds), by stock.  The 
means (across stocks) of the median event durations are 16.4 and 18.3 seconds for the {P>IP} and 
{IP>P}-type disagreement, with the smallest and largest median durations ranging from 4.2 seconds 
({IP>P}-type events for QCOM) to 73 seconds ({IP>P}-type events for CPN).16 Disagreement events 
have a short life, with 70% of disagreements disappearing in the first 20 seconds, and 90% being 
eliminated within 70 seconds.17   Our choice of evaluation periods of 30 and 60 seconds is motivated 
by these observations.   
The columns headed “Implied Spread” shows the average spread between the option-implied 
bid and ask prices. The overall average implied spread is 11 cents, with many option-implied quotes 
displaying an implied spread of 10 cents, the minimum possible implied spread.  These wide average 
implied spreads justify thinking intuitively of the stock price drifting inside the stripe of option-implied 
quotes. 
                                                 
15 These percentages are lower bounds on the fractions of option trading volume that occur during the disagreement events 
because we filter out subsequent events that begin within 5 minutes following the triggering of any event.  Thus, option 
trading volume during the subsequent events in not counted as disagreement volume, but is included in the total option 
volume that appears in the denominators of these calculations. 
16 CPN (Calpine) is a stock that typically did not have high option volume, but appears in our sample because it had  high 
volume due to a corporate event during the period when we selected our sample. 
17As discussed above, we exclude from the sample disagreements with durations of less than one-half second.  Because 
some (and perhaps most) of these short-lived disagreements are valid disagreements and not due to differences in latency or 
data reporting problems, the figure somewhat overstates the typical lengths of disagreement events. 
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For both event types, both the pre-event stock returns are substantially different from zero. 
Specifically, the 2-minute pre-event returns are 0.22% for the {P>IP}-type and −0.22% for the {IP>P}-
type, while the 10-second pre-event returns are 0.12% and −0.11%, respectively.  These pre-event 
returns are consistent with the fact that most price disagreements are precipitated by stock price 
changes.  In fact, 88% of the disagreements are initiated by the stock in the sense that a change in a 
stock price quote was the immediate cause of the disagreement, and only 12% of the disagreements are 
initiated by the options.  The pre-event returns in the broader sample are also positive and negative for 
the {P>IP}-type and {IP>P}-type disagreements, respectively, though of smaller magnitude than the 
pre-event returns for the primary sample events. 
1.5  Hypotheses and Main Results 
1.5.1 Distributions of Quote Changes 
We begin with a visual examination of the differences between the distributions of the quote 
changes in the disagreement and control samples.  For the {P>IP}-type disagreements, the option-
implied ask quote is less than the actual bid.  The hypothesis that the options follow the stock implies 
that the distribution of the change in the option-implied ask quote for the disagreement sample is to the 
right of the distribution for the control sample, while the hypothesis that the options do not follow the 
stock implies that the distribution of the change in the option-implied ask quote for the disagreement 
sample is either identical to or to the left of the distribution for the control sample. The hypothesis that 
the stock follows the options implies that for these {P>IP}-type disagreements the distribution of the 
change in the actual bid quote for the disagreement sample is to the left of the distribution for the 
control sample, while the hypothesis that the stock does not follow the options implies that the 
distribution of the change in the actual bid quote for the disagreement sample is either identical to or 
the right of the distribution for the control sample.   
For the {IP>P}-type disagreements, the option-implied ask quote is greater than the actual bid 
and the predictions for the differences in the distributions are opposite those above.  Specifically, the 
hypothesis that the options follow the stock implies that the distribution of the change in the option-
implied ask quote for the disagreement sample is to the left of the distribution for the control sample, 
and the hypothesis that the stock follows the options implies that the distribution of the change in the 
actual bid quote for the disagreement sample is to the right of the distribution for the control sample.   
Figure 1.3 consists of six panels comparing the quote change distributions over an evaluation 
period of one minute for the treatment and control samples aggregated across all stocks.  In 
18 
 
constructing the figures, for simplicity we replace the actual stock bid price with the bid-ask midpoint 
because the bid-ask spread in the stock market was typically only one cent and the distribution of 
changes in the actual bid-ask midpoint cannot be visually distinguished from the distributions of 
changes in the actual bid and ask prices. The top three panels (A-C) are for the {P>IP}-type 
disagreements and compare the distributions of changes in the option-implied bid, option-implied ask, 
and actual stock midpoint for the disagreement and control samples.  In each panel, the distribution of 
quote changes in the disagreement sample is represented by the light-shaded bars, while the distribution 
of quote changes in the control sample is represented by the dark-shaded bars.  The bottom three panels 
(D-F) also compare the distributions of changes in the option-implied bid, option-implied ask, and 
actual stock midpoint quotes between the disagreement and control samples, but for the {IP>P}-type 
disagreements.  In all cases quote changes are measured in U.S. dollars, e.g. 0.2 is 20 cents.  Note that 
the distributions of changes in the option-implied bid and ask prices are indeed discrete, as the tick size 
is five cents. 
For the {P>IP}-type disagreements (Panels A-C) the most noticeable difference in the 
distributions is in Panel B, which compares the distributions of the changes in the implied ask prices 
for the treatment and control samples.  For the control sample (dark-shaded bars), the implied ask stays 
the same or decreases more than 60% or the time; it increases and moves toward the actual bid in fewer 
than 40% of the events.  The finding that the implied ask moves toward the bid in some of the events 
should not be surprising, as in both the disagreement and control samples the option-implied bid-ask 
spread is less than its unconditional average value, so some spread widening is to be expected.   By 
construction in the control sample, the observed midpoint is closer to the implied ask than to the bid.   
In contrast, the distribution of changes in the treatment sample shows a much higher frequency of 
increases in the implied ask price.  The implied ask stays the same or decreases in about 20% of the 
treatment observations, and increases in more than 80%.    The mode of the distribution of the 
treatment sample is 10 cents, and the mean is close to 8 cents.  Thus, the implied ask typically changes 
by more than enough to eliminate the initial pricing disagreement. Importantly, the whole treatment 
distribution is to the right of the control distribution, implying that for the disagreement events, the 
change in the implied ask price is greater at every percentile. 
 Panel A shows that it is also the case that the distribution of changes in the option-implied bid 
prices for the disagreement sample is shifted to the right relative to the distribution for the control 
sample.  For the control sample, the probability that the option-implied bid price does not change is 
about 60%, and the distribution is approximately symmetric.  This is less movement than was found in 
the control sample ask prices, which is unsurprising because in the control sample by construction the 
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stock midpoint is closer to the implied ask than to the bid.  In contrast, the probability that the option-
implied bid increases during the evaluation period is about 60%.  Combined with the movement of the 
implied ask, this shift in the distribution of the bid prices provides strong evidence that the options 
market changes its assessment of a fair price during the disagreement events.  This implies that the 
stock market participates in price discovery.   
Examining the distributions of changes in the stock price allows us to assess whether the 
options market participates in price discovery.  If the stock price follows the options, then for the 
disagreement sample the distribution of changes in the actual stock quote midpoint should be shifted to 
the left relative to the control sample.  Panel C reveals that there is no such shift. Rather, the 
distributions for the treatment and controls samples look quite similar. If anything the treatment 
distribution is shifted slightly to the right of the distribution for the control sample, and displays 
slightly more dispersion.  This is evidence that the stock market does not follow the options, but rather 
is not affected by the disagreement.  
The distributions for the {IP>P}-type disagreements in which the option-implied bid exceeds 
the actual ask are shown in Panels D-F, and are almost a mirror image of the figures for the {P>IP}-
type in Panels A-C.   The distributions of changes in the option-implied bid and ask quotes for the price 
disagreement samples are shifted to the left relative to the corresponding distributions for the control 
samples, providing evidence that the options follow the stock.  The distributions of changes in the 
actual stock prices are very similar for the treatment and control samples, indicating that the stock does 
not follow the options.  If anything the treatment distribution is shifted slightly to the left of the control 
distribution, also mirroring the results for the {P>IP}-type disagreements. 
 The distributions of quotes changes in these six panels are consistent with the hypotheses that 
option price quotes follow stock price quotes, but not vice-versa. For both disagreement types, both 
option-implied bid and ask prices tend to change in the directions that reduce or eliminate the 
disagreement.  In striking contrast, stock prices do not change in directions that reduce or eliminate the 
disagreement.  To the extent that the distributions changes in stock prices differ between the treatment 
and control samples, the stock prices actually change in the directions that increase the magnitude of 
the disagreement. 
1.5.2 Comparison of Mean Differences in the Primary Sample 
For the primary sample {P>IP}-type disagreements, the option-implied ask quote is less than 
the actual bid. This suggests a focus on movements in the option-implied ask and the actual bid 
because these are the quotes most likely to change to eliminate the disagreement.  However, for 
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simplicity we use the stock midpoint rather than the bid; this has no effect on our analysis as the bid-
ask spread is typically only one cent.  The mean changes in the option-implied ask quotes and actual 
stock midpoints are estimated using  
ττ ε ++ +++=− tttt t XaDaa        Ask Implied Ask Implied 210 ,                            (1.3) 
and 
ττ ε ++ +++=− ttttt   X b  D b  b 210  MidpointStock MidpointStock ,                (1.4) 
respectively, where τ is the length of the evaluation period, D is a disagreement dummy that takes the 
value 1 for disagreement events, and X  is a vector of control variables relevant for the option-implied 
quotes. The estimates of the coefficients a1 and b1 are estimates of the mean differences between the 
treatment and control sample, i.e. they are estimates of the effect of the disagreement on subsequent 
mean changes in quotes.  If the stock market quotes contain information not yet reflected in the option 
quotes then a1 > 0, interpreted as the options follows the stock; otherwise  a1 ≤ 0.  If the options market 
quotes contain information not yet reflected in the stock quotes then b1 < 0, interpreted as the stock 
follows the options; otherwise we expect b1 ≥ 0.    
For the primary sample {IP>P}-type, we focus on the option-implied bid and the actual stock 
midpoint. The mean changes in the option-implied bid and actual stock midpoint are estimated using   
ττ ε ++ +++=− tttt t XaDaa        Bid Implied Bid Implied 210 ,                              (1.5) 
and equation (1.4) above, where a1 < 0 means that the options follow the stock and in (4) b1 > 0 now 
means that the stock follows the options.  
If the regressions do not include the vector of control variables X then these regressions and 
hypotheses are equivalent to a classic average treatment effect analysis.  Table 1.2 presents summary 
results for changes in the implied bid, implied ask, and stock midpoint based on evaluation periods of 
both 30 seconds and one minute.18  (The quote changes are calculated at the end of the evaluation 
periods.)  Specifically, the table shows the across-stock means and medians of the stock-by-stock 
average quote changes, and also presents the 4th and 36th average quote changes, ranking the averages 
from smallest to largest.  The left-hand side of the table is for the {P>IP}-type disagreements, while the 
right-hand side is for the {IP>P}-type disagreements. 
Examining the results for the {P>IP}-type disagreements, in the treatment sample for the one 
minute evaluation period the across-stock mean and median of the stock-by-stock average changes in 
the implied bid are 4.8 and 4.6 cents, respectively, while the 4-th and 36-th values are 4.1 and 6.1 cents, 
respectively.  Although it is not shown in the table, the minimum of the average changes across stocks 
                                                 
18 Appendix A reports detailed stock-by-stock results for the one minute evaluation period. 
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is 2.4 cents.  For the control sample, the across-stock mean and median of the average changes in the 
implied bids are only 0.3 and 0.4 cents, respectively, while the 4-th and 36-th values are −0.1 and 0.7 
cents, respectively.  
 The across-stock mean and median changes in the treatment sample option-implied ask quotes 
are somewhat larger, being 8.1 and 7.1 cents, respectively, for the one minute evaluation period.  For 
the control sample, the corresponding across-stock mean change in the implied ask is 2.7 cents, 
reflecting some spread widening.19  Thus, the average difference in the implied ask quote between the 
treatment and control samples is 8.1 – 2.7 = 5.4 cents, larger than the initial mispricing.  This average 
difference of 5.4 cents is also large relative to the average price of less than two dollars for the at-the-
money for call and put options that appear in the sample.20   
If the stock followed the options, the average changes in the stock midpoints in the treatment 
sample would be negative, and less than the corresponding average changes for the control sample. 
Inconsistent with this hypothesis, the across-stock mean and median average changes in the stock 
midpoint are both 0.1 cents, while in the control sample, the across-stock mean and median changes are 
both −0.2 cents. The 4-th and 36-th largest treatment sample average changes also exceed the 
corresponding average changes in the control sample.  In fact, while not shown in the table, for every 
stock the average change in the stock midpoint in the treatment sample exceeds  the average change in 
the control sample.  Together with the results for the option-implied quotes, these results imply that for 
the {P>IP}-type disagreements the options follow the stock and the stock does not follow the options. 
The right-hand half of the table presents the corresponding average quote changes for the 
{IP>P}-type disagreements.  The across-stock means and medians of the stock-by-stock average 
changes in the option-implied bid and ask are now negative and less than the corresponding control 
sample across-stock means and medians, implying that in this case also the options follow the stocks.  
(Recall that for the {IP>P}-type disagreements the option-implied stock prices exceed the actual stock 
prices, so that if the options follow the stock the average changes in the option-implied bid and ask 
prices will be negative.)   The across-stock mean change in the implied bid is −7.7 cents, close to the 
magnitude of the across-stock mean change in the implied ask of 8.1 cents for the {P>IP}-type 
disagreements, and the across-stock mean change in the implied bid is −4.6 cents, close to the 
magnitude of the across-stock mean change in the implied bid of 4.8 cents for the {P>IP}-type 
                                                 
19 Disagreements are more likely to occur when the option-implied bid-ask spread is smaller than average.  Because the 
option-implied bid-ask spread is used in identifying the matching observations in the control sample, the control sample 
includes observations of smaller than average option-implied bid-ask spread, and some spread widening is to be expected. 
20 Through the put-call parity relationship S = C – P + PV(K), the change in the option-implied stock price S is equal to the 
change in the difference between the call and put prices C – P. 
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disagreements.  The across-stock mean change in stock prices is zero and less than the across-stock 
change in the control sample, inconsistent with the hypothesis that the stocks follow the options.  
Overall, this table produces strong evidence that if prices disagree, the options market adjusts to 
eliminate mispricing, and the stock market does not adjust.  It seems worth emphasizing that the 
average changes in the option prices are large, and typically larger than the extent of the disagreement, 
while the average change in stock prices are close to zero.  To the extent that the average changes in 
stock prices are non-zero, the stock prices move to widen the disagreement rather than reduce it.  
 The results for the 30-second evaluation period show that the results are not sensitive to the 
length of the evaluation period.  Consistent with the previous results based on a one-minute evaluation 
period, the treatment sample changes in the option-implied quotes are positive and greater than the 
corresponding changes in the control sample for the {P>IP}-type disagreements, while the treatment 
sample changes in the option-implied quotes are negative and smaller than the corresponding changes 
in the control sample for the {IP>P}-type disagreements.   Unsurprisingly, the magnitudes of the 
average changes are smaller for the shorter 30-second evaluation period.  Also consistent with the 
previous results, the average changes in the actual stock prices are close to zero. 
1.5.3 Conditional Mean Differences in the Primary Sample 
The high-frequency data provides control observations that match very closely the 
characteristics of the treatment observations.  Nonetheless, the matching is not perfect.  In such 
circumstances, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) suggest controlling for the differences between the 
treatment and control samples by estimating regressions that include as covariates the variables used in 
matching the samples.  Following this advice, we use a vector of control variables X consisting of the 
three variables used in matching (the option-implied bid-ask spread at the beginning of the event, and 
the 2-minute and 10-second pre-event returns on the underlying stock) and an additional variable 
consisting of the signed order imbalance in the stock during the two minutes prior to the beginning of 
the event. We estimate the regressions (3)-(5) separately for each underlying stock and ETF. 
  Table 1.3 presents some summary information about the 39 estimates of the dummy variable for 
the implied bid, implied ask, and stock midpoint based on both the 30-second and one minute 
evaluation periods. It shows the means and medians across stocks of the stock-by-stock estimates of the 
dummy variable, and also presents the 4th and 36th estimates, and the associated t-statistics.   In the 
column headed “Mean,” the t-statistic is the mean of the t-statistics for the 39 stocks and ETFs.  The 
other columns report the t-statistic of the median, 4th, and 36th estimates, respectively.  Again the left-
hand side of the table is for the {P>IP}-type disagreements, while the right-hand side is for the {IP>P}-
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type disagreements. For the {P>IP}-type and using the one-minute evaluation period, for the implied 
ask the mean across stocks of the estimates is 5.2 cents, and the estimates varies from 3.7 cents for the 
4-th to 7.2 cents for the 36-th.  The mean of the dummy coefficient estimates for the implied bid is 4.5 
cents, only slightly smaller than the coefficient estimate in the regression explaining the ask quote. 
Thus, an option market marker moves both bid and ask by similar amounts, conditional on matching 
variables. These estimates are highly significantly different from zero at conventional levels, though 
one should recognize that the sample consists of 324,096 observations.   
For the actual stock midpoint, the mean of the coefficient estimates is 0.2 cents, with an average 
t-statistic of only 1.8 despite the large sample size.  Importantly, to the extent that the movement of the 
stock price is non-zero this provides evidence that the actual stock price moves in the direction of 
increasing the disagreement, not decreasing it.  For the {IP>P}-type, the results are again the mirror 
image of those for the {P>IP}-type disagreements.  
1.5.4 Mean and Conditional Mean Differences in the Broader 
Sample 
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the results for mean differences and conditional mean differences in 
the broader sample of about 4.5 million disagreement events.   An important difference between the 
results in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 and the corresponding results for the primary sample in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 
is that in the broader sample we do not use the option quotes to compute option-implied bid and ask 
prices for the stock, but rather work with the actual option bid and ask prices.  Thus, in the analysis of 
the broader sample the regression models (1.3) and (1.5) for the option-implied ask and bid (of the 
stock) are replaced by regression models for the option ask and bid, 
ττ ε ++ +++=− tttt t XaDaa        AskOption  AskOption 210 ,                            (1.6) 
and 
ττ ε ++ +++=− tttt t XaDaa        BidOption  BidOption 210 .                            (1.7) 
Table 1.4 shows the means and medians across stocks of the stock-by-stock average changes in 
the option bid, option ask, and stock midpoint, and also presents the 4th and 36th  average changes, for 
both 30-second and one-minute evaluation periods.    Again the left-hand side of the table is for the 
{P>IP}-type disagreements, while the right-hand side is for the {IP>P}-type disagreements.  For the 
{P>IP}-type disagreements increases in the option ask price will resolve the disagreements, and we see 
mean changes in the ask of 3.3 and 3.8 cents for the 30-second and one-minute evaluation periods, 
respectively.  These changes in the ask quotes are much larger than the corresponding changes in the 
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control sample, which reflect some spread widening.21 Changes in the implied bid are smaller but still 
positive, in contrast to the (small) negative changes in the control sample that reflect spread widening.  
For the {IP>P}-type disagreements decreases in the option bid price will resolve the disagreements, 
and we see mean changes in the ask of −3.5 and −4.0 cents for the 30-second and one-minute 
evaluation periods, respectively, which are larger than the corresponding changes in the control sample.  
Changes in the option ask are smaller, but negative, and contrast with the positive changes in the 
control sample.  Also consistent with the previous results, the changes in the actual stock prices are 
close to zero, and not meaningfully different from the changes in the control sample. 
Table 1.5 presents summary information about the 39 estimates of the dummy variable in 
regressions with control variables that explain the option bid, option ask, and stock midpoint, for both 
the 30-second and one minute evaluation periods.  The control variables are the four variables used in 
matching, these being option bid-ask spread, the 2-minute pre-event stock return, the square root of the 
days remaining to option expiration, and the option delta.  For the {P>IP}-type events the inclusion of 
the control variables somewhat increases and decreases the magnitudes of the estimated changes in the 
option bid and ask, respectively, and for the {P>IP}-type events it somewhat decreases and increases 
the magnitudes of the estimated changes in the option bid and ask, respectively.  However, the 
conclusion that the disagreements lead to economically significant changes in the option quotes is not 
affected.  Also consistent with previous results, the mean and median of the dummy variables for the 
estimated changes in the actual stock midpoints are zero. 
1.5.5 Signed Volume During Price Disagreement Events 
We expect to see some “arbitrage” trading during disagreement events. For the {P>IP}-type 
disagreements, we expect that arbitrageurs will buy call options at their ask prices and perhaps sell puts 
at their bid prices. For the {IP>P}-type disagreements, we expect that arbitrageurs will buy put options 
and sell call options.  In addition to arbitrage trading, there may be trading by patient options traders 
who follow the markets and wait for an opportune time to buy options.    For example, a trader who 
wants to buy a call may recognize that a {P>IP}-type disagreement event is an advantageous time to 
buy.   In looking for such arbitrage and other trading we will measure option trading volume using the 
delta-equivalent share position, i.e. we will compute the delta of each traded option, weight the deltas 
by the trade sizes, and sum the quantity-weighed deltas to obtain an estimate of the delta-equivalent 
                                                 
21 Disagreements are more likely to occur when the option bid-ask spread is smaller than average.  Because the bid-ask 
spread is used in identifying the matching observations in the control sample, the control sample includes observations of 
smaller than average bid-ask spread, and some spread widening is to be expected. 
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share position traded in the options market.   
In a frictionless market we would also expect to observe trades in the underlying stock.  But 
markets are not frictionless, and the evidence above indicates that the stock leg of the “arbitrage” trade 
will break even or perhaps lose money22 before transaction costs, and thus lose money after 
transactions costs.  Thus, traders may elect to trade only in the options and not the stock, and there is no 
prediction about stock trading during the disagreement events.   Because the disagreements tend to 
close quickly there is relatively little need to buy or sell stock to hedge any options trades, suggesting 
that there might be no unusual stock trading volume during the disagreement events. 
For these reasons we focus on option trading volume during the disagreement events.  We 
expect to see positive delta-equivalent volume during the {P>IP}-type disagreement events and 
negative delta-equivalent volume during the {IP>P}-type disagreement events.  
Table 1.6 presents some summary statistics for the signed volume in the stocks and the delta-
equivalent signed volume in the options for the treatment and control samples for evaluation periods of 
30 and 60 seconds. The statistics are constructed in the following way.  First, the mean signed volume 
and delta-equivalent option volume during the events are estimated for each stock.  The table then 
reports the equally-weighted mean and median of the stock-by-stock means, along with the fourth and 
36-th largest of the stock-by-stock means.  The table reports the statistics for the signed volume in the 
underlying stock, delta-equivalent signed volume in all options on the underlying stock, and delta-
equivalent signed volume in the pair of options that triggered the disagreement. The results for the 
{P>IP}-type events are shown in the left half of the table, while those for the {IP>P}-type events 
appear on the right.   
Table 1.7 is similar to Table 1.6, except that it presents total rather than signed volumes. 
The option volume follows the predictions above.  For the {P>IP}-type disagreements, during 
the first 30 seconds following the beginning of the disagreement, options traders on average buy the 
equivalent of 3,600 shares, which is much greater than the delta-equivalent option volume in the 
control sample. The difference in the median, 4th, and 36th highest delta-equivalent option volumes are 
also large.  The second panel of the table shows the volumes only in the option pair that triggered the 
disagreement indicates that about half of the option volume occurs in the call-put pair that triggered the 
disagreement.   Comparing the volumes during the 30 and 60-second evaluation periods, one can see 
that for the treatment sample most of the option volume occurs during the first 30 seconds following 
the beginning of the disagreement.  Comparing the signed volumes in Table 6 to the total volumes in 
                                                 
22 The estimates of the stock price movement indicate that the stock prices have a slight tendency to move so as to widen the 
disagreements, indicating the stock leg of the transaction will tend to lose money. 
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Table 1.7, one can see that signed volumes are a large fraction of total volume, especially for the 
disagreement pair.   
The results for the delta-equivalent signed option volume during the {IP>P}-type disagreements 
shown in the right-hand side of the table are similar, except that the signed volumes are negative rather 
than positive because for these events the option-implied price exceeds the actual stock price. Also, 
because the delta-equivalent signed volumes are negative the magnitudes of the volumes in the 4th 
highest volume stock exceed those in the 36th highest volume stock.  Again, signed volumes are large 
fractions of total volumes, especially for the disagreement pair. 
Turning to the signed volume in the actual stocks, for the {P>IP}-type disagreements, the mean 
(of the stock-by-stock means) signed volume is slightly lower in the treatment sample than in the 
control sample, but the median in the treatment sample is larger.  The same is true for the {IP>P}-type 
events.  In all cases, these mean and median signed volumes are small relative to the corresponding 
total volumes in Table 1.7.    These results are not suggestive of significant “arbitrage” trading in the 
stocks during the disagreement events. 
The bottom panels of Tables 1.6 and 1.7 show signed and total volume in the 2-minute pre-
event periods.  Consistent with earlier results for pre-event returns, there is positive and negative signed 
volume in the {P>IP} and {IP>P}-type events, respectively, in both the treatment and control samples.  
This similarity between the treatment and control samples should be unsurprising, because the 2-
minute pre-event return was used in matching.  Combined with the findings for the delta-equivalent 
option volume, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that disagreements are triggered by 
signed volume in the underlying stocks, and then closed following delta-equivalent signed volume in 
the options. 
1.6  Analysis of Various Subsamples 
1.6.1 Subsamples in which One Might Expect to Find Different 
Results 
The stock market initiates 88% of the disagreement events in the sense that, in 88% of the 
events, a stock market quote update is the proximate cause of the disagreement.  It is reasonable to 
hypothesize that the 12% of events that are initiated by the options market might have different 
characteristics.  Specifically, in these events it might be the case that the actual stock price moves 
toward the options market quotes, i.e. that price discovery occurs in the options market.  
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Column 2 of Table 1.8 shows the estimates of the coefficient on the disagreement dummy in 
regressions including the control variables explaining the implied bid, implied ask, and observed stock 
midpoint for the subset of disagreement events that are initiated by the options market.23 For 
comparison, the corresponding results for the full sample are shown in column 1.  In the top panel 
showing the results for the {P>IP}-type disagreements one can see that the change in the implied ask is 
4.5 cents, not much different from the change of 5.1 cents in the full sample.  The change in the actual 
stock midpoint is −0.1 cents, which is close to zero and not significantly different from zero.  In the 
bottom panel showing the results for the {IP>P}-type disagreements the change in the implied bid is 
−6.5 cents, actually of greater magnitude than the −5.8 cent change for the full sample.   The change in 
the actual stock midpoint is 0.1 cents, close to zero and not statistically different from zero.  These 
results indicate that even when the disagreement is initiated by the options market, the options market 
moves in a direction that tends to close the disagreement, and there is only a very small change in the 
stock price.24  Results for signed volume reported in Appendix A reveal the presence of signed option 
trading volume in the direction that tends to close the disagreements, though the magnitudes are not as 
large as in the full sample.   
Earnings announcements are a time when important value-relevant information is often 
released.  Perhaps the options market participates more in price discovery in the period immediately 
prior to earnings announcements?   
Table 1.8, column 3, shows the conditional average changes in the option-implied quotes and 
stock midpoint for the subset of disagreement events that occur in the two trading days prior to 
earnings announcements.   For both the {P>IP}-type and {IP>P}-type disagreements, the changes in 
both the option-implied bid and ask are similar to but slightly larger than the corresponding changes in 
the full sample.  The changes in the stock midpoint are also similar to those in the full sample.  
Recalling that in the full sample the stock price changes tend to increase rather than decrease the 
magnitude of the disagreement, this result for the stock price changes is evidence that the options 
markets do not participate in price discovery in the period immediately prior to earnings 
announcements. The point estimates for signed option volume for this subsample reported in Appendix 
A are very similar to those for the full sample, though the t-statistics are smaller because of the smaller 
sample size. 
We also consider the possibility that the markets’ reactions to large stock returns differs from 
the reaction in the full sample, perhaps because large stock returns tend to be overreactions to 
                                                 
23 We obtained similar results in untabulated regressions that do not include the control variables. 
24 The coefficient on the disagreement dummy is zero in untabulated robust regressions. 
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information.  If this is the case, one might expect to see stock price reversals in which stock prices 
move toward the unchanged or less changed option market quotes.  This would be consistent with some 
price discovery occurring in the options markets.   
Column 4 headed “Pre-Event Return >0.3%” shows the conditional average changes in the 
implied bid, implied ask, and observed stock midpoint for the subset of disagreement events for which 
the return (for the {P>IP}-type events) or its negative  (for the {IP>P}-type events) during the two 
minutes prior to the beginning of the disagreement event exceeded 0.3%.  The results here are very 
similar to those in column 3 for the two days prior to earnings announcements.   For both disagreement 
types, the changes in both the option-implied quotes and stock price midpoint are similar to but larger 
than the corresponding changes in the full sample.   The estimates for signed volume for this subsample 
are very similar to those for the full sample (see Appendix A).  
Options market liquidity increased during the sample period, suggesting that perhaps more price 
discovery might have occurred in the options market during the second half of the sample period.  
Column 5 of Table 1.8 addresses this hypothesis by presenting results for the subset of disagreement 
events that occurred during and after 2004.  The average quote changes for this subsample are very 
close to the averages for the full sample shown in Column 1, providing no evidence of any change over 
time in the amount of price discovery occurring in the options market.    
Using a VECM, Holowczak, Simaan, and Wu (2006) present evidence indicating that options 
quotes are more informative during periods in which there are either large numbers of options trades or 
significant signed order flow in the options market.  Column 6 of Table 1.8 explores whether our 
methodology also finds a greater informational role of options quotes during periods of high option 
volume by looking at the subsample of price disagreement events that occurred on days in which 
option trading volume exceeded the 80th percentile of daily option trading volume for that underlying 
stock.  Greater movement of the actual stock price quotes toward the option-implied quotes would 
indicate a greater informational role for the options quotes.  Focusing on the rows in Panels A and B 
labeled “Stock” and comparing the results in column 6 to the results for the full sample in column 1, in 
both the {P>IP} and {IP>P}-type disagreement events the point estimates in column 6 are similar to 
those in column 1, and continue to show a slight tendency for the stock price to move away from, 
rather than toward, the option quotes.  Turning to the results for the options in the rows labeled 
“Implied Bid” and “Implied Ask,” there is either identical or greater movement of the option quotes 
toward the actual stock price quotes than is found in the full sample results reported in column 1.   At 
the risk of over-interpreting the point estimates, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that  
high option trading volume makes option quotes more informative in the sense that they catch up with 
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stock price quotes more quickly, but not that they lead stock price quotes. 
  Harris (2003, p. 373) indicates that some arbitrage opportunities arise when liquidity demand in 
one market causes prices in that market to deviate from their fundamental values.  This suggests the 
possibility that options quotes might be relatively more informative immediately following order 
imbalances in the stock market.25  Column 7 of Table 1.8 explores this possibility by examining the 
subset of events for which the ratio of the signed stock market volume (or its negative, for the {IP>P}-
type events) to total stock volume in the two minutes preceding the event exceeds 0.5.  The results in 
both Panels A and B show that for this subsample the changes in the option-implied bid, option-implied 
ask, and actual stock midpoint are very similar to those in the full sample.     
We conclude that the finding that the options market does not participate in price discovery 
about the level of the stock price is a robust one that is found in different subsamples in which it 
plausibly might not have been found.  Given this, we turn to an examination of potential data concerns. 
1.6.2 Are the Quotes Good? 
 As is often the case in the analysis of high-frequency data, data issues are a potential concern. 
In particular, we calculate price disagreement based on the reported NBBO at each moment, but are the 
reported quotes valid?  Can option market participants actually trade at the reported quotes?  While 
“backing away” from quotes is not a concern with fully electronic exchanges, the frequency of 
disagreement events is relatively low.  It is conceivable that some fraction of the measured 
disagreement events could be the result of data or data transmission errors, and that such data errors 
could impact the results.26   
 Before turning to examining the subsamples of likely valid quotes are which option market 
participants can actually trade, it is worth emphasizing that the striking evidence of delta-equivalent 
signed option volume during the disagreement events discussed above is inconsistent with the 
                                                 
25 Order imbalances in the stock market might be symptomatic of information trade in the stock market, not liquidity 
demand.  But conditional on the alternative hypothesis that option market quotes are informative, these may be events in 
which the option market quotes contain relatively more information. 
26 To understand why data issues can produce spurious results similar to ours, consider an example. Imagine that options 
are identified by a call-put indicator, maturity date and strike without looking at the option  name. Surprisingly, in actual 
data this method can pick more than one option contract. For example, two Citibank call options C_AJ and KYV_AJ have 
the same strike and maturity but substantially different prices. On January 06, 2004, the first was traded at 0.45/0.5$ while 
the second was traded at 2.1/2.2 $.  The trick is that the second option has special settlement conditions, and its effective 
strike is different from the stated strike.  Thus, almost every quote update for the second option will trigger an apparent 
price disagreement event. Then, the next quote update for the first option will “eliminate” this false price disagreement. 
There is no difference in informationit is simply data feature that can produce results similar to those in this paper.  Less 
than 2% of the total number of option contracts in our sample has a special settlement and usually the difference in prices is 
not so dramatic.  But, because actual price disagreement events are infrequent, such events could account for a significant 
fraction of the total number of events. Had we not filtered out such events, this issue could have produced spurious results.  
 
30 
 
hypothesis that our results are due to quotes that are not valid because of data errors or other reasons.  
 We use two approaches to identity quotes that are highly likely to be valid.  First, an option best 
bid (ask) is called “trade confirmed” if there have been trades at exactly this price while the bid (ask) 
remains the best bid (ask), but not earlier than 200 seconds before the disagreement event. A problem 
arises because to “trade confirm” an option- implied stock quote, one should confirm both the call and 
put quotes that are inputs to the call-put parity relation. As trading is not frequent in options, this quote 
confirmation reduces the sample size by a factor of about seven. Note, however, that we do not need 
four options quotes to confirm both the option-implied ask and the option-implied bid, as only one 
quote is of interest when prices disagree. For example, for the {P > IP}-type it suffices to trade confirm 
only the option-implied ask quote. 
 A second way to verify quote validity is to consider only quotes displayed by multiple 
exchanges. For example, if both the ISE and CBOE report a bid of 1.15, it is more credible than if only 
the CBOE displays this price. We call an option-implied stock price “two exchange confirmed” if both 
the call and put quotes used in the put-call parity relation are reported by at least two exchanges. As 
should be expected, this requirement considerably reduces the number of disagreement events that are 
identified.  Option market makers have a strong incentive not to quote call and put prices that are 
inconsistent with the underlying stock price.  The frequency with which market makers at two or more 
option market makers quote option prices inconsistent with the stock prices is much less than the 
frequency with which at least one options market maker does so. 
 Trade and quote confirmations can be combined to increase the sample size. For example, a 
call price can be “trade confirmed” while a put price is “quote confirmed.”  We use this approach to 
increase the size of the sample of confirmed quotes.  
 Columns 8, 9, and 10 in Table 1.8 show results for the subsamples in which both the call and 
put prices used in the put-call parity are “trade confirmed,” both the call and put prices are “quote 
confirmed,” and for the combined case in which the call and put prices are either “trade confirmed” or 
“quote confirmed.”  In each case, we also use only correspondingly confirmed control observations. 
The results are similar to those obtained with the full sample.  Estimates of the stock price changes are 
close to zero, and the point estimates indicate that the stock price tends to move to slightly widen the 
disagreement, continuing to indicate that the stock price does not participate in price discovery.   
1.6.3 Differing Latencies across Markets 
We also entertain the hypothesis that there can be a systematic difference in the latencies in 
31 
 
different markets. 27  Specifically, is it possible that we find that the options market follows the stock 
market simply because latency is possibly much larger in the options market?  Three considerations 
make this seem unlikely. First, we are not aware or any systematic or anecdotal evidence that latencies 
across modern electronic exchanges differ by more than 10 milliseconds. Second, we have no reason to 
suspect that our data provider introduced additional latency or time-stamp errors. The data provider 
time-stamped the different quotes as they hit the vendor’s server, using a single clock. Moreover, our 
data provider’s business consists of vending real-time data to various high-frequency trading desks, and 
thus has strong incentives to minimize both latency and errors.  Third, the hypothesis that the 
disagreement events are spuriously created due to differing latencies across the options and stock 
markets implies that we should not observe significant signed volume pressure in the direction that 
would eliminate the disagreements. Thus, the signed volume results are a compelling piece of evidence 
that our results are not spurious.  
Nonetheless, we address this potential data problem by considering the subsample of treatment 
events in which the option-implied quotes that triggered the disagreement do not change for at least 10 
seconds after the event is triggered, and examine the quote changes over a one minute evaluation 
period. Differing latencies between the options and stock markets cannot drive the results for this 
subsample, because 10 seconds exceeds any plausible difference in latencies. 
The results for this subsample are shown in column 11 headed “>10 sec duration.”   Similar to 
the results in the full sample, the coefficient estimate for the dummy variable in the regression 
predicting stock price changes indicates a slight tendency for the stock price to move to widen the 
disagreement, again providing evidence the options market does not participate in price discovery.   
Also, similar to previous results, the option quotes move toward the stock price.  However, in this 
subsample the magnitudes of the coefficients are not as large as in the full sample or most of the other 
subsamples.  This result that the average movement in the option quotes is not as large in this 
subsample is unsurprising, because the criteria used to select this subsample was that the option quotes 
do not change for at least 10 seconds.  Thus, this subsample is likely to be overrepresented with events 
from market conditions in which quotes are less likely to change.  
                                                 
27 We do not have to be concerned about the possibility that different exchanges use clocks that might not always agree.  
The data vendor time-stamps the different quotes as they hit the vendor’s server, using a single clock.    Thus, the only issue 
is the possibility of different latencies at different exchanges.   
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1.7  Results for the Hasbrouck Information Share Measure 
of Price Discovery 
 The Hasbrouck (1995) information share is a widely used measure of the proportion of price 
discovery that happens in each of two or more related markets.   As discussed in Section 2, there is a 
literature that uses this measure to study the proportions of price discovery about the level of stock 
prices that takes place in the option markets.  
 In the context of studying option market price discovery, the information share is based on a 
vector error-correcting model (VECM) of changes in two price series, the actual stock price and an 
option-implied stock price computed from option prices.  We compute the option-implied stock price 
using the put-call parity relation and bid-ask midpoints.  The use of bid-ask midpoints is standard in the 
information share literature and our use of the put-call parity relation is consistent with our approach to 
analyzing the primary sample above, though in the analysis of the primary sample we did not use 
midpoints but rather took account of the bid-ask spread.  Letting 2ℜ∈∆ tp be a vector of the changes in 
the two prices, the VECM has a moving average representation28  
...22110 +++=∆ −− tttt BBBp εεε , 
where 2ℜ∈tε is a vector of zero-mean innovations with covariance matrix Ω, 
22×
ℜ∈iB is a matrix of 
moving average coefficients, and IB =0 , the identity matrix.   Letting B denote the limit of the sum of 
the moving average coefficient matrices 
∑
=
∞→
=
k
i
i
k
BB
1
lim ,                                                                 (1.8) 
the two rows of B are identical.  Letting the vector b be either of the rows, the variance of the 
permanent component of the quotes is bb ′Ω=2σ .  If Ω is diagonal, the information share of the j-th 
market is defined as  
2
2
σ
jjj
j
b
IS
Ω
= .                                                                  (1.9) 
If Ω is not diagonal, the information share is not uniquely defined.  Upper and lower bounds on the 
information share can be computed by considering Cholesky factorizations of all possible rotations of 
the innovations. 
In estimating the VECM we use price quotes observed at one-second frequency and 200 lags, 
                                                 
28 See, e.g. Hasbrouck (1995) and Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004). 
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and we  include k = 5,000 moving average matrices in the sum in equation (1.8).  Even with 5,000 
terms the two rows of the matrix B in equation (1.8) fail to agree in about one percent of the day-by-
day estimations we describe below.29  In these cases we do not compute the option market information 
share. 
 We compute two different sets of estimates of the upper and lower bounds on the option market 
information shares of the 39 stocks and ETFs.   First, we follow the literature and for each stock 
compute estimates of the upper and lower bounds for each day.  One reason to compute day-by-day 
estimates of the information share upper and lower bonds is that the VECM underlying the information 
share measure may not be stable over time.  The second column of  Table 1.9 reports, for each stock, 
the number of daily estimates that were computed.  The numbers of daily estimates computed are not 
all equal to the maximum number of 864 because (i) some stocks dropped from the sample before the 
end of the sample period, (ii) for some stock-days there is no call-put pair that passes the filters (a)-(d) 
described in Section 4.1, and (iii) for some stock-days the estimates of the rows of the matrix B do not 
converge even when including 5,000 terms in the sum in equation (1.8).  For each of the 39 stocks, the 
third and fourth columns of Table 1.9 report the means and medians, respectively, of these day-by-day 
estimates of the upper bounds, while the sixth and seventh columns report the means and medians of 
the day-by-day estimates of the lower bounds.  The fifth and eighth columns report the standard 
deviations of the daily estimates for each of the stocks.  The last three rows of the table reports the 
means, minimums, and maximums across the 39 stocks of the various stock-by-stock statistics. 
Second, we also pool the data for each stock and compute a single estimate of the upper bound 
and a single estimate of the lower bound for each of the 39 stocks.30  These estimates of the upper and 
lower bounds based on the pooled data for each stock are shown in the two rightmost columns of Table 
1.9.  A disadvantage of these estimates computed from the pooled data for each stock is that they 
involve the assumption that the VECM is stable over time. On the other hand, if the VECM is stable 
over time, the information share estimates based on the pooled data will be closer to their probability 
limits.  If the actual option market information shares are zero or close to zero, these estimates might be 
less biased than the means or medians of the day-by-day estimates.31 
  The left-hand part of the table showing the results for the day-by-day estimates reveals that for 
                                                 
29 With k < 500 we consistently obtained different estimates of the two rows of B.  Our experience suggests that option 
market information share estimates computed from rows of a matrix B that have failed to converge are upward-biased.  Note 
that when the true information share is zero, any error, e.g. the use of rows of B that have failed to converge, results in an 
upward-biased estimate. 
30 To avoid close-to-open “jumps” in stock prices, each day’s stock prices were normalized so that the opening price was 
equal to the previous closing price. 
31 Because the information share is by construction between 0 and 1, when the “true” option market information share is 
zero estimates of it are upward biased. 
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most stocks the means of the day-by-day estimates of both the upper and lower bounds of the option 
market information share are in single digits, i.e. less than 10%.   The medians of the day-by-day 
estimates are below the means for every stock and usually considerably below the means, consistent 
with right-skewed distributions of the day-by-day information share estimates for most of the stocks.  
Examining the last three rows of the table, one can see that the mean, minimum, and maximum of the 
stock-by-stock medians of the information share upper bounds are 2.9%, 1.6%, and 6.8%.   The mean, 
minimum, and maximum of the stock-by-stock means of the information share upper bounds are larger, 
with the mean of the stock-by-stock means being 6.7% and the maximum being 18.7%.  The statistics 
summarizing the estimates of the lower bounds are of course smaller than the corresponding statistics 
for the upper bounds.  
These generally single-digit estimates of the option market information share obtained from 
day-by-day estimation of the upper and lower bounds are smaller than those reported in most of the 
literature.  The estimates of the information share upper and lower bounds obtained by pooling the data 
for each stock are even lowerthe means across stocks of the upper and lower bounds are 2.1% and 
1.1%, respectively, while the maximums are 10.1% and 6.8%.  While it is not clear whether one should 
prefer the day-by-day or pooled estimates, the two sets of estimates present a consistent picture of 
single-digit option market information shares.    This evidence of some limited option market price 
discovery based on a statistical metric, the Hasbrouck information share, is consistent with the 
evidence of no economically significant option market price discovery reported in the main results of 
this paper, as it is not unusual for researchers to find evidence of statistically significant but 
economically insignificant predictability in financial markets.   Our finding of single-digit option 
market information share also helps reconcile our results with those in the earlier literature, e.g. 
Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004)option market price discovery appears to have declined 
since the sample period used in that paper.   While the option market information share has not declined 
to zero, it has declined to a level that seems consistent with no economically significant option market 
price discovery. 
1.8  Conclusion 
This paper focuses on events in which the stock and options markets disagree about the stock 
price in the sense that the option-implied stock price obtained from the put-call parity relation differs 
from the actual stock price.  During these disagreement events, the movement of the stock price is 
virtually identical to the movement of the stock price in otherwise similar events during which there is 
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no disagreement about the underlying stock prices.   Our findings about both the magnitudes of the 
quote changes during disagreement events provide information about the economic significance of the 
statistical predictability found in the literature using VECMs, and therefore complements this literature.  
Our results provide compelling evidence that option price quotes do not contain any economically 
significant information that has not already been reflected in the stock market price quotes, and thus 
that in this sense option price quotes do not participate in the price discovery process for the underlying 
stock price.  In contrast, during the price disagreement events the option-implied stock price quotes 
move toward the actual stock price quotes.   
We also use a much larger sample based on a weaker definition of a price disagreement, and 
obtain similar results in that much larger sample. 
In 88% of the primary sample disagreement events, the disagreement is precipitated by a 
movement in the underlying stock price quotes.  During more than one-half of the events, there is 
signed order flow in the options market in the direction that will tend to push the option-implied stock 
price quotes in the direction of the actual stock prices.  In some of the disagreement events, the signed 
order flow in the options market is large, consistent with some option market participants aggressively 
trading at option price quotes that have been rendered stale by the stock price movement.   
Our main results are also found in the subsample of events for which the disagreement was 
precipitated by a change in an option price quote, subsamples in which the option price quotes are 
confirmed by either trades at the quotes or the presence of an identical quote at another exchange, and a 
subsample in which the results are almost certain not to be driven by differences in latency across the 
two markets. 
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1.9 Figures and Tables 
Figure 1.1  Illustration of a Price Disagreement Event.  Through time 10:00:36.200 ABC’s ask 
price is greater than or equal to $60.00 and the option-implied quotes are $60.00 / $60.10.    At the 
quotes prevailing through 10:00:36.200 the mispricing is only one cent and the disagreement event is 
not triggered.  Then, 200 milliseconds later, at 10:00:36.400, the actual ask quote changes from $59.99 
to $59.98. The threshold of 3 cents is met and an {IP>P}-type price disagreement event is triggered. 
The quotes at 10:01:06.400 and 10:01:36.400 (30 and 60 seconds after the beginning of the 
disagreement event) are used in the analysis of quotes changes subsequent to the disagreement event. 
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Bid 
Time 
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Duration 
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Figure 1.2  Average levels of the normalized actual and option-implied stock prices around the 
disagreement events. The prices are normalized by dividing each price by the overall mean of the implied bid, 
implied ask, and stock midpoint observed at 20-second intervals during the 400-second window.  Red lines are 
for the price disagreement sample and blue lines are for the control sample, while dashed lines are the option-
implied bid and ask price and solid lines are the actual stock bid-ask midpoints.   
 
Panel A: Price > Implied Price 
 
 
Panel B: Price < Implied Price 
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Figure 1.3  Comparisons of the distributions of quote changes for the primary disagreement and control samples. Panels (A-C) compare the 
distributions of changes in the option-implied bid, option-implied ask, and actual stock midpoint for the disagreement and control samples for the {P>IP}-
type disagreements, using an evaluation period of one minute.  In each panel, the distribution of quote changes in the disagreement sample is represented by 
the light-shaded bars, while the distribution of quote changes in the control sample is represented by the dark-shaded bars.  Panels (D-F) compare the 
distributions of changes in the option-implied bid, option-implied ask, and actual stock midpoint quotes between the disagreement and control samples for 
the {IP>P}-type disagreements.  In all cases quote changes are measured in U.S. dollars. Panels A, B, D, and E use a bin size of 5 cents, which is the tick 
size in the options market.  Panels C and F showing the distribution of changes in the stock midpoint use a bin size of 2 cents 
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Table 1.1  Summary statistics for the 36 stocks and 3 ETFs in the primary sample.   The median duration 
is the time (in seconds) from when a disagreement event is triggered to the first time the actual stock quotes 
return inside the option-implied quotes. The implied spread is the difference between the option-implied ask and 
bid quotes, each computed using the call-put parity relations (1) and (2), in cents.  It is computed from the option 
quotes prevailing at the moment a disagreement event is triggered.  The pre-event returns are computed from 
stock quote midpoints prevailing when each event is triggered and 2 minutes or 10 seconds before the event, 
respectively, and are reported in percentage points.  The averages in the last row are equal-weighted averages of 
the stock/ETF averages.  Ticker symbols indicated with * dropped before the end of the sample period. 
 
  {P>IP}-type disagreements {IP>P}-type disagreements 
Ticker 
No. of 
Events 
Median 
Duration 
(seconds) 
Mean 
Implied 
Spread 
(cents) 
2-minute 
Pre-event 
Return 
(%) 
10-second 
Pre-event 
Return 
(%) 
No. of 
Events 
Median 
Duration 
(seconds) 
Mean 
Implied 
Spread 
(cents) 
2-minute 
Pre-event 
Return 
(%) 
10-second 
Pre-event 
Return 
(%) 
AIG 845 10.1 12.9 0.18 0.11 838 9.3 13.0 -0.17 -0.11 
AMAT 544 13.4 10.1 0.26 0.13 688 16.2 10.1 -0.30 -0.14 
AMGN 1,862 5.9 12.1 0.18 0.12 2,075 6.4 12.1 -0.18 -0.12 
AMR 407 18.4 10.7 0.47 0.22 443 17.5 10.7 -0.38 -0.19 
AMZN 4,206 5.1 11.7 0.23 0.15 4,223 5.3 11.7 -0.22 -0.15 
AOL* 29 38.8 10.5 0.41 0.28 34 42.7 10.0 -0.20 -0.08 
BMY 137 14.9 10.7 0.19 0.11 159 30.8 10.4 -0.18 -0.08 
BRCM 3,033 3.9 11.4 0.26 0.17 3,260 4.3 11.5 -0.27 -0.18 
C 526 21.6 10.3 0.14 0.07 539 21.9 10.4 -0.14 -0.07 
COF 837 10.7 14.1 0.21 0.12 740 9.0 14.5 -0.20 -0.12 
CPN* 27 53.0 10.0 0.48 0.18 41 73.0 10.0 -0.66 -0.26 
CSCO 474 14.9 10.0 0.24 0.13 603 15.0 10.0 -0.25 -0.13 
DELL 1,518 7.7 10.1 0.21 0.11 1,460 8.5 10.1 -0.20 -0.12 
DIA 266 19.0 20.3 0.07 0.03 231 18.1 19.2 -0.10 -0.04 
EBAY 4,634 6.0 12.8 0.19 0.12 5,241 5.4 12.8 -0.20 -0.13 
EMC 126 30.5 10.2 0.28 0.14 179 37.3 10.4 -0.28 -0.12 
F 44 34.3 10.1 0.26 0.13 66 40.7 10.6 -0.24 -0.11 
GE 255 25.7 10.0 0.14 0.07 279 29.1 10.3 -0.13 -0.06 
GM 1,018 14.0 11.1 0.23 0.13 937 14.3 11.0 -0.20 -0.11 
HD 420 12.6 10.3 0.17 0.10 510 12.7 10.4 -0.20 -0.09 
IBM 791 14.3 12.4 0.12 0.07 843 14.9 12.5 -0.14 -0.07 
INTC 1,190 20.3 10.0 0.21 0.11 1,419 20.1 10.0 -0.23 -0.11 
JPM 410 19.3 10.2 0.15 0.07 425 21.8 10.4 -0.16 -0.08 
KLAC 2,619 5.4 12.2 0.21 0.14 2,678 4.5 12.2 -0.22 -0.15 
MMM 357 11.7 13.1 0.15 0.09 384 9.1 13.1 -0.14 -0.09 
MO 490 12.3 12.1 0.15 0.09 497 16.1 11.9 -0.14 -0.09 
MSFT 719 17.6 10.0 0.19 0.10 849 20.5 10.0 -0.19 -0.10 
MWD* 317 10.6 12.2 0.18 0.11 268 12.8 12.3 -0.17 -0.09 
NXTL* 562 12.9 10.2 0.26 0.17 692 12.0 10.2 -0.29 -0.17 
ORCL 141 23.2 10.1 0.32 0.18 155 18.1 10.0 -0.34 -0.17 
PFE 488 17.9 10.4 0.18 0.10 579 23.8 10.2 -0.16 -0.08 
QCOM 3,277 4.3 11.2 0.22 0.14 3,796 4.2 11.1 -0.22 -0.14 
QLGC 1,887 5.4 12.2 0.26 0.18 1,940 5.6 12.2 -0.26 -0.18 
QQQ* 916 30.0 10.0 0.13 0.05 1,021 33.4 10.0 -0.13 -0.05 
QQQQ 585 5.0 10.1 0.15 0.05 667 4.9 10.1 -0.16 -0.08 
SBC* 61 31.7 10.2 0.24 0.11 53 36.8 10.0 -0.20 -0.09 
SMH 992 16.8 10.5 0.16 0.07 1,000 16.5 10.5 -0.19 -0.08 
TYC 301 19.4 10.3 0.23 0.12 325 23.1 10.2 -0.19 -0.10 
XLNX 1,375 5.9 10.9 0.28 0.17 1,576 5.4 11.0 -0.27 -0.18 
XOM 293 10.3 11.4 0.15 0.09 332 10.0 10.9 -0.15 -0.07 
 Mean 
or sum 
38,979 16.4 11.2 0.22 0.12 42,045 18.3 11.2 -0.22 -0.11 
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Table 1.2 Comparison of mean quote changes in the primary disagreement and control samples for 30-
second and one minute evaluation periods.  The table presents summary information about the mean changes (in 
cents) of the option-implied bid quote, option-implied ask quote, and actual stock midpoint for the disagreement 
and the control samples, for both the {P>IP}-type and {IP>P}-type disagreements.  The columns headed “Mean” 
and “Median” present the mean and median, respectively, across the 39 stocks and ETFs, of the mean quote 
changes computed for the 39 stocks and ETFs.  The columns headed “4-th” and “36-th” present the fourth and 
36
th
 of the mean quote changes across the 39 stocks and ETFs.  The number of disagreements for each stock is 
reported in Table 1.1.  Because each disagreement event is matched to three control events, the control samples 
are three times the sizes of the treatment samples. 
 
 
Variable 
Evaluation 
Period Subsample 
{P > IP}-Type Disagreements  {IP>P}-Type Disagreements 
Mean Median 4-th 36-th  Mean Median 4-th 36-th 
Option-
Implied 
Bid 
30 seconds 
Treatment 4.2 4.1 3.0 5.5  -6.3 -5.7 -10.4 -3.6 
Control 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.5  -2.3 -2.1 -3.9 -1.1 
1 minute 
Treatment 4.8 4.6 4.1 6.1  -7.7 -6.8 -11.7 -5.3 
Control 0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.7   -2.7 -2.6 -4.1 -1.5 
Option-
Implied 
Ask 
30 seconds 
Treatment 6.6 5.8 4.0 9.5  -4.0 -4.1 -5.3 -2.9 
Control 2.3 1.9 0.9 3.8  -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 
1 minute 
Treatment 8.1 7.1 5.3 11.4  -4.6 -4.6 -5.9 -3.3 
Control 2.7 2.6 1.2 4.2   -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 0.2 
Actual 
Stock 
Midpoint 
30 seconds 
Treatment 0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.4  -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.3 
Control -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.2  0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.4 
1 minute 
Treatment 0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.4  0.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.4 
Control -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 0.2   0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.7 
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Table 1.3  Estimates of the mean effect of disagreement in the primary sample, controlling for the three 
variables used in matching and the stock market order imbalance.  The table presents summary information 
about the coefficient estimates on the disagreement dummy in regressions of quote changes on a constant, the 
disagreement dummy, and the three variables used in matching (the option-implied spread and the 2-minute and 
10-second pre-event returns), and a fourth control variable equal to the order imbalance in the stock during the 2-
minute pre-event period.  The columns headed “Mean” and “Median” present the mean and median, 
respectively, across the 39 stocks and ETFs, of the coefficient estimates on the disagreement dummy and their 
associated t-statistics (in parentheses). The columns headed “4-th” and “36-th” present the fourth and 36
th
 the 
coefficient estimates, again with the associated t-statistics. In the column headed “Mean,” the t-statistic is the 
mean of the t-statistics for the 39 stocks and ETFs.  The other columns report the t-statistic of the median, 4
th
, 
and 36
th
 estimates, respectively.  The t-statistics are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
The number of disagreements for each stock is reported in Table 1.1.  Because each disagreement event is 
matched to three control events, sample sizes for individual regressions are four times the number of 
disagreements for each stock reported in Table 1.1. 
 
 
 
Variable 
Evaluation 
Period 
{P > IP}-Type Disagreements  {IP>P}-Type Disagreements 
Mean Median 4-th 36-th  Mean Median 4-th 36-th 
Implied 
Bid 
30 seconds 
3.9 3.6 2.7 5.2  -4.0 -3.6 -5.9 -2.3 
(21.5) (7.5) (19.4) (29.6)   (-20.1)  (-17.2)  (-12.9)  (-8.9) 
1 minute 
4.5 4.3 3.5 5.9  -4.9 -4.4 -7.2 -3.1 
(20.4) (33.5) (13.8) (19.0)    (-20.9)  (-31.8)  (-23.4)  (-4.1) 
Implied 
Ask 
30 seconds 
4.2 3.7 2.7 6.2  -3.8 -3.8 -5.2 -2.6 
(19.1) (7.1) (3.5) (16.2)   (-22.2)  (-22.0)  (-52.5)  (-4.5) 
1 minute 
5.2 4.4 3.7 7.2  -4.5 -4.3 -5.9 -3.4 
(20.5) (31.6) (29.2) (14.6)    (-20.9)  (-35.0)  (-30.7)  (-6.4) 
Actual 
Stock 
Midpoint 
30 seconds 
0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.7  -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 0.3 
(2.0) (0.5)  (-1.3) (7.1)   (-2.2)  (-2.7)  (-6.8) (2.1) 
1 minute 
0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.7  -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 0.2 
(1.8) (1.6)  (-0.9) (3.8)    (-2.0)  (-2.1)  (-5.5) (0.5) 
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Table 1.4 Comparison of mean quote changes in the broader disagreement and control samples for 30-
second and one minute evaluation periods.  The table presents summary information about the mean changes (in 
cents) of the option-implied bid quote, option-implied ask quote, and actual stock midpoint for the disagreement 
and the control samples, for both the {P>IP}-type and {IP>P}-type disagreements.  The columns headed “Mean” 
and “Median” present the mean and median, respectively, across the 39 stocks and ETFs, of the mean quote 
changes computed for the 39 stocks and ETFs.  The columns headed “4-th” and “36-th” present the fourth and 
36
th
 mean quote changes across the 39 stocks and ETFs.  The number of {P > IP}-type disagreements per 
underlying stock range from 2,551 to 199,122, and the number of {IP > P}-type disagreements per underlying 
stock range from 2,551 to 195,500. Because each disagreement event is matched to three control events, the 
control samples are three times the sizes of the treatment samples. 
 
Variable 
Evaluation 
Period Subsample 
{P > IP}-Type Disagreements  {IP>P}-Type Disagreements 
Mean Median 4-th 36-th  Mean Median 4-th 36-th 
Option 
Bid 
30 seconds 
Treatment 1.1 1.1 0.7 1.7  -3.5 -3.4 -5.1 -2.1 
Control -0.5 -0.4 -0.9 -0.2  -0.6 -0.6 -1.1 -0.2 
1 minute 
Treatment 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.9  -4.0 -4.0 -5.5 -2.6 
Control -0.7 -0.6 -1.2 -0.3   -0.8 -0.7 -1.4 -0.3 
Option 
Ask 
30 seconds 
Treatment 3.3 3.2 1.9 4.7  -1.1 -1.2 -1.8 -0.6 
Control 0.6 0.5 0.2 1.0  0.5 0.4 0.2 0.9 
1 minute 
Treatment 3.8 3.7 2.4 5.3  -1.4 -1.4 -2.1 -0.8 
Control 0.8 0.7 0.3 1.3   0.7 0.6 0.3 1.2 
Actual 
Stock 
Midpoint 
30 seconds 
Treatment 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.3  0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.3 
Control -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
1 minute 
Treatment -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.2  0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.4 
Control -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.0   0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 
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Table 1.5  Estimates of the mean effect of disagreement in the broader sample, controlling for the 
variables used in matching.  The table presents summary information about the coefficient estimates on the 
disagreement dummy in regressions of quote changes on a constant, the disagreement dummy, and the four 
variables used in matching, these being the option bid-ask spread, 2-minute pre-event stock return, the square 
root of the days remaining to option expiration, and the option delta.  The columns headed “Mean” and 
“Median” present the mean and median, respectively, across the 39 stocks and ETFs, of the coefficient estimates 
on the disagreement dummy and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses). The columns headed “4-th” and 
“36-th” present the fourth and 36
th
 coefficient estimates (ranked from smallest to largest), again with the 
associated t-statistics. In the column headed “Mean,” the t-statistic is the mean of the t-statistics for the 39 stocks 
and ETFs.  The other columns report the t-statistic of the median, 4
th
, and 36
th
 estimates, respectively.  The t-
statistics are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  The number of {P > IP}-type 
disagreements per underlying stock range from 2,551 to 199,122, and the number of {IP > P}-type disagreements 
per underlying stock range from 2,204 to 195,500.  Because each disagreement event is matched to three control 
events, the sample sizes for individual regressions are four times the number of disagreements for each stock.  
 
 
Variable 
Evaluation 
Period 
{P > IP}-Type Disagreements  {IP>P}-Type Disagreements 
Mean Median 4-th 36-th  Mean Median 4-th 36-th 
Option 
Bid 
30 seconds 
1.6 1.5 0.9 2.5  -2.9 -2.9 -4.1 -1.7 
(115.3) (109.2) (52.8) (231.2)   (-142.1)  (-139.7)  (-296.7)  (-80.1) 
1 minute 
2.0 1.9 1.3 3.0  -3.1 -3.2 -4.2 -2.2 
(116.5) (113.7) (59.7) (196.6)    (-136.0)  (-145.4)  (-226.8)  (-71.9) 
Option 
Ask 
30 seconds 
2.7 2.6 1.6 3.8  -1.6 -1.6 -2.7 -0.9 
(142.6) (139.6) (23.1) (251.9)   (-108.8)  (-118.0)  (-191.8)  (-18.5) 
1 minute 
3.0 3.0 2.0 3.9  -2.1 -2.1 -3.2 -1.2 
(138.1) (144.4) (26.3) (237.1)    (-116.3)  (-161.2)  (-231.6)  (-21.9) 
Actual 
Stock 
Midpoint 
30 seconds 
0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.4  0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.2 
(1.6)  (-1.4)  (-13.9) (24.1)   (-1.1)  (-2.4)  (-28.8) (12.7) 
1 minute 
0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.4  0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.2 
(0.7)  (-1.6)  (-14.2) (16.8)    (-0.5)  (-1.7)  (-24.7) (13.0) 
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Table 1.6  Average signed volume during the disagreement and control events.  Signed volume in the underlying stocks is based on the Lee and 
Ready (1991) algorithm, while a version of the quote rule is used to estimate the direction of options trades. The delta-equivalent volume is computed 
using the estimates of signed option volume and the option deltas computed from the Black-Scholes-Merton formula with implied volatilities from 
Option Metrics.   “All Options” include all option pairs for a given underlying stock, while the “Disagreement Pair” includes only volume in the option 
pair that triggered the disagreement event. The columns headed “Mean” and “Median” report the mean and median, respectively, of the 39 values for 
each of the stocks and ETFs. The columns headed “4-th”, and “36-th” reports 4-th and 36-th largest of the signed volumes for the 39 stocks and ETFs.  
The units are round lots of 100 shares, so that for example “1” means 100 shares.  All results are reported for evaluation periods of both 30 and 60 
seconds.  The number of disagreements for each stock is reported in Table 1.1. Because each disagreement event is matched to three control events, the 
control samples are three times the sizes of the treatment samples. 
 
 Evaluation 
Period Sample 
{P > IP}-Type Disagreements  {IP>P}-Type Disagreements 
  Mean Median 4-th 36-th  Mean Median 4-th 36-th 
    All 
Options 
   
30 seconds 
Treatment 36.0 23.5 8.9 57.9  -32.8 -20.0 -53.9 -3.0 
Control 8.4 4.1 -2.2 13.1  -11.5 -4.3 -20.8 -0.2 
1 minute 
Treatment 42.0 25.9 10.6 74.3  -42.7 -24.1 -70.9 -4.1 
Control 10.4 5.2 -4.1 21.0  -14.6 -5.0 -23.1 -0.3 
Disagreement 
Pair 
30 seconds 
Treatment 17.1 12.4 4.1 33.5  -15.3 -11.1 -29.0 -3.1 
Control 1.9 1.2 0.2 3.9  -2.7 -1.7 -8.5 -0.3 
1 minute 
Treatment 19.5 14.3 4.6 35.5  -17.7 -13.8 -32.8 -2.6 
Control 3.0 2.2 0.1 5.6  -2.8 -1.9 -6.2 -0.4 
Stock 
30 seconds 
Treatment 6.3 15.3 -140.0 72.8  -12.9 7.1 -152.0 84.6 
Control 12.8 9.8 -40.6 63.3  0.2 1.1 -57.0 33.1 
1 minute 
Treatment 18.1 11.5 -196.8 209.8  -23.9 10.6 -197.7 121.5 
Control 27.9 11.0 -73.2 118.0  8.5 7.6 -71.1 68.5 
Stock in 2-Minute Pre-Event 
Period 
Treatment 249.1 117.2 -27.6 601.1  -141.4 -44.8 -600.6 60.1 
Control 196.2 109.5 -2.1 567.3  -143.7 -75.6 -434.7 20.0 
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Table 1.7  Average total volume during the disagreement and control events.  The options volumes are “delta-equivalent” volumes computed 
using option deltas option deltas computed from the Black-Scholes-Merton formula with implied volatilities from Option Metrics.   “All Options” include 
all option pairs for a given underlying stock, while the “Disagreement Pair” includes only volume in the option pair that triggered the disagreement event. 
The columns headed “Mean” and “Median” report the mean and median, respectively, of the 39 values for each of the stocks and ETFs. The columns 
headed “4-th”, and “36-th” reports 4-th and 36-th largest of the signed volumes for the 39 stocks and ETFs.  The units are round lots of 100 shares, so that 
“1” means 100 shares.  All results are reported for evaluation periods of both 30 and 60 seconds.  The number of disagreements for each stock is reported 
in Table 1.1. Because each primary sample disagreement event is matched to three control events, the control samples are three times the sizes of the 
treatment samples.  
 
 Evaluation 
Period Sample 
{P > IP}-Type Disagreements  {IP>P}-Type Disagreements 
  Mean Median 4-th 36-th  Mean Median 4-th 36-th 
    All 
Options 
   
30 seconds 
Treatment 104.4 61.0 30.5 194.9  105.2 64.5 28.5 162.6 
Control 57.0 33.9 9.8 68.0  58.4 30.8 12.0 79.6 
1 minute 
Treatment 167.7 112.2 42.8 294.1  168.7 101.4 43.0 247.0 
Control 105.8 59.9 20.4 128.4   106.0 55.8 22.0 149.8 
Disagreement 
Pair 
30 seconds 
Treatment 29.8 21.0 9.8 61.6  30.3 20.7 9.1 63.1 
Control 8.1 5.8 1.8 13.9  8.2 5.0 2.3 14.5 
1 minute 
Treatment 42.3 29.7 12.9 90.3  42.6 27.5 12.6 77.0 
Control 14.9 10.1 3.5 26.0   14.4 9.8 3.8 23.9 
Stock 
30 seconds 
Treatment 653.7 373.7 161.3 1813.3  631.6 311.6 153.9 1687.5 
Control 464.5 241.4 111.5 1276.1  460.2 220.3 116.6 1336.3 
1 minute 
Treatment 1188.6 659.5 289.9 3215.3  1137.1 593.5 293.6 2968.4 
Control 870.6 480.6 207.1 2319.5  864.8 442.4 211.9 2479.5 
Stock in 2-Minute Pre-Event 
Period 
Treatment 2039.1 1182.1 477.0 5101.9  1898.1 1077.4 477.0 4953.4 
Control 1683.4 968.5 393.9 4600.2  1602.8 843.6 379.8 4345.3 
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Table 1.8  Conditional average quote changes in various subsamples.  Panels A and B show coefficient estimates for the {P>IP} and {IP>P}-type 
disagreement events, respectively.  In each panel, each column reports the coefficient estimates on the disagreement dummy and the associated t-statistics 
(in parentheses) for regressions explaining the option-implied bid, option-implied ask, and actual stock midpoint for the subsample identified in the 
column heading.  In each subsample, all observations are pooled together and a single regression is estimated. Each column also reports the median 
disagreement duration, in seconds, and the number of treatment sample events.  Because each disagreement event is matched with three control events, 
the total number of observations is four times the number of treatment events.  The evaluation period is one minute, and the t-statistics are based on 
White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
 
Results for the full sample are provided in column 1 for comparison. Column 2 headed “Option-initiated” contains the results for the subsample of events 
(and corresponding matched observations) triggered by changes in options quotes.  Column 3 headed “2 Pre-Earnings Days” is for the subsample of 
events that occur in the 2 days before an earnings announcement, column 4 headed  “Pre-Event Return >0.3%” uses the subsample of events for which 
the absolute value of the 2-minute pre-event stock return exceeded 0.3%, and column 5 headed “Year >2004 ” uses events from 2005 and 2006.  Column 
6 headed “Option Volume > 80
th
 %-tile” is for the subsample of events that occurred on days in which option trading volume exceeded the 80
th
 percentile 
of daily option trading volume for that underlying stock.  Column 7 headed “Pre-Event Order Imbalance” uses events in which the ratio of signed to total 
stock market volume in the 2 minutes preceding the event exceeds 0.5.  Column 8 headed “Trade Conf.” is for the subsample of events  with “trade-
confirmed” quotes, where “trade-confirmed” means that there were trades at both the call and put quotes used to compute the option-implied stock quote 
that causes the disagreement, while column 9 headed “Exch. Conf.” is for the subsample of events  with “exchange-confirmed” quotes, where “exchange-
confirmed” means that the call and put quotes used to compute the option-implied stock quote that causes the disagreement were quoted by at least two 
exchanges.  Column 10 headed “Trade or Exch.” uses the quotes that are either trade or exchange confirmed, i.e. it uses the union of the subsamples used 
in columns 8 and 9.  Column 11 headed “> 10 Sec. duration” includes only events where the violating implied quote does not change in the first 10 
seconds after the disagreement is triggered. 
 
Panel A: {P>IP}-Type Disagreements   
  
 
    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
  
Full 
Sample 
Option- 
Initiated 
2 Pre-
Earnings 
Days 
Pre-Event 
Return 
>0.3% 
Year 
>2004 
Option 
Volume > 
80
th
 %-tile 
Pre-Event 
Order 
Imbalance 
Trade 
Conf. 
Exch. 
Conf. 
Trade or 
Exch. 
>10 Sec. 
Duration 
Implied Bid 
5.1 4.5 5.2 5.6 4.8 5.3 4.8 5.0 4.9 5.1 4.5 
(131.2) (49.8) (25.7) (60.6) (73.3) (64.9) (45.2) (58.2) (42.9) (83.2) (87.0) 
Implied Ask 
5.9 6.8 6.5 6.8 5.9 6.5 5.7 4.9 4.9 5.5 4.1 
(134.8) (60.5) (27.7) (67.6) (78.4) (69.7) (44.7) (48.7) (38.8) (79.9) (66.0) 
Actual Stock 
Midpoint 
0.5 -0.1 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.5 
(14.5) (-1.4) (3.0) (9.2) (3.8) (7.7) (3.3) (6.6) (1.0) (7.1) (11.1) 
Median 
Duration 
8.0 5.1 5.8 5.0 3.4 6.5 15.0 17.7 9.4 8.9 30.3 
No. of  
Treatment 
Events 
38,979 4,745 1,517 10,161 12,868 10,095 4,916 5,402 4,228 13,734 17,765 
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Table 1.8 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: {IP>P}-Type Disagreements           
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
  
Full 
Sample 
Option- 
Initiated 
2 Pre-
Earnings 
Days 
Pre-Event 
Return  
< -0.3% 
Year 
>2004  
Option 
Volume > 
80
th
 %-tile 
Pre-Event 
Order 
Imbalance 
Trade 
Conf. 
Exch. 
Conf. 
Trade or 
Exch. 
>10 Sec. 
Duration 
Implied Bid 
-5.8 -6.5 -6.5 -6.4 -5.9 -6.0 -5.6 -4.9 -4.9 -5.4 -4.1 
 (-140.4)  (-61.5)  (-24.8)  (-71.3)  (-84.4)  (-67.1)  (-39.3)  (-54.2)  (-40.8)  (-83.6)  (-70.4) 
Implied Ask 
-5.0 -4.3 -5.5 -5.5 -4.8 -5.0 -4.8 -5.1 -5.0 -5.1 -4.5 
 (-132.9)  (-42.7)  (-20.6)  (-64.7)  (-74.7)  (-57.6)  (-39.1)  (-62.2)  (-44.0)  (-82.3)  (-91.1) 
Observed 
Midpoint 
-0.5 0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 
 (-13.7) (1.4)  (-1.7)  (-8.7)  (-2.9)  (-3.7)  (-3.4)  (-8.9)  (-3.7)  (-8.8)  (-13.2) 
Median 
Duration 
7.9 5.1 6.1 5.1 3.2 6.4 16.0 16.8 9.4 9.1 30.6 
No. of  
Treatment 
Events 
42,045 4,714 1,487 11,344 13,832 10,706 3,807 6,154 4,714 15,141 19,045 
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Table 1.9   Estimates of the upper and lower bounds of the Hasbrouck (1995) information share of the option market.  The second 
through seventh columns report summary statistics of day-by-day estimates of the upper and lower bounds of the option market information 
share.  For each stock, estimates of the upper and lower bounds are computed each day. The second column reports the number of daily 
estimates for each of the stocks, and the third through seventh columns report the means, medians, and standard deviations of the daily 
estimates for each of the stocks.  The two rightmost (eighth and ninth columns) report estimates based on a pooled sample combining data 
from all days for each of the stocks.  The last three rows of the table report the means, minimums, and maximums of the statistics for the 39 
stocks. 
 
Summary Statistics of Day-by-Day Estimates of the Hasbrouck Information 
Share Upper and Lower Bounds 
Estimates Based on Pooled Sample 
Combining Data from All Days 
Stock 
Ticker 
No. of Daily 
Estimates 
Upper Bound Lower Bound Estimate of 
Upper Bound 
Estimate of 
Lower Bound Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
AIG 813 6.2% 3.2% 8.7% 4.7% 2.2% 7.9% 10.1% 6.8% 
AMAT 707 5.1% 1.9% 9.8% 4.8% 1.9% 9.6% 0.8% 0.3% 
AMGN 829 4.4% 1.9% 7.8% 3.2% 1.2% 6.8% 2.2% 0.3% 
AMR 762 8.4% 3.5% 14.3% 7.6% 2.8% 14.0% 0.5% 0.3% 
AMZN 830 4.1% 1.7% 7.3% 3.4% 1.3% 6.7% 1.2% 0.0% 
AOL 88 9.8% 3.6% 18.0% 9.9% 3.0% 18.3% 0.7% 0.5% 
BMY 441 7.5% 3.2% 12.4% 6.8% 2.7% 11.9% 0.7% 0.4% 
BRCM 856 3.8% 1.6% 6.8% 3.1% 1.3% 6.4% 0.7% 0.2% 
C 344 6.9% 3.0% 10.7% 5.8% 2.3% 9.9% 3.5% 1.8% 
COF 864 5.6% 2.4% 8.8% 4.3% 1.8% 7.7% 1.5% 0.5% 
CPN 178 18.7% 5.4% 27.2% 18.5% 5.5% 27.1% 1.7% 1.3% 
CSCO 726 6.2% 2.3% 11.7% 5.8% 2.4% 11.3% 1.0% 0.4% 
DELL 731 4.4% 1.7% 8.9% 4.2% 1.5% 8.9% 1.0% 0.2% 
DIA 297 8.0% 3.8% 10.4% 6.1% 2.9% 8.8% 1.3% 0.8% 
EBAY 849 4.3% 2.0% 7.7% 3.0% 1.0% 6.8% 2.4% 0.4% 
EMC 645 10.9% 4.3% 17.6% 10.5% 3.8% 17.5% 2.4% 1.6% 
F 350 14.1% 5.3% 20.6% 13.9% 5.3% 20.3% 2.5% 1.9% 
GE 457 5.9% 2.9% 8.2% 5.3% 2.4% 7.7% 3.6% 2.8% 
GM 443 6.8% 2.7% 10.3% 6.1% 2.4% 9.7% 2.5% 1.1% 
HD 676 5.9% 3.0% 9.1% 4.9% 2.2% 8.6% 1.1% 0.5% 
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Table 1.9 (continued) 
 
Summary Statistics of Day-by-Day Estimates of the Hasbrouck Information 
Share Upper and Lower Bounds 
Estimates Based on Pooled Sample 
Combining Data from All Days 
Stock 
Ticker 
No. of Daily 
Estimates 
Upper Bound Lower Bound Estimate of 
Upper Bound 
Estimate of 
Lower Bound Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
IBM 806 6.5% 3.8% 9.1% 4.5% 2.1% 8.0% 0.8% 0.4% 
INTC 781 4.6% 2.0% 7.2% 4.2% 1.9% 6.8% 0.8% 0.3% 
JPM 346 6.1% 3.1% 8.8% 5.2% 2.1% 8.1% 3.6% 2.3% 
KLAC 856 3.8% 1.7% 6.1% 2.6% 1.1% 5.5% 1.0% 0.1% 
MMM 541 5.3% 2.9% 6.5% 3.7% 1.8% 5.2% 2.1% 0.6% 
MO 470 6.8% 3.0% 10.6% 5.5% 2.1% 9.4% 3.9% 2.2% 
MSFT 688 6.5% 2.8% 11.4% 6.1% 2.4% 11.0% 1.1% 0.6% 
MWD 360 5.3% 3.2% 6.5% 3.8% 1.9% 5.3% 3.8% 2.0% 
NXTL 443 5.4% 2.2% 10.8% 5.2% 1.8% 10.4% 1.2% 0.6% 
ORCL 586 8.3% 2.4% 14.7% 8.1% 2.6% 14.3% 1.1% 0.5% 
PFE 616 7.5% 3.3% 12.5% 6.8% 2.7% 12.1% 3.6% 2.4% 
QCOM 807 4.2% 1.8% 7.6% 3.0% 1.2% 6.6% 2.2% 0.1% 
QLGC 839 5.2% 2.2% 9.4% 4.1% 1.5% 8.6% 1.1% 0.2% 
QQQ 352 10.0% 6.8% 10.5% 8.3% 5.3% 9.4% 2.8% 2.1% 
QQQQ 282 5.5% 2.7% 7.1% 3.6% 1.8% 5.1% 2.0% 0.3% 
SBC 199 6.7% 3.1% 10.3% 6.2% 2.7% 10.0% 2.4% 1.5% 
SMH 816 7.4% 4.4% 9.4% 6.1% 3.2% 8.7% 3.4% 2.7% 
TYC 641 6.8% 2.6% 11.8% 6.2% 2.4% 11.3% 1.3% 0.5% 
XLNX 844 4.0% 1.6% 8.3% 3.4% 1.3% 7.9% 1.0% 0.2% 
XOM 373 3.9% 2.0% 5.6% 3.1% 1.4% 5.0% 1.7% 0.7% 
Mean 588.3 6.7% 2.9% 10.5% 5.8% 2.3% 9.9% 2.1% 1.1% 
Minimum 88 3.8% 1.6% 5.6% 2.6% 1.0% 5.0% 0.5% 0.0% 
Maximum 864 18.7% 6.8% 27.2% 18.5% 5.5% 27.1% 10.1% 6.8% 
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Chapter 2 
Execution Timing in Equity Options 
2.1 Introduction  
Measures of trading costs and price impact play a fundamental role in financial 
economics. For example, an analysis of permanent and temporary price impacts sheds 
light on information flows within and between markets
1
. The link between liquidity and 
asset returns receives increasing attention, with the bid-ask spreads being the most 
popular measure of liquidity
2
. 
 Traditional measures of trading costs rely on the quote midpoint as an estimate of 
the true value. For example, the effective bid-ask spread is defined as a doubled 
difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint at the time of the trade
3
. This 
assumption has historical roots as outsiders often had access only to the best bid and ask 
prices. However, there is now a considerable amount of public information in addition to 
best prices that is easily accessible, with limit order book and prices of related securities 
being the most obvious examples.  
This public information allows for a more precise estimate of the true underlying 
security value
4
 than the quote midpoint. We call this estimate the public information 
midpoint (or simply the public midpoint). More specifically, we define the public 
midpoint as the best linear forecast of the future quote midpoint based on the current 
quote midpoint and other public variables. The definition is summarized in Equation 
(2.1).  
( )ttTtTt XPPEP ,0,|ˆ ++ =    (2.1) 
We argue that the quote midpoint should be replaced with the public midpoint in 
all measures of trading costs and price impact. For example, the effective bid-ask spread 
                                                 
1
 Hasbrouck (1991) is a good example. 
2
 Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2006) provide an extensive survey. 
3
 Bessembinder  and Venkataraman (2009) and numerous other papers have this definition. 
4
 We define fair value as a market consensus about a price of a given security. Most of the time the fair 
value is between the best bid and ask prices, otherwise investors will trade against them. 
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becomes the public effective spread after the adjustment as summarized in equations 
(2.2) and (2.3). In addition to being more accurate, the new measures reflect how 
investors actually execute their trades. Although the theoretical literature acknowledges 
the importance of accounting for public information in estimating the true security value, 
the empirical literature, with the exception of Hasbrouck (1991)
5
, ignores this 
recommendation and uses the quote midpoint with a small number of control variables. 
)Pˆ-(TradeP*2  Costs  )P-(TradeP*2  Costs Ttttt +=→=            (2.2) 
TtTtt PˆPˆImpactPImpact ++∆+∆+ −=→−= tttP             (2.3) 
Although the quote and public midpoints are equal on average in the long run, 
they differ at any particular moment. For example, an aggressive limit order can 
substantially change the quote midpoint. However, it has little effect on the true stock 
value, because everybody knows that the order will be quickly executed, and the 
midpoint will jump back to its previous level.  
 It is important to note that investors exploit the deviations between the two 
midpoints to time their trades. The quote midpoint will converge to the public midpoint 
by definition. Taking advantage of this convergence, investors buy when the public 
midpoint is closer to the ask price than the quote midpoint, and vice versa. We call this 
strategy the execution timing, and it is at the core of the paper. We demonstrate that 
execution timing is essential for modern investors and has a significant effect on trading 
costs and price impact. 
The execution timing implies that traditional measures of trading costs are biased 
upwards. Indeed, if trade transactions were executed at random, the public and quote 
midpoints would be equal on average. In this case, the effective bid-ask spread would be 
an unbiased measure of trading costs. However, in real life, investors do time their 
executions and thus pay less than indicated by the effective or quoted spreads.  
To quantify the effect of the execution timing, Equation (2.4) defines the 
execution timing bias as one minus the ratio of public to effective spreads. As the public 
spread is twice the difference between the transaction price and the public midpoint, the 
timing bias can be rewritten in terms of the difference between public and quote 
                                                 
5
 Hasbrouck controls for past price changes and signed volumes to distinguish the permanent and transitory 
price impacts. However, other public variables are not included. 
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midpoints normalized by a measure of the bid-ask spread. If investors execute trades at 
random times the bias will be zero.  
2/adBidAskSpre
ˆ
Spread Effective
Spread Public
  1  Bias Timing
tt
t
t
tTt PP −=−= +            (2.4) 
The execution timing also leads to the upward bias for the conventional measures 
of price impact, because these measures usually don’t account for the predictable changes 
in the quote midpoint. If the public midpoint is much higher than the quote midpoint, the 
latter will increase converging to the mean. At the same time, sophisticated investors are 
likely to buy because the public spread is relatively small. Thus, only a portion of the 
subsequent price increase should be attributed to the causal impact of trades, the 
remainder is simply regression toward the mean. This decomposition is illustrated by 
Equation (2.5). In addition, the execution bias in price impact is larger for large trades 
because they are more likely to come from sophisticated investors. Thus, the slope of the 
price impact as a function of trade size is gentler than implied by conventional measures. 
More generally, this example illustrates how endogeneity between trade transactions and 
quote dynamics may affect the causal inference.  
4342144344214434421
BiasExecutionImpactPrice  largefor  0
ˆˆˆˆ
t
Tt
t
Tt
t
Ttt
tt
t
Ttt
ttttttt PPPPPPPP −+−+−=−
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∆≈
+∆+
∆+∆+∆+        (2.5) 
The measures adjusted for execution timing introduced by Equation (2.3) can 
substantially reduce but cannot fully eliminate the execution bias. The small bias remains 
because sophisticated investors are better than an econometrician at estimating the public 
midpoint. For example, the set of control variables tX ,0 employed by the econometrician 
in Equation (2.1) can exclude some important public information known to investors.  
In the next logical step, we show that the execution timing is significant in 
practice. We find that the timing bias is large in the options market: effective and average 
quoted spreads overestimate actual trading costs by 50% and 100% respectively! 
The options market is a perfect laboratory to study the execution timing bias for 
two reasons. First, the underlying stock price is obviously the most important public 
information influencing option prices, and is observable by everyone. Most of the short-
term variation in option prices is driven by changes in the price of the underlying 
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security. Second, a good estimate of the option public midpoint can be constructed by 
combining the current stock price with the past implied volatility by the Black-Scholes-
Merton (BSM) model. In the first step, implied volatility is inferred from lagged option 
and stock prices from recent past; and then the implied volatility is combined with current 
stock price to compute the implied option price. Essentially, the method relies on two 
assumptions: quoted midpoint has been on average equal to the option fair value in recent 
past, and implied volatility changes slowly during the trading day. In addition, we 
develop an alternative methodology, which relies on lagged changes in option and delta-
adjusted stock prices to predict public price by a linear regression in the spirit of Equation 
(2.1). We apply these methodologies to the sample of 39 stocks with liquid options over 
the three-year period from April 2003 through October 2006.  
The empirical analysis revealed several findings. First, as mentioned above, the 
execution timing has a large effect on trading costs and price impacts in the options 
market. Thus, both variables have much smaller magnitudes than was previously 
believed.  
Second, there is a substantial variation in the execution bias across stocks ranging 
from 15% for America Online to 50% for QQQQ Nasdaq Index ETF. Thus, stock 
rankings based on conventional bid-ask spread and actual trading costs implied by the 
public spread can differ. 
Third, the execution timing bias increased by several times during the sample 
period, likely as a result of algorithmic trading becoming more popular and sophisticated. 
Therefore, execution timing is likely to be even more important in the future. 
Finally, there is a significant variation in execution bias depending on the trade 
size. Round trades, with size divisible by 10, have 20% worse execution than non-round 
trades. For example, trades of 30 contracts pay a spread of four cents, while trades of 29 
or 31 contracts pay only three cents. The difference in execution is entirely due to the 
execution timing as the effective spreads are identical for the two groups. 
Besides methodological and empirical contributions, the paper also raises an 
important policy question. Currently, retail investors, who pay the entire effective spread, 
cross-subsidize institutional investors, who employ the execution timing and pay half the 
spread. By not changing quoted option prices to every price change in the underlying 
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security, option market makers effectively quote two different bid-ask spreads for 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. How can the option market structure be 
changed to minimize the execution timing, and thus, level the playing field between 
institutional and retail investors? One of the possible solutions is to quote option prices in 
implied volatilities rather than prices. Another is to encourage exchanges to introduce 
limit orders linked to implied volatility.   
Overall, our results indicate that the usage of the adjusted measures is crucial for 
making inferences about liquidity and informed trading. 
2.2 Data and Methodology 
The paper employs tick-level option and stock data on 39 stocks including 2 
ETFs. The data are provided by Nanex, a firm specializing in providing high-quality data 
feeds to its customers. The sample period is April 2003 through October 2006 and 
includes 882 trading days. The selected stocks had the most liquid options as measured 
by trading volume prior to the beginning of the sample period in March 2003. The data 
include trades and best quotes for both stocks and options for all exchanges. A more 
detailed description of the data is provided by Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2012).  
The paper focuses on the analysis of option trades and subsequent quote changes. 
Table 2.1 summarizes main descriptive statistics on a stock by stock basis. The total 
sample includes 20.4 million option trades. Nasdaq ETF QQQ/QQQ has the largest 
number of trades (1.9 million before the ticker change and 1.8 million afterwards) while 
AOL has only 50 thousand trades
6
. Average trade transaction has a price of 1.7 dollars 
and is for 28 contracts, each on the hundred shares. The distribution for option trade size 
is highly skewed and is roughly exponential. There are slightly more seller initiated 
(55%), and call options transactions (66%). 
 The direction of a trade is determined by the quote rule. If a transaction price is at 
the NBBO quote midpoint, the quote rule is applied to the best quotes of the exchange 
which reported the transaction. As more than 90% of transactions are recorded at NBBO 
prices, the method is easy to apply. On average more than four out of six exchanges are 
                                                 
6
 AOL dropped from the sample after changing its ticker in October 2003. 
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quoting the best national at the transaction moment. This fact illustrates the high level of 
competition between option exchanges for providing liquidity. 
Turning to the methodology, the implied option price is computed using the BSM 
formula. The main inputs for the formula are the stock quote midpoint one second before 
the trade and the average implied volatility for a given option over the previous 20 
minutes. We take one second lag for the stock price instead of its current value to account 
for possible latency between the option and stock markets. One second leaves ample time 
for option market makers to process and respond to information.  
To compute the average implied volatility, we first compute implied volatility for 
two-minute snapshots through the trading day with current stock and option prices as 
inputs. In the second step, we take an average of the ten most recent snapshots preceding 
a trade transaction.  The remaining inputs for the BSM model are set in the following 
way. Risk-free rate is set to the 60-day LIBOR rate. The dividend rate is set to zero. Time 
to expiration is measured using calendar time. 
This method requires two main assumptions. First, implied volatility moves much 
slower than stock price within a trading day. Indeed, after adjusting for market 
microstructure effects, implied volatility changes slowly and smoothly. In addition, most 
of the continued popularity of the BSM model among practitioners is driven by its ability 
to decompose fast-moving option prices into the stock price component and the slow-
changing residual called implied volatility. The second assumption is that the implied 
option price is equal to the quote midpoint on average during 20 minutes before the trade 
transaction. This assumption is reasonable except for OTM options with large quoted bid-
ask spreads.   
This simple approach provides good estimates of the public option price as will be 
shown in the results section. A more sophisticated option pricing model can potentially 
produce even more precise estimates. However, arguably, our simple approach picks the 
first order variation in the public price, and is simple enough to be implemented by the 
majority of investors.    
The second approach for computing the public price is based on a linear 
regression summarized in Equation (2.6). 
ti tititittiti it
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Changes in the option quote midpoint over the next 15 minutes are being 
explained by changes in the delta-adjusted stock and option quote midpoints and the 
difference between the prediction of the BSM-method and the current quote midpoint. 
We call this difference the implied bias. Lagged changes in prices are taken for twelve 
five-second snapshots to accommodate the most recent information. Equation (2.7) shows 
that the implied bias compares current option price to the price implied by cumulative 
returns in the stock market in the recent past. 
)(ˆ ττ
dSPP
t
TtTt
BSM
t ∑ −− ∆+≈       (2.7) 
One way to interpret Equation (2.6) is to think about the implied bias as 
representing mid-term information from the last half an hour, while the lagged price 
changes provide a detailed short-term representation of the last minute of trading. 
The regression is estimated separately for each stock and six absolute delta (0.35 
and 0.65 cut-offs) and time-to-expiration (60 days cut-off) bins within each of the 30-day 
periods. The average coefficients are reported in Table 2.4. As expected, the implied bias 
is the most significant variable. Delta-adjusted stock returns positively predict future 
option midpoint changes as options underreact to stock returns as shown by Muravyev, et 
al. (2012). However, the magnitude of the coefficient is large: a one cent increase in the 
delta-adjusted stock price 15 seconds in the past corresponds to a 0.3 cent increase in the 
option price in the next minute. It is hard to explain why it takes so long for options to 
respond. Option price changes are negatively auto-correlated: if the option midpoint 
decreases, there is a 30% probability that it will jump back to the previous level within 
one minute.  
It is useful to summarize in one place the definitions for the four bid-ask spread 
types used in the paper. The public bid-ask spread is twice the difference between 
transaction price and the price implied by the BSM model based on the current stock 
price and the lagged implied volatility. The effective spread is the double difference 
between trade price and quote midpoint. The quoted spread is twice the difference 
between the relevant best quoted price and the quote midpoint at the moment of 
transaction. Finally, the average quoted spread is computed separately for each option 
from one-second snapshots on the transaction day. 
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2.3 Empirical Analysis of the Bid-Ask Spreads and 
Price Impact 
2.3.1 Bid-Ask Spreads 
We start the empirical section by the analysis of average bid-ask spreads for 
options on each of the stocks in Table 2.1. We compare four measures of the bid-ask 
spread.  
First, the average daily quoted spreads show trading costs for an investor who 
trades at random. Such an investor will pay 8.4 cents for a round trip trade on average, 
which is substantial if compared to an average option price of 1.7 dollars. Although 
trading at random helps to avoid front running, it is very costly because it doesn’t take 
advantage of the execution timing and the mean reversion in quoted spreads. The later 
strategy, the quoted spread timing, is based on the idea that investors should wait for 
quoted spreads to be below historical average to execute trades. To evaluate the effect of 
the quoted spread timing we compare the average quoted spread with the quoted spread at 
the transaction time. The quoted spread is 6.6 cents which is a 1.8 cents improvement 
over the average spreads. 
Another way for investors to achieve better execution is to receive an 
improvement over the current NBBO price. However, there is little price improvement in 
the options market as the effective spreads are 6.4 cents and almost equal to the quoted 
spreads. Also, more than 90% of option trades are executed at the NBBO price. 
Finally, the last way to improve on “random” execution is the execution timing. 
Investors have their own estimate of the true price which is different from the quoted 
midpoint, and they time the execution based on the difference between the two midpoints 
(the implied bias). The public bid-ask spread is only 4.3 cents, a stunning 2.1 cent 
improvement over the effective spread.  
From the comparison between the four spreads, it is evident that the execution 
timing is economically the most important improvement over the baseline case of 
“random” execution. 
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Importantly, the execution timing affects not only the level of trading costs but 
also the relative costs for different underlying stocks. For example, Pfizer and QLogic 
have the same public spreads (4 cents), but very different quoted spreads (7 versus 10 
cents). Unfortunately, our sample contains too few stocks to conduct a comprehensive 
cross-sectional analysis. 
Another important dimension of the execution timing is revealed by a time-series 
analysis. The execution timing has been increasingly important over time. Figure 2.2 
shows that the spreads are comparable in the beginning of the sample period. However at 
the end of the sample period, the public spread decreases in half, while the other spreads 
change little. The trend can be a result of the increased popularity of algorithmic trading. 
The spreads fluctuate around a long term trend and have a positive autocorrelation, but 
little volatility clustering is observed, and the volatility of day-to-day changes in the 
spreads is constant over the sample period. 
The execution timing has a substantial effect on the shape of the bid-ask spread 
surface. Each underlying stock has hundreds of options which differ in their type, time to 
expiration and moneyness. The main stylized fact about the bid-ask spread surface is that 
dollar spreads increase linearly with the absolute option delta. This feature is illustrated 
by Figure 2.2. For OTM options the average quote spreads are below seven cents, while 
the spread reaches eleven cents for ITM options. By contrast, the public spread is much 
flatter in delta. The spread increases only from 4 to only 5.5 cents from OTM to ITM. An 
even smaller increase is observed for large trades. It should also be noted that the public 
spread is substantially below the effective spread for any moneyness. 
Finally, Table 2.5 provides a rigorous analysis of the timing bias conditional on 
different variables of interest. The timing bias is increasing in absolute delta because 
stock price is the most relevant public information. Stock price changes have a larger 
effect on ITM options, making execution timing easier. Average timing bias is 0.38 (or 
38%), and the change from OTM (delta=25) to ITM (delta=75) will increase the bias by 
0.1. The execution bias is decreasing in time to expiration and is smaller for call options; 
however, both effects are economically small (about 0.02). 
Interestingly, the link between trade size and the execution bias are economically 
small. Buyer-initiated transactions have higher bias than sells by 0.07. However, if more 
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than one exchange is quoting the best price, then the coefficient becomes negative (-
0.18), so in this case sell orders are more sophisticated. As expected, the number of 
exchanges quoting the best price in the direction of a trade is a significant determinant of 
the bias. Each additional exchange reduces the bias by 0.11. In a special case of only one 
exchange quoting the best price the bias is larger by 0.25. Trades of minimum size (one 
contract) have a higher bias by 0.03. Trades, with size divisible by 10, have lower bias by 
0.13 compared to other large trades. 
2.3.2 Price Impact 
Price impact is also significantly affected by the execution timing bias. As was 
discussed above, the price impact has two components: the causal impact of a trade and 
the expected price change, as the quote midpoint converges to the public midpoint. In the 
options market, the expected price impact is larger than the causal effect of trades. 
Following the literature, price impact is measured as change in the quote midpoint 
in the five minutes following a trade transaction. We adjust actual price impact for its 
predictable component in two ways. The most natural one is just to subtract the implied 
bias from the actual price impact. The second way to adjust price impact is to subtract the 
price change expected by a regression. The regression is based on regular time intervals, 
thus predicting price changes in similar market situations except for no trade transaction.  
Table 2.2 provides a comparison between price impact and its expected 
component. Option prices move by 1.3 cents after a trade, with the maximum of 2.1 cents 
for Capital One, and the minimum of 0.6 cents for America Online. However, most of 
this price change would occur even without a trade transaction. The regression method 
predicts a 0.65 cents move in price, while the implied bias adjustment predicts a 1.07 cent 
change.  
Price impact is often studied as a function of trade size to infer which trades are 
informed. Figure 2.4 reports price impact as a function of trade size measured in number 
of contracts. There are several stylized facts to note here. Actual price impact is 
increasing in size especially for small trades. Trades of the smallest size (one contract) 
have a surprisingly large price impact of more than one cent. We also observe that round-
size trades have significantly lower (by 0.5 cents) price impact than average trades. Both 
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the expected price impact and the implied bias are increasing in trade size only for small 
trades. 
Figure 2.5 shows the price impact after adjusting for the expected price changes. 
The impact adjusted by the implied bias is remarkably smooth, the non-round size effect 
disappears, and the price impact line originates from zero. However, the regression-
adjusted impact is between actual and bias-adjusted price impacts by its properties. A 
possible explanation for why the implied bias adjustment seems to work better is because 
a trade transaction prompts an option market maker to center his quotes on the true price 
for which the implied midpoint is a good estimate.   
Finally, Table 2.6 provides a rigorous analysis of the price impact conditional on 
different variables of interest including expected price changes.  Since the price impact is 
linked with the timing bias, the independent variables have a similar effect on the two 
variables. The timing bias is increasing in absolute delta. The average price impact is 
1.26 cents and the change from OTM (delta=25) to ITM (delta=75) will increase the 
impact by 0.9 cents which is substantial. The execution bias is increasing in time to 
expiration and is smaller for call options; however, both effects are economically small 
(about 0.22 cents). The price impact is increasing in volume and buy orders have a higher 
price impact. The expected price impact is the most significant variable, r-squared jumps 
from 4% to 13%, then this variable is included.  Confirming the observation from Figure 
2.5, if the price impact adjusted for the implied bias is put as the dependent variable, most 
of the independent variables lose their predictive ability, and r-squared drops to zero. 
2.3.3 Trades of Non-round Size  
Trades of round size pay much larger public spreads and have a smaller price 
impact. In this section we examine this finding and its implications in more detail. We 
define round-size trades as large trades, with more than 10 contracts, with size divisible 
by ten and to a lesser degree trades divisible by five.  
The non-round trades are better executed for two reasons. First, for psychological 
reasons, unsophisticated investors are likely to choose a round number as a target option 
position, and to acquire this position in a single transaction.  On the other hand, 
sophisticated investors are more likely to compute the target position from a model. For 
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example, exotic derivatives desks at investment banks commonly hedge with plain 
vanilla options. The second reason is that smart investors are likely to split the execution 
into multiple trades to take advantage of opportunities of lesser than the target size. If the 
price is attractive, they will take all the size available in the limit order book at the price.  
We find that non-round trades are smarter because they want to trade a non-round 
amount rather than because a non-round amount is placed at the best quotes. The simplest 
way to show this fact is to add an interaction between two dummy variables: non-round 
trade size and only one exchange quoting best price. In the regression, non-round trades 
with only one exchange at the best quotes have the same execution bias and have a lower 
price impact than average non-round size trades.  
The superior timing ability of non-round trades can be used to illustrate the 
danger of confusing public information with private information. Consider a clever 
method for separating information and inventory price impacts by comparing trades of 30 
contracts with trades sized 29 or 31. Both groups have the same trade size, and thus, the 
same inventory impact. Therefore, the difference in price impacts can be solely attributed 
to the difference in information content for the two groups of trades. If the quote 
midpoint includes all public information then price impacts reflect only private 
information. As shown above, non-round trades have a much larger price impact, 
indicating that they contain substantial private information. This conclusion is wrong 
because non-round trades are superior in using public rather than private information. 
Non-round trades have a much higher timing ability than round ones. Thus, the public 
midpoint is likely to be much higher than the quote midpoint at the time a non-round buy 
trade arrives because of the execution timing. Therefore, the quote midpoint is likely to 
increase even without the buy trade. In summary, the private information conclusion 
confuses the regression toward the mean of quoted midpoint for the causal impact of a 
trade transaction.   
Interestingly, out of trades larger than fifteen, 61% are round-size trades which is 
six times larger than if all trade sizes were equally likely. Why there are so many round-
size trades is hard to explain rationally. 
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2.4 Figures and Tables 
Figure 2.1 The public bid-ask spreads are much smaller than the effective or 
quoted spreads for any absolute option delta. The graph plots non-parametric estimates 
for five types of the bid-ask spreads: public (red line), public spread for the subsample of 
trades with size of at least ten contracts (magenta dashed), quoted (blue), effective (blue 
dashed), and average quoted spread from one-second snapshots on a trade date (black 
dash-dot) as a function of the absolute option delta. Investors execute their trades when 
the quoted spread is smaller than its average. The effective and quoted spreads are close. 
The public spread is much lower and much flatter than the other spreads. The spreads 
vary between 3 and 12 cents. The public bid-ask spread is the double difference between 
the transaction price and the price implied by the BSM model based on the current stock 
price and the lagged implied volatility. The effective spread is the double difference 
between the trade price and the quote midpoint. The lines are estimated using a kernel 
regression based on the sample of 20 million trades for options on 39 stocks from April 
2003 to October 2006. Option deltas are computed from the Black-Scholes-Merton 
formula.  
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Figure 2.2 Execution timing is becoming increasingly important over time. The graph 
plots the evolution of three main types of the bid-ask spread over the sample period. In 
the beginning, the spreads are comparable; however at the end, the public spread 
decreases in half, while other spreads change little. The trend can be a result of the 
increased use of algorithmic trading. The public bid-ask spread (red) is the double 
difference between transaction price and the price implied by the BSM model based on 
the current stock price and the lagged implied volatility. The effective spread (blue) is the 
double difference between trade price and quote midpoint. The average quoted spread 
(black) is computed separately for each option from one-second snapshots on the 
transaction day. Each point is an average across all option trades on a given day. The 
spreads vary between 3 and 9 cents. The sample period is April 2003 through October 
2006 
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Figure 2.3 Analysis of trade size reveals an important variation in the public bid-ask 
spreads. First, execution timing is increasing with trade size as larger trades are more 
likely to come from sophisticated investors. Second, round-sized trades (divisible by 10) 
pay larger spreads than non-round trades. Finally, trades of the smallest possible size (one 
lot) pay substantially less than slightly larger trades. The graph plots the public and 
effective bid-ask spreads as a function of trade size measured in contracts. The effective 
spread (blue) is the double difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint. 
The public bid-ask spread (red) is the double difference between the transaction price and 
the price implied by the BSM model based on the current stock price and the lagged 
implied volatility. Each point is an average across all option trades of a given trade size. 
The distribution of trade size is highly skewed (roughly exponential). Mean trade size is 
10, and its 50
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles are 42 and 114 contracts respectively. The effective 
spread is stable around 6.5 cents. Confidence bounds are based on twice the standard 
deviation for each trade size which is around 6 cents. 
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Figure 2.4 Most of the price impact is explained by predicted changes in the option quote 
midpoint. Actual price impact (blue) is the change in the option quote midpoint in 5-
minutes following the transaction. The implied bias (in black) is the difference between 
the option price implied by the BSM model from the current stock price and the lagged 
implied volatility and the option quote midpoint immediately before the trade. Predicted 
quote changes (in red) are computed from a regression of option midpoint 5-minute 
changes on implied bias as well as lagged changes in option and stock quote midpoints. 
The regression is estimated separately for each stock and six absolute delta and time-to-
expiration bins within each of 30-day periods. The regression is based on regularly 
spaced 5-minute time steps. Each point is computed as a simple average across all option 
trades of a given trade size. The distribution of trade size is highly skewed (roughly 
exponential). Mean trade size is 10, and its 50
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles are 42 and 114 
contracts respectively. Trade size is reported in contracts each on 100 underlying shares, 
price impact is cents. 
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Figure 2.5  Adjusting the price impact for predicted changes in price. 5-minute quote 
midpoint change is adjusted for predicted changes in the option price by subtracting the 
implied bias (blue) or by subtracting a prediction from a regression model. The implied 
bias (in black) is the difference between the option price implied by the BSM model from 
the current stock price and the lagged implied volatility and the option quote midpoint 
immediately before the trade. Predicted quote changes (in red) are computed from a 
regression of the option midpoint 5-minute changes on implied bias as well as lagged 
changes in option and stock quote midpoints. The regression is estimated separately for 
each stock and six absolute delta and time-to-expiration bins within each of the 30-day 
periods. The regression is based on regularly spaced 5-minute time steps. Each point is 
computed as a simple average across all option trades of a given trade size. The 
distribution of trade size is highly skewed (roughly exponential). The mean trade size is 
10, and its 50
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles are 42 and 114 contracts respectively. Trade size is 
reported in contracts each on 100 underlying shares, price impact is cents. The smoothed 
version of the implied bias adjustment is shown in dashed black. The smoothing is done 
via kernel regression. 
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Table 2.1  Summary statistics Each column reports an average across all option trades for 
a given underlying stock: stock and option prices in dollars; option trade size in number 
of contracts; dummy variable which equals to one for buy trades; dummy variable which 
equals to one for call options; number of exchanges quoting the best ask price for buy 
trades and vice versa for sell trades; the dummy variable which equals to one if the 
transaction price equals to the best quoted price. An average and standard deviation 
across 39 stocks are reported at the bottom. 
 
Ticker # Obs. 
Stock 
Price 
Option 
Price 
Trade 
Size 
D(Buy) D(Call) 
#Exch. at 
NBBO 
D(Trade at 
NBBO) 
AIG 322,969 61.8 2.47 27.6 0.45 0.62 4.4 0.96 
AMAT 414,220 18.7 1.11 25.1 0.44 0.71 4.3 0.93 
AMGN 555,071 66.9 2.60 17.1 0.45 0.70 4.3 0.93 
AMR 295,537 15.2 1.66 29.4 0.47 0.61 4.2 0.95 
AMZN 672,929 42.0 2.26 20.1 0.50 0.52 4.1 0.92 
AOL 50,180 15.1 1.07 29.1 0.43 0.75 3.9 0.87 
BMY 220,922 24.9 1.05 29.1 0.42 0.68 4.4 0.94 
BRCM 554,683 36.7 2.22 18.9 0.48 0.66 4.3 0.95 
C 476,235 46.6 1.51 32.9 0.42 0.67 4.5 0.95 
COF 177,043 67.9 3.06 17.7 0.43 0.56 4.1 0.94 
CPN 113,406 4.6 0.92 40.3 0.43 0.70 4.1 0.91 
CSCO 775,814 20.3 1.12 31.3 0.45 0.74 4.6 0.94 
DELL 506,931 32.7 1.37 33.5 0.46 0.66 4.4 0.96 
EBAY 1,257,095 63.7 2.95 15.9 0.49 0.64 4.3 0.94 
EMC 251,021 12.6 0.85 24.6 0.44 0.78 4.4 0.93 
F 203,740 10.6 0.94 33.4 0.46 0.67 4.5 0.93 
GE 614,305 32.5 1.17 25.6 0.41 0.73 4.6 0.94 
GM 623,791 30.1 2.13 27.0 0.47 0.52 4.4 0.95 
HD 372,670 37.2 1.56 18.0 0.42 0.71 4.4 0.95 
IBM 742,223 86.1 2.53 18.1 0.46 0.65 4.2 0.93 
INTC 1,229,294 24.3 1.26 28.6 0.45 0.71 4.6 0.93 
JPM 381,015 37.4 1.53 29.1 0.42 0.65 4.4 0.94 
KLAC 314,469 48.3 2.32 17.3 0.49 0.53 4.0 0.91 
MMM 267,323 89.3 2.65 13.8 0.45 0.61 4.2 0.93 
MO 583,644 64.3 2.37 33.8 0.44 0.67 4.4 0.96 
MSFT 971,954 26.3 1.12 36.7 0.45 0.75 4.5 0.93 
MWD 148,701 52.8 2.07 29.2 0.45 0.66 4.2 0.93 
NXTL 191,266 22.4 1.62 24.2 0.45 0.74 4.0 0.91 
ORCL 307,400 13.0 0.77 36.0 0.45 0.75 4.4 0.93 
PFE 714,595 28.3 1.23 31.2 0.42 0.70 4.6 0.95 
QCOM 754,523 45.3 2.33 20.9 0.48 0.70 4.4 0.95 
QLGC 243,974 38.2 2.04 14.1 0.47 0.63 4.1 0.94 
QQQ 1,896,294 34.2 1.20 45.0 0.50 0.54 4.1 0.85 
68 
 
Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
QQQQ 1,842,983 39.1 0.95 48.6 0.52 0.49 4.6 0.96 
SBC 108,082 24.3 1.11 25.1 0.38 0.71 4.3 0.93 
SMH 388,508 35.0 1.58 54.9 0.47 0.60 4.3 0.95 
TYC 225,684 27.4 1.46 31.0 0.43 0.69 4.4 0.92 
XLNX 170,583 29.9 1.62 19.6 0.47 0.61 4.1 0.93 
XOM 538,189 55.4 1.89 25.2 0.44 0.72 4.6 0.96 
Average 20,479,266 37.5 1.68 27.7 0.45 0.66 4.3 0.93 
Std.Dev.   20.2 0.64 9.3 0.03 0.07 0.2 0.02 
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Table 2.2  Option bid-ask spreads by stock. The public bid-ask spread is the double 
difference between the transaction price and the price implied by the BSM model based 
on the current stock price and the lagged implied volatility. The effective spread is the 
double difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint. The average quoted 
spread is computed separately for each option from one-second snapshots on the 
transaction day. Spreads are reported in cents. An average and standard deviation across 
39 stocks are reported at the bottom. 
 
Ticker 
Bid-Ask Spread, Cents Public Relative to Others, % 
Public 
Effec-
tive 
Quoted 
Average 
Quoted  
Effec-
tive 
Quoted 
Average 
Quoted 
AIG 5.2 7.9 8.2 10.7 33.8 36.2 51.0 
AMAT 3.6 5.3 5.6 6.9 33.3 36.0 48.7 
AMGN 4.5 7.4 7.8 10.2 39.5 42.3 55.8 
AMR 4.3 6.7 7.0 9.3 36.2 39.2 54.4 
AMZN 3.8 6.6 7.0 9.3 42.1 44.9 58.6 
AOL 5.1 6.0 6.0 7.0 14.7 15.3 26.8 
BMY 4.4 5.9 6.1 7.5 25.6 28.3 41.9 
BRCM 3.8 6.9 7.3 9.7 44.9 47.6 60.6 
C 4.5 6.3 6.4 8.0 28.3 29.7 43.4 
COF 5.7 8.7 9.0 12.1 34.3 37.0 52.9 
CPN 4.6 5.9 6.1 7.4 21.2 24.2 37.6 
CSCO 3.5 5.2 5.3 6.3 32.1 33.7 44.5 
DELL 3.6 5.8 5.9 7.5 37.5 39.2 51.4 
EBAY 4.4 7.5 7.8 10.1 40.8 43.0 56.0 
EMC 3.8 5.3 5.4 6.7 28.2 29.6 43.7 
F 4.2 5.5 5.7 6.9 24.3 26.2 39.2 
GE 4.2 5.6 5.7 6.8 24.5 26.4 38.1 
GM 4.9 7.5 7.8 10.1 34.7 36.8 51.2 
HD 4.4 6.3 6.5 8.1 29.7 32.5 45.7 
IBM 4.8 7.4 7.6 9.7 34.6 36.9 50.4 
INTC 3.5 5.2 5.4 6.4 33.8 35.5 46.2 
JPM 4.7 6.5 6.7 8.4 27.0 29.7 43.5 
KLAC 3.8 6.9 7.3 9.8 44.7 47.4 60.9 
MMM 5.7 8.5 8.8 11.5 32.4 34.9 50.1 
MO 5.6 8.0 8.3 10.5 30.5 32.4 46.6 
MSFT 3.5 5.2 5.4 6.3 33.0 35.1 44.8 
MWD 5.1 7.3 7.6 9.9 30.3 33.0 48.7 
NXTL 4.7 6.4 6.5 8.2 26.3 26.9 42.1 
ORCL 3.5 5.1 5.2 6.4 31.3 33.4 45.6 
PFE 4.1 5.7 5.8 6.9 28.2 29.4 41.4 
QCOM 3.9 6.8 7.0 9.2 42.8 44.9 57.9 
QLGC 4.0 6.9 7.3 9.8 42.2 45.5 59.1 
QQQ 3.7 5.2 5.4 6.2 28.2 30.5 40.0 
QQQQ 2.3 4.6 5.0 6.1 50.2 53.8 62.3 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
 
SBC 4.7 5.9 6.1 7.5 20.9 23.0 37.6 
SMH 3.5 5.7 6.0 7.9 38.5 41.7 55.5 
TYC 4.7 6.4 6.7 8.4 26.8 30.3 43.9 
XLNX 3.7 6.1 6.4 8.7 40.5 43.2 58.2 
XOM 4.2 6.6 6.9 8.7 36.3 39.0 51.5 
Average 4.3 6.4 6.6 8.4 32.9 35.2 48.4 
Std.Dev. 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.6 7.5 7.9 7.9 
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Table 2.3  Price impacts and predicted changes in the option quote midpoint. The actual 
price impact is the change in the option quote midpoint in 1, 5 or 15 minutes following 
the transaction. The implied bias is the difference between the option price implied by the 
BSM model and the quote midpoint immediately before the trade. Predicted quote 
changes are computed from a regression of changes in the option midpoint on implied 
bias as well as lagged changes in option and stock quote midpoints (see Table 2.4) with 
lags based on 5-second intervals. The ratios are reported for the 5-minute time interval. 
An average and standard deviation across 39 stocks are reported at the bottom. 
 
Ticker 
Actual Price Impact, Cents 
Implied 
Bias 
Actual-
to-
Implied-
Bias, % 
Predicted Price Impact, Cents Actual-
to- 
Predicted, 
% 
1 
minute 
5 
minutes 
15 
minutes 
1 
minute 
5 
minutes 
15 
minutes 
AIG 1.50 1.74 1.89 1.36 78.3 0.54 0.79 0.88 45.6 
AMAT 0.84 0.98 1.02 0.89 90.6 0.34 0.56 0.66 56.8 
AMGN 1.49 1.69 1.73 1.48 87.7 0.69 0.96 1.05 56.9 
AMR 1.41 1.69 1.84 1.23 73.0 0.40 0.65 0.78 38.8 
AMZN 1.39 1.58 1.67 1.42 89.9 0.70 0.98 1.06 61.8 
AOL 0.46 0.58 0.67 0.45 77.2 0.10 0.20 0.25 34.4 
BMY 0.89 1.05 1.15 0.77 73.0 0.21 0.37 0.45 35.2 
BRCM 1.61 1.74 1.81 1.57 90.4 0.81 1.07 1.14 61.8 
C 0.93 1.08 1.14 0.91 84.0 0.32 0.51 0.60 47.1 
COF 1.75 2.10 2.29 1.53 72.6 0.65 0.90 0.98 43.0 
CPN 0.79 0.94 1.02 0.64 68.1 0.11 0.23 0.32 24.4 
CSCO 0.71 0.88 0.94 0.83 95.2 0.25 0.45 0.57 51.7 
DELL 1.04 1.18 1.26 1.10 92.8 0.40 0.64 0.76 54.6 
EBAY 1.56 1.72 1.80 1.56 90.6 0.82 1.07 1.15 62.4 
EMC 0.72 0.88 0.96 0.76 86.2 0.19 0.37 0.48 42.5 
F 0.76 0.92 1.02 0.68 74.0 0.13 0.26 0.37 28.4 
GE 0.65 0.79 0.85 0.69 86.6 0.20 0.36 0.46 45.8 
GM 1.57 1.85 2.00 1.34 72.6 0.39 0.69 0.83 37.3 
HD 1.00 1.15 1.22 0.94 81.3 0.35 0.57 0.67 49.6 
IBM 1.31 1.47 1.54 1.29 87.6 0.57 0.80 0.89 54.6 
INTC 0.71 0.91 0.97 0.89 98.2 0.28 0.49 0.60 53.8 
JPM 0.91 1.10 1.20 0.89 81.1 0.29 0.48 0.58 43.5 
KLAC 1.58 1.72 1.76 1.57 90.9 0.86 1.13 1.21 65.8 
MMM 1.61 1.83 1.90 1.41 77.1 0.59 0.84 0.91 45.9 
MO 1.47 1.73 1.87 1.27 73.5 0.44 0.67 0.75 38.4 
MSFT 0.74 0.90 0.98 0.87 96.7 0.24 0.45 0.56 50.1 
MWD 1.39 1.58 1.67 1.14 71.7 0.47 0.70 0.78 44.0 
NXTL 0.93 1.08 1.13 0.86 80.4 0.42 0.59 0.66 54.9 
ORCL 0.74 0.88 0.96 0.81 91.6 0.21 0.41 0.53 46.4 
PFE 0.80 0.98 1.05 0.82 83.6 0.23 0.41 0.50 41.5 
QCOM 1.45 1.58 1.61 1.46 92.7 0.73 1.01 1.09 64.0 
QLGC 1.50 1.65 1.72 1.48 89.3 0.75 1.03 1.12 62.2 
QQQ 0.53 0.75 0.80 0.74 98.1 0.32 0.52 0.60 69.2 
QQQQ 0.98 1.20 1.24 1.17 97.5 0.54 0.81 0.91 67.7 
SBC 0.66 0.79 0.86 0.64 80.3 0.21 0.34 0.42 43.0 
SMH 1.18 1.36 1.41 1.11 82.0 0.47 0.74 0.83 54.2 
TYC 0.96 1.14 1.22 0.88 77.2 0.28 0.47 0.56 40.9 
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
 
XLNX 1.33 1.46 1.50 1.25 85.7 0.60 0.87 0.97 59.7 
XOM 1.29 1.48 1.54 1.22 82.3 0.50 0.77 0.86 51.9 
Average 1.11 1.29 1.36 1.07 84.1 0.43 0.65 0.74 49.5 
Std.Dev. 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 8.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 10.8 
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Table 2.4 Average coefficient estimates for a regression of changes in the option quote midpoint. A regression of option midpoint 
changes for 1, 5, or 15 minutes on implied bias as well as lagged changes in the option and delta-adjusted stock quote midpoints. The 
regression is estimated separately for each stock and six absolute delta (0.35 and 0.65 cut-offs) and time-to-expiration (60 days cut-
off) bins within each of the 30-day periods. The regression is based on 12 regularly spaced 5-minute time periods (only the first four 
and the last one are reported). Equation (2.6) summarizes the setup. Price impacts and quote changes are measured in dollars. 
 
Days-to-
Expiration 
Money-
ness 
Intercept, 
1/100 
Implied 
Bias 
Lagged changes in stock price 
adjusted for option delta, 5 seconds   
Lagged changes in option quote 
midpoint, 5 seconds  
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4  t-12 
 
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 
 
t-12 R^2 
T = 1 minute  
short-term OTM -0.00279 0.13 0.39 0.27 0.22 0.19  0.08 -0.28 -0.22 -0.19 -0.16 -0.05 0.09 
long-term OTM 0.00047 0.15 0.43 0.30 0.24 0.21  0.09 -0.28 -0.23 -0.20 -0.17 -0.05 0.10 
short-term ATM -0.01109 0.22 0.51 0.36 0.30 0.27  0.11 -0.28 -0.24 -0.21 -0.18 -0.05 0.12 
long-term ATM -0.00392 0.21 0.52 0.37 0.30 0.27  0.11 -0.29 -0.24 -0.21 -0.18 -0.05 0.12 
short-term ITM -0.02401 0.32 0.52 0.37 0.31 0.27  0.10 -0.28 -0.25 -0.22 -0.19 -0.05 0.13 
long-term ITM -0.00680 0.28 0.50 0.35 0.29 0.25  0.09   -0.28 -0.24 -0.21 -0.18   -0.05 0.14 
T = 5 minutes  
short-term OTM -0.00192 0.31 0.42 0.31 0.27 0.24  0.12   -0.28 -0.24 -0.21 -0.19   -0.08 0.10 
long-term OTM 0.00086 0.34 0.45 0.33 0.29 0.25  0.12 -0.29 -0.25 -0.22 -0.20 -0.08 0.11 
short-term ATM -0.02000 0.44 0.49 0.37 0.32 0.29  0.14 -0.26 -0.24 -0.22 -0.20 -0.07 0.09 
long-term ATM -0.01153 0.43 0.51 0.38 0.33 0.29  0.14 -0.27 -0.24 -0.22 -0.20 -0.07 0.11 
short-term ITM -0.10875 0.55 0.45 0.33 0.29 0.26  0.11  -0.23 -0.22 -0.20 -0.19  -0.06 0.08 
long-term ITM -0.04095 0.52 0.44 0.32 0.28 0.25  0.10   -0.24 -0.22 -0.20 -0.18   -0.07 0.11 
T = 15 minutes  
short-term OTM 0.01439 0.45 0.37 0.27 0.23 0.23  0.11   -0.23 -0.20 -0.18 -0.16   -0.06 0.08 
long-term OTM 0.00775 0.48 0.40 0.29 0.25 0.25  0.12 -0.23 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.07 0.09 
short-term ATM -0.01786 0.55 0.44 0.33 0.28 0.27  0.12 -0.22 -0.21 -0.19 -0.18 -0.07 0.06 
long-term ATM -0.01741 0.56 0.45 0.33 0.29 0.27  0.14 -0.21 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.06 0.07 
short-term ITM -0.30067 0.63 0.39 0.29 0.25 0.22  0.10 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 -0.16 -0.06 0.04 
long-term ITM -0.12175 0.63 0.38 0.27 0.23 0.21  0.09   -0.19 -0.18 -0.16 -0.15   -0.06 0.07 
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Table 2.5 The timing execution bias is conditional on other variables. Each column 
reports a regression of the timing bias on absolute delta, square root of time to expiration 
in days, dummy for call options, dummy for buy transactions, square root of trade size in 
contracts, dummies for trades of one contract and trades of round size, number of 
exchanges quoting best ask price for buy orders and vice versa for sell orders, and finally, 
a dummy for a single exchange quoting the relevant best price. The last two columns 
report regressions for subsamples of large trades and trades with more than one exchange 
quoting the relevant best price. “RoundVolume” equals 2 for trade size divisible by 10, 
and equals 1 for trades divisible by 5. The timing bias is defined as the implied bias 
(difference between the midpoint implied by the BSM model and the quote midpoint) 
divided by the average quoted spread for a given option. T-statistics based on robust 
standard errors, which are clustered by date, are reported in parentheses. Stock fixed 
effects are included but not reported. Average timing bias is 38% with standard deviation 
of 78%.  
 
Implied Bias 
/Quoted Spread, 
% 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Volume 
>16 
#Exchan-
ges > 1 
Abs(Delta) 0.210 0.206 0.165 0.198 0.093 
 (52.71) (53.52) (41.29) (52.00) (20.41) 
Sqrt(T-t) -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 
 (27.43) (27.23) (33.58) (44.85) (30.08) 
D(Call) -0.026 -0.024 -0.013 0.007 -0.018 
 (14.79) (14.77) (8.23) (4.31) (9.73) 
D(Buy)  0.069 -0.372 -0.437 -0.378 
  (15.20) (54.48) (74.21) (55.41) 
Sqrt(Volume)  -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.001 
  (7.05) (17.52) (59.65) (16.49) 
D(Volume=1)   0.034  0.050 
   (9.97)  (12.91) 
RoundVolume   0.010 -0.067 0.015 
   (7.45) (82.44) (11.62) 
#ExchAtNBBO   -0.110 -0.126 -0.112 
   (43.73) (65.34) (44.65) 
D(#Exch=1)   0.361 0.278  
   (48.75) (46.94)  
R
2
 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.04 
N, 1000s 20,434 20,433 20,433 6,145 17,021 
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Table 2.6 Timing execution bias is conditional on other variables. Price impact is the 
change in the option quote midpoint in the 5 minutes following the transaction. The 
implied bias is the difference between the option price implied by the BSM model and 
the quote midpoint immediately before the trade. The expected price impact is computed 
from a regression of changes in the option midpoint on implied bias as well as lagged 
changes in the option and stock quote midpoints (see Table 2.4) with lags based on 5-
second intervals. Independent variables also include absolute delta, square root of time to 
expiration in days, dummy for call options, dummy for buy transactions, square root of 
trade size in contracts, dummies for trades of one contract and trades of round size, 
number of exchanges quoting best ask price for buy orders and vice versa for sell orders, 
and finally, a dummy for a single exchange quoting the relevant best price. The last 
column uses the difference between the actual price impact and the implied bias as the 
dependent variable. T-statistics based on robust standard errors, which are clustered by 
date, are reported in parentheses. Stock fixed effects are included but not reported. 
“RoundVolume” equals 2 for trade size divisible by 10, and equals 1 for trades divisible by 
5. Average price impact is 1.3 cents, and its standard deviation is 4.6 cents. 
 
Price Impact, 
Cents 
     Impact –Bias, 
Cents 
Implied Bias    0.253   
    (14.98)   
ExpPriceImpact    0.629 0.993  
    (25.51) (207.54)  
Abs(Delta) 1.740 1.738 1.614 0.539 0.397 0.410 
 (92.16) (91.81) (84.93) (33.35) (29.52) (30.73) 
Sqrt(T-t) 0.028 0.028 0.025 0.017 0.018 0.012 
 (50.60) (53.01) (42.43) (35.29) (34.81) (27.67) 
D(Call) -0.229 -0.207 -0.179 -0.119 -0.117 -0.096 
 (41.00) (38.77) (31.29) (23.40) (23.10) (17.34) 
D(Buy)  0.259 -0.996 -0.254 -0.264 0.104 
  (25.91) (57.11) (21.39) (22.10) (7.36) 
Sqrt(Volume)  0.014 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 
  (41.85) (60.62) (59.19) (59.92) (52.55) 
D(Volume=1)  0.052 0.054 0.002 0.014 -0.052 
  (4.44) (4.72) (0.22) (1.50) (6.36) 
RoundVolume  0.043 0.040 0.014 0.013 0.007 
  (9.02) (9.57) (6.06) (5.11) (4.13) 
#ExchAtNBBO   -0.306 -0.101 -0.110 0.015 
   (39.44) (22.01) (24.10) (4.50) 
D(#Exch=1)   1.084 0.452 0.490 0.073 
   (42.59) (29.98) (30.38) (6.13) 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.00 
N, 1000s 20,434 20,433 20,433 20,433 20,433 20,433 
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Chapter 3 
Order Flow and Expected Option Returns 
3.1 Introduction 
Exploring factors behind asset returns is central to asset pricing. The derivative 
markets receive increasing attention because they are an excellent laboratory to test some 
of the asset pricing theories including the inventory hypothesis that is at the center of this 
paper. For example the options market has several features giving it an advantage 
compared to the stock market. Changes in fundamentals are easier to track. There are no 
short sale restrictions and contracts have short duration.  
Over the past years, many models have been proposed to fit option prices. 
However, much less attention has been paid to factors behind option returns. One of the 
advantages of using returns rather than prices is that returns provide a direct and model-
independent measure of the aggregate risk premium embedded in option prices. What 
factors observed on day t-1 predict future option returns on day t ? This paper shows that 
the inventory channel plays a first order role in determining expected option returns,1 
while other observed variables have much lower predictive power. Thus, the paper 
emphasizes the importance of including order flow as a state variable in option pricing 
models. The fact that inventory is central to the options market may indicate that its role 
in other markets, where clean tests of the inventory channel are harder to conduct, is 
more important than previously thought.  
The idea behind the inventory channel is that order imbalances move prices even 
in a market with no information asymmetry and no changes in fundamentals. A negative 
customer order imbalance increases the market maker’s net positions and forces risk-
averse market makers to decrease the price to compensate for holding inventory and 
attract order flow in the opposite direction. The compensation depends on position size, 
volatility, and time to liquidation. Ho and Stoll (1981) are among the first to provide a 
formal treatment of this idea, while Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009, GPP 
                                                 
1 More precisely, these are returns on delta-neutral option portfolios. Note that for daily returns, there is 
little difference between subtracting and not subtracting a risk-free rate. 
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hereafter) develop an equilibrium inventory model for the options market, which serves 
as theoretical background for this paper.   
There are two big empirical challenges for quantifying the effect of the inventory 
channel on prices. First, a clean identification strategy is necessary because a simple 
regression of option returns on same-day order imbalances is subject to the endogeneity 
problem, as both variables are determined on the same day and by the same factors such 
as news. However, the biggest challenge is that besides having an inventory impact, order 
imbalance also contains informed trading and is correlated with fundamentals as pointed 
out by Shleifer (1986). For example, investors may buy put options because they have 
information that the stock will underperform or because they want to protect their stock 
positions in a high-volatility environment. Thus, the elasticity of option prices to net 
market-maker inventory resulting from order imbalance is determined by informed 
trading and fundamentals as well as the inventory channel; separating the latter from the 
rest is not easy. The previous literature on the relationship between inventory and option 
prices (Bollen and Whaley, 2004 and GPP, 2009) is subject to both of these criticisms. 
The paper demonstrates how these problems can be solved by using two 
identification strategies and a novel market microstructure method. In the first strategy, 
we exploit the fact that option expirations create exogenous variation in order imbalances 
and thus exogenous variation in market maker inventories, as investors open new 
positions to replace positions in expiring options. At the same time, nothing unusual is 
observed in the stock market, indicating that most of the variation in the order flow can 
be attributed to the inventory channel. The second strategy uses a two-stage least square 
(2-SLS) approach that takes advantage of the fact that market-wide and individual order 
imbalances can be predicted by their past values which are plausibly exogenous. To 
confirm that most of the variation in order flow, in this case, comes from the inventory 
channel, we show that previous-day order imbalances predict future returns primarily 
through future order imbalances. Under both strategies, the inventory-related order 
imbalance has a similar and significant impact on expected option returns, while other 
explanatory variables have much smaller predictive power. Finally, the last part of the 
paper develops a novel microstructure method to decompose the price impact of trades 
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into inventory and information components. We apply this method to the options market 
and find that inventory has a larger price impact than information. 
Let us provide more detail on the results of these tests. Options expire after the 
close on the third Friday of each month. During the “expiration rollover,” investors 
substitute expiring positions with similar non-expiring ones in the three-day window 
around an expiration day. Because investors are short call and put options on average in 
the equity options market (Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman, 2007), the rollover 
creates unprecedentedly large selling pressure in the non-expiring options. As market 
makers, who are the main liquidity providers in the options market, accumulate excess 
inventory, they decrease prices for one-month options by 5.7% in just three days. Little 
mean reversion in price and order flow is observed in subsequent days, as few investors 
have the infrastructure and risk management expertise to help market makers with their 
inventory. In addition, for a smaller subsample with available intraday data, we show that 
option returns and order imbalances closely follow each other at the intraday level, and 
most of the “abnormal” returns are observed during trading hours. Later, we demonstrate 
that the 2-SLS regression with individual and market-wide order imbalances 
instrumented by their lagged values can explain the “abnormal” expiration returns.2 The 
main advantage of using the expiration rollover is that the variation in order imbalance is 
predominantly inventory-driven. Alternative channels are easily ruled out: volatility is 
unchanged around expiration; thus, fundamentals and informed trading are not 
responsible for the expiration order imbalance. The option bid-ask spreads are reduced by 
an insignificant amount; thus, liquidity changes are too small to explain the expiration 
returns. Behavioral factors such as inattention advocated by Duffie (2010) are less likely 
to be important because all equity options expire on the same day. In conclusion, option 
expiration dates create exogenous variation in order imbalance and thus exogenous 
variation in market maker inventories which is mostly inventory-driven and has a 
substantial effect on option prices. 
The second identification strategy extends our results beyond the expiration 
period by analyzing a panel of daily option returns with the instrumental variables 
approach. As implied by the inventory channel, order imbalances predict future option 
                                                 
2 The expiration dummy variables become insignificant in this 2-SLS regression.  
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returns primarily through future order imbalances. In the first stage of the 2-SLS 
regression, individual and market-wide order imbalances from day t are instrumented by 
three nested sets of instruments based on expiration day dummies and past individual and 
market-wide order imbalances. In the second stage, a regression of option returns on the 
predicted imbalances produces very similar coefficient estimates across all instrument 
sets. In these regressions, market-wide order imbalance is a particularly important factor 
because market makers manage their inventory risk on a portfolio basis. Overall, the 
effect of inventory-related order imbalance on option prices is six times stronger if 
estimated with the clean 2-SLS approach compared to simple OLS regressions. Thus, our 
identification strategies not only produce more precise estimates but also show that their 
magnitudes are much larger than implied by the literature. 
The next step is to conduct a direct “horse race” between the inventory channel 
and other return predictors by estimating a regression of day t returns on day t-1 
explanatory variables. We control for more than 60 variables including different 
measures of implied and historical volatility, shape of the volatility surface, stock returns, 
open interest, and option volume. Appendix B contains a complete list of the variables 
and their descriptions. Lagged order imbalances are very good predictors of future 
returns. One standard deviation change in the inventory-related order imbalance 
corresponds to a 1% change in expected option returns on the next day before costs. 
Other control variables have a much smaller predictive ability which can often be 
explained by microstructure reasons. This result directly shows that the inventory channel 
has a much bigger impact on expected returns than any other observable factors. 
Importantly, the ability of lagged order imbalance to predict future returns is driven by its 
ability to predict future order imbalances. The return predictability is: (1) observed for 
many days in the future, (2) robust to other ways of computing option returns, and (3) 
equally strong for stocks with liquid as well as illiquid options. Importantly, the return 
sensitivity to order flow is higher during the financial crisis as inventory risk is more 
“expensive” to manage during periods of high volatility and risk aversion. 
Finally, the last part of the paper develops a novel microstructure method that 
provides independent support for the inventory channel from the intraday perspective. 
The method decomposes the price impact of trades into inventory and information 
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components. The main idea behind the method is that information is symmetric while 
inventory is asymmetric. That is, we assume that all investors instantaneously receive 
equal information about a trade transaction, while only the market maker at the receiving 
exchange (the exchange where the trade is made) gets the extra inventory. This 
assumption is reasonable because in modern electronic markets information is highly 
standardized. Thus, the price impacts can be estimated by comparing price response at 
the receiving exchange with price changes at other exchanges. The option market 
microstructure fits the method assumptions particularly well. Applying the method to the 
options market, we find that option trades have a significant price impact: a sequence of 
10 buy transactions moves an option price by 0.5%. Second, inventory has a bigger price 
impact than information, which provides additional support for the main point of the 
paper. Third, both price impacts are increasing and concave functions of trade size. 
Fourth, we study how the price impacts vary with trade and option characteristics. The 
inventory impact is larger for buy transactions, and the relative information impact is 
larger for put, out-of-the-money (OTM), and short-term options. Finally, the underlying 
stock price instantly responds to option trades; however, the economic magnitude of this 
impact is small: 0.02 cents for an average option trade. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes 
the related literature. Section 3 discusses the data employed in the paper. Section 4 
contains the results for the expiration rollover and defines the main variables. In Section 
5, we discuss the identification strategy based on instrumental variables. Section 6 
compares the inventory channel with other observed factors. Section 7 develops a 
microstructure test and estimates the price impact of option trades. A short appendix 
summarizes the variable definitions. 
3.2 Connection to the Literature  
The idea that prices are affected by supply and demand was only recently brought 
to the options literature by Bollen and Whaley (2004, BW hereafter). Specifically, they 
document that daily changes in the level and slope of implied volatility are positively 
correlated with an order imbalance on the same trading day.  
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Several issues should be taken into account while interpreting their results. The 
most important concern comes from Shleifer (1986) who emphasizes that order flow can 
be informed, and thus prices can change in response to information rather than inventory. 
Indeed, several papers provide evidence of informed trading in the options market.3 
Specifically, option order imbalance can predict future stock returns (Pan and Poteshman, 
2006), and volatility (Ni, Pan, and Poteshman, 2008). Another important concern is 
endogeneity. For example, both returns and order imbalances are determined on the same 
day and by the same factors such as news. Reverse causality may also be at play. Are 
investors buying because prices are rising or vice versa? Finally, it is common in 
financial economics to re-evaluate research results which are exposed to endogeneity, 
with the “investment-cash flow sensitivity” literature being one of the prominent 
examples. As was emphasized in the introduction, this paper addresses all of the issues 
outlined above by designing two specific identification strategies. 
Another difference between BW (2004) and this paper is that we study option 
returns rather than changes in implied volatility. Although the two variables are strongly 
correlated, there are some important distinctions. In market situations when the Black-
Scholes-Merton model fails, changes in implied volatility are particularly misleading. For 
example, implied volatility drops while option returns are close to zero on earnings 
announcements. Another example is the day-of-week seasonality in implied volatility. 
Implied volatility is higher on Fridays and lower on Mondays because the calendar time 
to expiration is used for its computation by convention. In addition, by computing option 
returns directly, we assess a cumulative risk premium embedded in option prices without 
relying on a specific option pricing model. Option returns are more volatile than changes 
in implied volatility, and it affects statistical significance; but for a sufficiently large 
sample, this problem becomes less important. 
Apart from BW (2004), GPP (2009) is the only paper which studies supply and 
demand imbalances in the options market. In the empirical section of the paper, they 
document that the market-maker net positions are positively correlated with the spread 
between the observed implied volatility and the implied volatility estimated from a 
                                                 
3 Among others, see SEC cases as well as Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005). 
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benchmark jump-diffusion model. They also found a negative coefficient for the 
interaction between the net non-market maker demand and market maker profits.  
Most of the concerns for BW (2004) are also relevant for GPP (2009). For 
example, part of the net inventory can come from informed investors or be correlated 
with market fundamentals4. In short, the difference between the two papers is that GPP 
(2009) examine levels whereas BW (2004) as well as this paper look at changes in levels.  
Both BW (2004) and GPP (2009) document the correlation between order 
imbalances and implied volatility, while this paper complements the literature by 
identifying the inventory-related part of order imbalance and quantifying its causal effect 
on option returns by solving the endogeneity problem. Moreover, we demonstrate that the 
inventory channel is a major factor determining expected option returns. 
This paper, especially its “expiration rollover” part, is related to the literature on 
the elasticity of asset prices. Unlike stocks, options are always in zero net supply so the 
classic definition of elasticity does not work here. However, net supply can be split into 
the customer demand and the market maker net position which sum to zero. The latter 
part plays a market clearing function, and thus we can study elasticity of option prices 
with respect to non-market-maker net demand.     
The most prominent “natural experiment” on the stock price elasticity is the 
S&P500 additions. On the day a stock is added to the S&P500 index; mutual funds rush 
to buy it and push the stock price 3% higher on average. Little price mean reversion is 
observed after the ex-date. This test was introduced by Shleifer (1986) together with 
Harris and Gurel (1986), but there is still a debate about how to explain it with buying 
pressure being only one of the hypotheses. Both the setup and the results for the 
expiration rollover are markedly similar to the S&P additions test. A substantial order 
imbalance moves option prices during the expiration period, while the effect on prices is 
largely permanent. 
However, several features of the expiration rollover make its results much easier 
to interpret than the S&P additions. Most importantly, changes in fundamentals are much 
easier to track in the options market. Roughly speaking, a stock price is an estimate of a 
                                                 
4 Finally, it is worth noting that both of these papers are based predominantly on the pre-2000 data. The 
equity options market experienced a major change from floor-based to electronic trading after ISE entered 
the scene in May 2000. 
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firm’s unobservable value; while for an option price, it is enough to combine an observed 
stock price with an estimate of future volatility. A firm’s value is affected by numerous 
factors such as operating performance, borrowing costs, stock recognition, and analyst 
following. Some of these factors do change after a stock is added to the index and can 
potentially explain the increase in market capitalization (Denis, McConnell, 
Ovtchinnikov, and Yu, 2003). On the other hand, the main unknown for an option price is 
future volatility, which can be estimated. As Muravyev et al. (2011) show, the option 
market is a price-taker with respect to the underlying stock price. A related feature is the 
effective duration which is possibly infinite for a stock but is only 30 days for the most 
liquid options. Also, establishing a short position in the stock market can be costly if not 
impossible. This is a likely reason why prices revert faster after index deletions compared 
to additions. By contrast, long and short positions are equally easy to establish in the 
options market. The expiration rollover has a larger sample size than other elasticity tests. 
Options on thousands of stocks expire every month, while other tests have only several 
hundred observations. Finally, the expiration rollover is a market-wide event, as all 
equity options expire on the same day. This market-wide feature puts this test in a unique 
position compared to other tests. For example, inattention (Duffie, 2010) is unlikely to 
explain the expiration rollover, as expiration is an apparent market-wide event. All these 
features make the expiration rollover an attractive test for the price elasticity even when 
compared with the S&P additions.  
This paper is directly related to the literature on option pricing. Although option 
returns were used as early as in Black and Scholes (1972), most of the attention is paid to 
explaining option price levels rather than changes. The literature is too extensive to cite 
and so we refer the reader to the survey by Bates (2003). The main research efforts are 
directed towards designing a proper stochastic model for the underlying stock price 
which captures all risk premiums. Although considerable progress has been made in this 
direction, there are still many inconsistences which are hard to explain and correct within 
the mainstream approach.5 Less attention is paid to other lines of research. Stein (1989), 
                                                 
5 Bates (2003), summarizing the research on option pricing, writes that “to blithely attribute divergences 
between objective and risk-neutral probability measures to the free ‘risk premium’ parameters within an 
affine model is to abdicate one’s responsibilities as a financial economist. ... a renewed focus on the explicit 
financial intermediation of the underlying risks by option market makers is needed.” 
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Poteshman (2001), Han (2008) as well as Lemmon and Ni (2010) advocate behavioral 
explanations such as sentiment and under/overreaction. Christoffersen, Goyenko, Jacobs, 
and Karoui (2011) argue that liquidity is a significant factor for option returns. Bollen 
and Whaley (2004) as well as Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009) show that order 
imbalance is one of the factors. By showing that the inventory channel is the main factor 
for expected option returns, this paper points to the importance of adding order flow to 
the mainstream option pricing models. 
The empirical literature on option returns is relatively sparse. Jones and Shemesh 
(2010) indicate that option returns are markedly lower over the weekend (Friday close to 
Monday close). Goyal and Saretto (2009) show that options with a high volatility 
premium, defined as the difference between implied and historical volatilities, earn lower 
option returns. Bakshi and Kapadia (2003) argue that risk-neutral skewness affects option 
returns. Ang, Bali, and Cakici (2010) find that stocks with high one-month returns tend to 
experience an increase in implied volatility over the next month. Cao and Han (2010) 
show that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have lower option returns. Duarte and 
Jones (2007) study the effect of exposure to the market volatility risk. We design proxies 
to control for these factors and show that the inventory channel has a much bigger impact 
on returns. 
3.3 Data Description 
The data used to compute daily order imbalances were obtained from the 
International Securities Exchange (ISE). The dataset contains daily non-market-maker 
volume for all ISE-listed options starting in May 2005. For each option, the daily trading 
volume and number of trades have four types: open buy (close buy), in which investors 
buy options to open new (close old) positions; open sell and close sell. Trading volume is 
further divided by investor type into two categories: customer and firm. If an investor 
buys options through a broker, it is classified as a customer trade. This investor can be a 
small retail investor or a large hedge fund. Trades made by members (like Morgan 
Stanley) for their own account or on behalf of another broker/dealer are “firm” trades. 
The data only include transactions which were executed at ISE; however, through most of 
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the sample period, ISE was the biggest equity options exchange with a market share of 
about 30%. Battalio and Schultz (2010) use a small subsample of this dataset.  
The ISE open/close data are similar to the early CBOE data used by Pan and 
Poteshman (2006). There are several distinctions between the datasets. The most 
important one is on the “public/private information” dimension. It is important because if 
information about order imbalance is public, then the informed trading hypothesis has a 
smaller potential to explain the return predictability. Poteshman’s data, which span pre-
2001 period, are not public. The information was collected by CBOE but was never 
released to the market. CBOE made part of this dataset available for purchase only in 
2006. On the other hand, the ISE data are mostly public. Subscribers were initially 
receiving reports at the end of a trading day. Currently, the information is updated every 
10 minutes during trading hours. In addition, the order imbalance can be approximated 
from publicly available tick level data. On the other side, Poteshman’s dataset has some 
information not contained in the ISE data. It includes open interest subdivided by 
investor type as well as information about exercised options. Thus, it is much harder to 
reconstruct market maker positions from the ISE data. 
For the intraday analyses, we use tick level data collected by Nanex, a firm 
specializing in selling real time data feeds to proprietary traders. The dataset contains all 
quotes and trades for 39 stocks including three ETFs and their options from April 2003 to 
October 2006. The selected stocks had the most liquid options in March 2003. The data 
were archived by Nanex as they arrived from the exchanges at Nanex’s server, and time-
stamped by Nanex to 25 millisecond precision as they arrived. The data come from all 
U.S. exchanges where a given contract is traded. The transaction price, size, exchange 
code, and some other information are available for trades. The exchange-level best quotes 
and volumes are available for quotes. That is, the data include each instance when any 
exchange adjusts its best quote or quoted volume, even if this change does not alter the 
National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO). A more detailed description of this dataset can be 
found in Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2011). 
Finally, OptionMetrics is a common source of price information on equity 
options. For each option contract, it contains end-of-day best bid and ask prices as well as 
other variables such as volume, open interest, implied volatility, and option Greeks. 
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Underlying stock returns and volume are also taken from OptionMetrics avoiding sample 
reduction from merging OptionMetrics with CRSP based on historical CUSIPs. Our 
sample period ends in October 2010 because at the moment of writing this is the last 
month when data are available in OptionMetrics/WRDS. 
3.4 Variation in Expected Option Returns around 
Expiration Dates 
3.4.1. Expiration rollover identification strategy 
This section describes the expiration rollover test. Option expirations create 
exogenous variation in order imbalance, and thus exogenous variation in market-maker 
inventories as investors open new positions to replace positions in expiring options. We 
use this variation to study the link between inventory and option returns.  
Why should we expect that option investors would rebalance portfolios around 
expiration? First, from the practitioner’s standpoint, expirations provide a natural exit 
strategy: establish an option position, wait until expiration, and repeat. For example, 
Bollen and Whaley (2004) as well as Ni (2008) use it in their papers and Whaley (2004) 
in his textbook. Second, it is often optimal to wait until expiration. Covered call writing is 
one of the most popular strategies among option investors with the idea to “profit from 
time decay.” The time value of options decays fastest right before expiration, making it 
optimal to hold positions until that day. Moreover, some investors care about tail risks, 
thus—as some options in their portfolio expire—they have to replace them to maintain 
positive gamma as a protection against jumps in the underlying stock. That is, these 
investors want to make money if a stock price jumps by 30% in either direction. There 
are other factors which incentivize investors to hold positions until the expiration date, 
including large bid-ask spreads which make closing the position costly and margin 
requirements which favor certain combinations of options with the underlying stock. 
Why do we expect to see order imbalances around the expiration day? Large 
trading volume does not necessarily create big order imbalances. However, in the equity 
options market, investors are on average short call and put options, as confirmed by 
Lakonishok et al. (2007) and GPP (2009). Thus, when investors roll over their positions, 
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there is more selling than buying which leads to big selling order imbalances. To sum up, 
there are strong a priori reasons to expect significant order imbalances around expiration.  
In the expiration rollover test, expiration dates are clearly exogenous, as equity 
options expire on the third Friday of each month. Thus, option expiration exogenously 
triggers simultaneous portfolio rebalancing by many option investors which results in 
substantial selling pressure. It is a natural experiment in the sense that a discrete event 
triggers exogenous variation in the variable of interest. The pressure is easily predictable 
and there is no reason to expect more informed trading around expiration dates compared 
to other days. Importantly, option expiration is a pure option market event. Thus, the 
stock market behaves in a normal way and fundamentals do not change around that day. 
3.4.2. The computation of key variables 
This paper has two main classes of variables: option returns and measures of 
order imbalance. We study returns of delta-neutral option portfolios. There are several 
reasons for using delta-neutral returns. First, unhedged (raw) option returns contain risk 
premiums from both the option and stock markets. However, reinventing stock market 
anomalies is hardly interesting. Delta-neutral returns by construction do not depend on 
the direction of stock price movements and thus do not include risk premiums from the 
stock market. In addition, delta-neutral returns have substantially lower dispersion than 
raw returns. It is common in the literature to study delta-neutral returns and we follow 
this path in this paper.  
For each day and stock, we divide options into four groups based on the 
remaining time to expiration. The 0th expiration group includes options with less than 13 
calendar days to expiration. We call them “ultra short-term” options. The next expiration 
group (“short-term” options) is the most important one. That is why we use variable 
bounds for it to ensure some presence on each day.6 The average time to expiration for 
this group is 30 days. The third group contains “mid-term” options with no more than 150 
days left. Finally, the fourth expiration group includes “long-term” options with more 
than 150 days left. Within each group for options with the shortest expiration, we find the 
                                                 
6 The exact boundary between the second and third expiration groups is 45+ |18-day (date)/2| days to 
expiration which on average is equal to 45 days. 
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call-put pair closest to the at-the-money (ATM) point. If there are no options close to 
ATM among options with absolute delta between 0.3 and 0.7, we skip this stock and day. 
For the selected call-put pair we compute option returns from the end of day t-1 until the 
end of the next day t.  
In the majority of cases, we use delta-neutral straddle returns. For the call-put pair 
selected within each expiration group, a straddle portfolio is formed with weights (1, -
)(/)( tt PC ∆∆ ). That is, one call option is bought and then as many put contracts added as 
required to make the position delta-neutral. If the call-put pair is exactly ATM, then this 
portfolio will be a classic straddle that consists of one call and one put option. Option 
returns are computed based on the price at which the portfolio can be purchased at the 
end of day t-1 and then sold at the end of the next day t. We follow the literature in 
computing prices based on quote midpoints. Deltas are taken from OptionMetrics which 
computes them via the CRR-trees. For robustness, we also use delta-neutral call returns 
computed for a portfolio of a call option and a short position in )( tC∆  shares of the 
underlying stock. The option return definitions are summarized in the following 
formulas: 
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We prefer straddle returns to call returns for two reasons. First, straddle returns 
rely only on the data from the options market, avoiding any potential issues with 
asyncronization between the stock and options markets. Second, there is no consensus on 
which option pricing model is the best. Derman (1999) shows that the replication ability 
of main model classes (BSM, SV, and LV) depends on the current market environment. 
Thus, deltas can be slightly biased. In untabulated results, we show that in our sample, 
straddle returns have smaller delta bias than call returns.  
Unless otherwise stated, we refer to the delta neutral straddle returns for short-
term options as option returns. The reason for focusing on the one-month ATM options is 
that they are the most actively traded options. 
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 The second key group of variables is measures of order imbalance. We follow 
Bollen and Whaley (2004) in defining a measure of individual order imbalance as the 
difference between the number of buy and sell transactions divided by the total number of 
option trades on a given day.  
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This measure doesn’t distinguish between low and high volume days. That is why, we 
also use a measure of volume-adjusted order imbalance defined in Eq. (3.3). 
( )
( )∑ ∑
∑
=
−
=
29
0 i ij,-tA,
i
it,A,it,A,
tA,
Trades#
30
1
SellTrades#BuyTrades#
Imb AdjOrd
j
        (3.3) 
Instead of the number of trades on day t, we use the average number of trades in the 
previous 30 days in the denominator. Thus, on high-volume days, a volume-adjusted 
imbalance has a larger magnitude than a simple order imbalance. For some of the tests, 
we use order imbalance measures computed for a particular subsample of options such as 
only put options or only short-term options. In this case, both numerator and denominator 
are based on the same selected subsample of options. 
An important role is played by a measure of market-wide order imbalance which 
shows whether option investors are buying or selling at the aggregate level. 
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A market-wide order imbalance is a weighted average of individual order imbalances 
with weights equal to the average option volume during the previous 250 trading days. It 
is important because each market maker operates in options on hundreds of stocks and 
manages inventory risk on the portfolio basis. 
Standard filters are used. Stocks-days with stock prices below 5 dollars or with 
positive option volume on less than 80 days per year are excluded. Returns are computed 
only for options that satisfy three criteria: (1) both option bid prices should be larger than 
10 cents; (2) OptionMetrics deltas should be well defined; and (3) the option bid-ask 
spread should be less than 50% of the price.   
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Appendix B describes a large battery of control variables that this paper uses. 
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for selected variables. 
3.4.3. Empirical results 
The empirical results section starts by examining the average dynamics of market 
averages around expiration day in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2. Looking at market averages 
is useful because some of the order imbalances around expiration can be affected by 
option traders having information (e.g., the “roll” volume might be slightly more or less 
due to information). However, this information “reverse causality” is unlikely to affect 
the market-wide averages. Later in the paper we will pursue a different strategy that 
explores return cross-section using 2-SLS approach. 
The first thing to notice is that the expiration order imbalance is highly negative. 
It has a minimum of -24.3% on the post-expiration Monday. This number is big: there are 
only 49 days with market-wide order imbalances lower than -20%, and 43(!) of them fall 
on the post-expiration Monday. Thus, it is not be surprising that expiration is the biggest 
seasonal pattern in option order flow. The other two days also have big negative order 
imbalances of -10% on Friday and -12.5% on Tuesday. Order imbalances revert to their 
average of about -4% after expiration.  
This substantial order imbalance translates into negative option returns, as market 
makers require premium for accumulating inventory. Figure 3.1 illustrates how returns 
mirror order imbalances. The returns from Friday through Tuesday are -1.4%, -3.5%, and 
-0.8%, respectively, which sum up to cumulative returns of -5.7%. This number can be 
converted into dollar terms by multiplying it by an average option price of 4.4 dollars 
which corresponds to a 25-cent profit. The strategy of selling straddle on Thursday and 
buying it back on Tuesday has returns bigger than the average bid-ask spread of 20 cents. 
However, this comparison indicates that for the trading strategy to be profitable, a 
sophisticated execution strategy is required because taking liquidity and paying the full 
bid-ask spread is too expensive. The returns of course are also reflected in implied 
volatility which drops by 4.5% in relative terms (or 1.8% in absolute terms). This 
decrease is even bigger if we account for the fact that implied volatility on average 
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increases by 0.9% in absolute terms over the weekend because volatility is much lower 
during the weekend compared to a regular trading day. 
The correlation between option returns and order imbalances is also positive for 
mid-term and long-term options (second and third expiration groups). However, the 
magnitudes are smaller. Cumulative option returns are -2.8% for mid-term and -1.5% for 
long-term options, while average order imbalances are -10.7% and -8.3%7 during the 
expiration period. These facts are consistent with inventory models such as GPP (2009). 
Indeed, mid-term options are closer substitutes for short-term options than long-term 
ones. Thus, an inventory shock to short-term options should have a higher effect on the 
mid-term rather than long-term options.  
The dollar option volume for short-term options is abnormally high during the 
expiration period providing more support for the rollover hypothesis, as investors use 
mainly short-term options for their “roll.” Short-term option volume reaches its 
maximum on the post-expiration Monday when it is 30% higher than the pre-expiration 
average of -15%.8 As investors finish rolling over their positions, volume decreases but 
remains about 10% higher than the pre-expiration level.  
3.4.3.1. Possible changes in liquidity 
After establishing the link between order imbalances and option returns, we 
examine alternative explanations and confirm that the link is driven predominantly by the 
inventory channel. The first alternative is the liquidity channel. Since options are in zero 
net supply, it is not entirely clear why a seller of an option should pay a liquidity 
premium to the buyer. We follow Christoffersen et al. (2011) who argue that buyers 
should pay a lower price for illiquid options. The liquidity story implies that after 
expiration, trading costs decrease for the short-term options and that is why their prices 
increase. Following Christoffersen et al. (2011), we use the dollar option bid-ask spread 
as a liquidity measure and compare it before and after expiration. To better estimate 
trading costs, we take an average over multiple options.9 Since the bid-ask spread is 
                                                 
7 Mid-term options have -6.9%, -15.0%, and -10.3% averages, while long-term options have -6.3%, -
10.8%, and -7.9%. 
8 Pre-expiration volume is 15% lower than average over the whole sample for this expiration group. 
9 Specifically, we compute the dollar bid-ask spread as the ask price minus the bid price averaged for all 
options with absolute delta between 0.3 and 0.7 within an expiration group for a given stock and date. 
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approximately linear in absolute delta and is very volatile, this measure provides a good 
estimate of the ATM bid-ask spread. The ATM bid-ask spread decreases by about 7% or 
1.5 cents in absolute terms based on an average bid-ask spread of 20 cents. It is unlikely 
that a 1.5-cent change in trading costs can cause a 25-cent swing in option prices, 
especially given that short-term options have only 30 days left to expiration. Other 
measures of trading costs (e.g., the relative bid-ask spread) change even less or don’t 
change at all. The bid-ask spreads for mid-term and long-term options are slightly smaller 
on the post-expiration day but then revert to an average level. Overall, the variation in 
trading costs is unlikely to explain the observed option returns. 
3.4.3.2. Possible changes in fundamentals and informed trading 
Change in fundamentals is another alternative explanation. For example, the 
expiration period may be associated with abnormal volatility in the underlying stock. 
Although volatility is not directly observable, there are good measures which estimate it. 
In this paper, we consider three of them: standard close-to-close volatility measured as 
absolute stork return, close-to-open volatility measured as absolute close-to-open return, 
and high-low volatility measured as a logarithm of daily high and low prices.  
High-low volatility is a popular proxy for intraday volatility. Table 3.2 
demonstrates that high-low volatility deviates very little from its average of 4% during 
the period. Another measure of volatility is absolute stock return. Unlike high-low 
volatility, absolute returns account for both intraday and overnight volatility. The average 
absolute returns are 2.1%. The lowest absolute returns of 1.9% are on the expiration day 
and the highest (2.4%) on the post-expiration Monday. This pattern in volatility is 
consistent with the expiration “pinning,” a phenomenon that a stock price tends to close 
near an option strike on the expiration day. Ni, Pearson, and Poteshman (2005) show that 
pinning can be explained by market maker delta-hedging on the expiration day. Although 
Ni et al. (2005) consider only the ex-day, it is not hard to extrapolate their intuition to the 
post-expiration day. After the force, which “pins” a stock price to the strike price on 
Friday, is withdrawn on Monday, the price “un-pins” away from the strike causing higher 
volatility. Although pinning creates some variation in volatility, the average volatility 
during the expiration period equals to the sample average of 2.1%.  
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In addition, as nothing remarkable is observed in the stock market, the stock bid-
ask spreads remain unchanged, indicating that there are no changes in information 
asymmetry. Thus, the share of informed trading does not increase around expiration. 
Thus, even a simple analysis of aggregated variables suggests that the liquidity 
and change in fundamentals channels are unlikely to explain the observed option returns 
and order imbalances. 
3.4.4. Intraday evidence on expiration rollover 
The previous section demonstrated that the expiration period (from Thursday 
close to Tuesday close) is a very special time with strong selling pressure accompanied 
by negative option returns. With intraday data, it is possible to get additional insights by 
looking inside this three-day period. This section conducts an intraday analysis of the 
expiration period using tick data on 39 stocks and ETFs (April 2003–October 2006) from 
Nanex.  
We compute option returns and order imbalances the same way as for the daily 
data. However, there are small differences which are worth noting. Each trading day is 
split into several periods. We treat each period the same way we treat one day of daily 
data. At the beginning of each period, we search for a call-put pair closest to ATM for a 
given expiration group and then compute straddle returns. The ATM call-put pair for the 
next period may differ from the pair for the current period. However, such changes are 
rare intraday. We exclude an observation if one of the bid prices for the selected pair is 
below 20 cents at the beginning of the period. For the order imbalance, the biggest 
difference in methodology is that we do not observe which side of the trade (if any) is 
taken by a market maker. We assume that market makers provide liquidity in each trade 
transaction. We estimate which side of the trade provides liquidity by using a simple 
algorithm to infer a trade direction. Trades are assigned into buyer or seller initiated by 
applying the quote rule to the NBBO. If the trade is at the NBBO midpoint, the quote rule 
is applied to the BBO from the exchange at which the trade is executed.  
Figure 3.2 shows order imbalances for the period around the expiration day. It 
plots the imbalances for four expiration groups based on the number of calendar days left 
to expiration: the first group has less than 15 days; the second group has 15–45 days; the 
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third group has 45–130 days; and the fourth group has at least 130 days to expiration. 
Every day is split into four equal periods of about one hundred minutes each. Every 
single point on the graph is an average of about 1,500 observations with the same 
intraday period and the same number of days to expiration. Figure 3.2 clearly shows that 
the order imbalance is unusually negative during the three-day expiration period and that 
it reaches a minimum of -30% on the post-expiration Monday (denoted “zero” on the 
figure). Mid-term and long-term options follow the same pattern. Order flow starts to 
decrease from -10% to -13% on Monday at the beginning of the expiration week. 
However, the three-day expiration period clearly stands out with its abnormally negative 
order imbalance. 
 At the same time for expiring options, we see a completely different pattern. The 
order imbalance becomes positive about ten days before the expiration and then continues 
to increase slowly to about 5%. The order imbalance jumps to 10% on the Monday that 
begins the expiration week and reaches a maximum of 25% on the expiration Friday. 
 Figure 3.2 clearly demonstrates that investors are buying expiring options and 
selling options in other expiration groups which is consistent with investors rolling over 
their positions. The expiration order imbalance is so large that it can be visually spotted 
while examining the time series of aggregated order imbalances. The expiration sell-off is 
the largest calendar anomaly in the option order imbalance.  
 After visually establishing a significant selling pressure during the expiration, we 
turn to the analysis of option returns in Table 3.3. Each day is split into five periods. The 
first period is the overnight period from the close of day t-1 to the open of the next day t. 
The second interval is a 5-minute period right after the market opens. The rest of the day 
is split into three equal periods of about 120 minutes each.  
For short-term options, the returns are zero or slightly positive outside the 
expiration period. However, on the expiration Friday, negative returns start to build up as 
order imbalance becomes substantially negative. Friday is associated with a cumulative 
negative return of -2%. Monday has the biggest returns of -4.8% with -1.9% during the 
overnight period, at the same time the order imbalance reaches its minimum of -25%. On 
Tuesday, the cumulative returns are -1.6%. The total cumulative returns for the expiration 
period are -8.4% which is comparable to returns in the ISE daily sample. The main 
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conclusion from these observations is that order imbalances go hand in hand with option 
returns. Although the expiration selling pressure can be easily predicted, option prices 
adjust to order imbalances simultaneously and not in advance.  
Overall, the results in this section confirm our findings from the daily data and 
provide several new insights. First, the expiration order imbalance can be easily spotted 
even without the ISE data by just analyzing the tape. Second, expiration returns are 
accumulating, as order imbalances come in during trading hours rather than during non-
trading hours.  
3.5 Instrumental Variable Approach for Daily 
Returns Panel 
3.5.1. Identification strategy 
The previous section provided strong evidence for the inventory hypothesis by 
analyzing average order imbalances during the expiration period. This section extends 
this result by showing that inventory can explain option returns on days not near 
expiration as well as their cross-sectional and time-series variation. The main idea in this 
section is that order imbalances are predictable using expiration dummies and past order 
flow. As has been emphasized earlier, concurrent returns and volume are driven by 
common shocks leading to endogeneity and biased coefficient estimates. We use the 
instrumental variables approach which is a common way to deal with endogeneity.  
We study three nested sets of instrumental variables. The first set contains only 
expiration day dummies. Specifically, it includes a separate dummy variable for each of 
nine days around the post-expiration Monday. As the previous section demonstrated, 
expiration dummies correspond to exogenous changes in order flow which are unrelated 
to alternative channels such as informed trading and fundamentals. On the downside, this 
set of instruments by construction uses information primarily from the expiration period.  
The second set of instruments contains two lags of market-wide order imbalance 
as well as expiration dummies. Lagged variables are the most popular instrument choice 
in economics and we follow this strategy here. Although these instruments allow us to 
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study time-series variation, they cannot identify cross-sectional variation because market-
wide imbalances have the same value for every stock on a given day. 
Finally, the third set of instruments adds two lags of individual order imbalance. 
With this set of instruments, both time-series and cross-section dimensions can be 
explored. In addition, it is possible to separate the effects of individual and market-wide 
order imbalances. Employing lagged variables solves the main econometric problem, as 
shocks on different days are largely uncorrelated. However, it is not a priori clear whether 
all predicted order imbalances should be attributed to the inventory channel. For example, 
individual order imbalances may be informed about future volatility and through it, about 
future option returns. The private information contained in order imbalances may take 
time to be reflected in the prices. Subsection 5.3 addresses this concern by showing 
empirically that the predicted order imbalances are driven primarily by the inventory 
channel. In particular, it shows that order imbalances can predict future returns 
predominantly through future order imbalances. In addition, order imbalances are public 
information which limits the potential for the informed trading hypothesis. 
After settling on the sets of instruments, we apply a standard 2-SLS approach to 
study the effect of order imbalance on option returns. Equations (3.5) and (3.6) 
summarize the setup.  
First stage: 
}OrdImb,OrdImb  ; {IVSet(2)IVSet(3)
}MWOrdImb,MWOrdImb  ; {IVSet(1) IVSet(2)
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β
β
         (3.5) 
Second stage: 
 it,i1,-tt2it,10it, εControls'MWOrdImb αAdjOrdImbααOptRet ++++= β      (3.6) 
3.5.2. Empirical results for 2-SLS 
Table 3.4 reports parameter estimates for the first stage in Eq. (3.5). There is a 
significant positive correlation between current and future order imbalances. Both 
97 
 
market-wide and individual imbalances are important for predicting future imbalances 
with all the coefficients being positive with cumulative coefficients of 0.710 for market-
wide imbalances and 0.26 for individual imbalances. Thus, if an option market maker 
observes an increase in inventory on one day, then his net position is likely to continue 
increasing on the next day. This fact can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is 
that option market makers are comfortable with holding inventory and don’t exert much 
effort in balancing it. The other interpretation is that although market makers adjust 
prices, they fail to attract order flow in the opposite direction. That is, the elasticity of 
order imbalances with respect to prices is small, and the main instrument which market 
makers have does not quite work in the options market. Interestingly, in the stock market, 
the market maker order flow is negatively autocorrelated (Seasholes and Hendershott, 
2007).   
Table 3.5 reports coefficient estimates for return sensitivity to order flow from the 
second stage of 2-SLS in Eq. (3.6) and a simple OLS regression for comparison. Part A 
estimates Eq. (3.6) without market-wide order imbalance. The OLS coefficient of 0.025 
is comparable with estimates in BW (2004). This coefficient is six times smaller than 
0.16 produced by the 2-SLS. Thus, our clean identification strategy not only produces 
more precise estimates but also demonstrates that these estimates are substantially larger 
than implied by current literature which is based on simple OLS regressions.  
Turning to the 2-SLS estimates, the first thing to notice is that for all instrument 
sets, the estimates are very close to each other. If only individual imbalance is included 
(Part A), then the estimates range from 0.18 to 0.12. If both individual and market-wide 
imbalances are included (Part B), then estimates for market-wide imbalance range from 
0.26 to 0.32. As discussed in the previous subsection, only the last set of instruments can 
separate individual and market-wide imbalances. That is why we get a significant 
estimate for the individual imbalance of 0.036 only for the third instrument set. If we 
transform the coefficients for the last instrument set into a single order flow factor, then 
one standard deviation change in it can explain a substantial portion of variation in daily 
option returns, namely 2.2% out of 9.6%. 
                                                 
10 0.7 is a sum of 0.561 for the first lag and 0.118 for the second lag. 
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This subsection quantifies the effect of inventory on returns and shows the 
importance of accounting for market-wide imbalance. The logical next step is to examine 
a specific channel through which this predictability works which is done in the next 
section. 
3.5.3. Alternative channels for return predictability 
What is a channel through which past order flow predicts future returns? By 
showing that order imbalance predicts future returns predominantly through its ability to 
predict future order imbalance, this subsection shows that most of predicted order 
imbalances can be attributed to the inventory channel.  
Order imbalance can affect option returns through two alternative channels. The 
inventory channel implies that the order imbalance on day t-1 helps to predict the order 
imbalance on the next day t which in turn moves option prices on the day t. The other 
channel implied by the informed trading hypothesis builds on the results of Ni, Pan, and 
Poteshman (2008) with the idea that order imbalance can predict future stock volatility 
which in turn directly transmits into future option returns. To test these two alternatives, 
we instrument both future imbalance and volatility to conduct a horse race between them.  
To compare the two channels, we use an instrumental variables approach to the 
day t order imbalance and volatility as predictors of day t option returns. The instruments 
include lags of order imbalance and volatility. If the inventory channel is the main one, 
then we should expect to see that the instrumented volatility has small or no predictive 
power.  
Among all the measures of day t order imbalance, we choose the same variables 
as before: market-wide and individual imbalances. Stock volatility is measured in two 
complementary ways. The first measure is absolute stock return. However, it may vary 
widely across stocks and in time (ARCH effects). The second measure tries to account 
for these two features. An adjusted absolute return is computed as an absolute stock 
return normalized by its 20-day moving average. It measures how high current volatility 
is relative to the recent past. Furthermore, regression coefficients for this measure are 
easier to interpret. Overall, the two measures complement each other. 
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Table 3.7 reports results for the 2-SLS regressions. The first half of the table 
reports the first stage. As the previous section showed, a significant positive correlation 
exists between current and future order imbalances. Another interesting fact to note about 
the first stage concerns the underlying volatility. Order imbalances are indeed good 
predictors of future volatility. However, a more careful examination of the results reveals 
that the interpretation of this predictability as informed trading (Ni et al., 2008) is not the 
only one. In particular, market-wide imbalance is the most significant predictor of future 
volatility. Market-wide variables including order imbalance usually are unlikely to be 
affected by informed trading, because it is hard to obtain private information about future 
market moves. The alternative explanation for the order flow predictability of volatility is 
that the econometric model does not account for information about future volatility that 
the market already knows. This information triggers hedging or speculative trading which 
translates into order imbalance.11  
The last four columns of Table 3.7 report the second stage of 2-SLS. The 
regression in Column 6 estimates sensitivity of option returns to the same-day order 
imbalance and the coefficient of 0.078 means that the order imbalance of 25%, which 
equals to one standard deviation, corresponds to option returns of about 2%. The next 
column adds market-wide order imbalance and the coefficient drops by half indicating 
that market-wide imbalance is at least as important as individual imbalance. 
Finally, in the last two columns, we conduct a horse race between the inventory 
and volatility channels for the return predictability. Both future volatility and order 
imbalance are instrumented and placed in the same regression. Both measures of 
volatility are insignificant if measures of order imbalance are included. At the same time, 
the coefficient estimates for order imbalances are unchanged. This result indicates that 
predictive order imbalance rather than predictive volatility is the main channel for the 
return/order flow predictability. It provides further support for the inventory hypothesis 
advocated in this paper. 
                                                 
11 For example, economic releases such as GDP are often associated with high volatility. The timing of the 
releases is known many days in advance to all market participants but is not known to the econometrician 
who relies only on history of prices and volumes. In anticipation of the release, some investors adjust their 
portfolio to hedge or speculate. Usually, such trades are correlated and they create order imbalance. This 
imbalance is observed by the econometrician who concludes that the imbalance predicts future volatility. 
However, in this example, there is no informed trading since information is common to all investors.  
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Another concern is that individual order imbalances contain some private option-
specific information that becomes known to the market and realized in option returns 
only on subsequent days. There are two reasons why the effect of this channel is likely to 
be small. First, day t-1 individual order imbalance becomes public information by the end 
of that same day. Subscribers to the ISE open/close data receive updated estimates of the 
order imbalance every ten minutes.12 Even without special data products from ISE and 
CBOE, the order imbalance can be estimated from the public tick-level data broadcasted 
by OPRA in real time. Second, the effect of private information embedded in the lagged 
order imbalance should remain significant even after controlling for future order 
imbalances. However, the last column in Table 3.6 shows that this is not the case. The 
coefficient for day t-1 individual order imbalance decreases from 0.008 to 0.002 and 
becomes economically insignificant13 if day t order imbalance is included in the return 
regression.14 This result indicates that individual imbalances predict future returns 
predominantly through future individual imbalances and thus, are unlikely to be driven 
by private information.  
3.5.4 Inventory channel can explain “abnormal” 
expiration returns 
This subsection demonstrates that the 2-SLS regression, which has lagged 
imbalances as instruments for their future values, can statistically explain the “abnormal” 
expiration returns. 
The first two columns in Table 3.6 report unconditional returns and the adjusted 
order imbalance around expiration days. The cumulative abnormal returns are -6.7% with 
a -4% contribution from the post-expiration Monday. The number is slightly larger than   
-5.7% returns in Table 3.2 because average option returns for the whole sample are 
slightly positive. The order imbalance reaches a minimum of -21.7% on the post-
expiration day. Friday and Tuesday have order imbalances of -7.3% and -10%, 
respectively.  
                                                 
12 See http://www.ise.com/WebForm/viewPage.aspx?categoryId=513. 
13 A coefficient of 0.002 times standard deviation of 0.3 corresponds to a 0.06% changes in option returns. 
14 The regression of  day t  option returns on explanatory variables and order imbalances from  day t-1  . 
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If the inventory channel is the main driver of the expiration returns, then it should 
be able to explain significant portion of them. First, cumulative “abnormal” returns 
diminish from -6.7% to -3% in the regression of day t option returns on individual and 
market-wide imbalances from day t-1 as reported in Column 4. Although the coefficients 
in this regression are based predominantly on the information from non-expiration days, 
they can explain significant portion of the expiration returns. Even better results are 
achieved with an instrumental variable approach. If the order imbalances of  day t  are 
instrumented with their values from day t-1, then in the second stage of 2-SLS, 
“abnormal” expiration returns diminish from -6.7% to insignificant 0.9%. Not only are 
the returns positive now, but they are also very similar to returns on other days around 
expiration. Thus, the regression estimated on the whole sample can explain the expiration 
returns and show that there is nothing special about them. This result is important 
because it explicitly demonstrates that order imbalances can explain the “abnormal” 
expiration returns and provides additional support to the inventory channel. 
3.6 Return Predictability: Inventory versus Other 
Factors 
3.6.1. Order imbalance and future option returns 
This section shows that the inventory channel has much larger affect on expected 
option returns than all other observable factors. We compare return predictability of 
lagged order imbalances with a big battery of variables from day t-1 which according to 
previous research can predict returns on day t. Appendix B provides a complete list of the 
control variables that include risk-neutral volatility, skewness and kurtosis (Bakshi, 
Kapadia, and Madan, 2003), past stock returns, different measures of stock volatility, 
measures of size such as volume and capitalization, implied volatility skew and time 
slope, and weekend dummy. We use these variables in different combinations and select 
the best combination which avoids collinearity.   
Table 3.8 reports regressions in Eq. (3.7) for different sets of order imbalances 
and control variables.  
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t,i1,i-t1-t21,i-t10t,i εControls'MWOrdImbαOrdImbααOptRet ++++= β   (3.7) 
Columns 3 to 5 gradually add different measures of order imbalance in the 
regression. First, we include the individual order imbalance on day t-1 which shows up 
highly significant with t-statistics of 20 even in the presence of all the control variables. 
Next, we add market-wide order imbalance which shows up significant and has a t-
statistic of “only” 6.5 because this variable has the same value for all stocks on a given 
day. Thus, the effective sample size is smaller than total for it. The advantage of using the 
market-wide order imbalance is that it is unlikely to be determined by informed trading 
unless informed trading is correlated across stocks. Finally, in the last column, two more 
measures are added, namely, the order imbalance on the previous day t-2 and the order 
imbalance for the short-term options (first expiration group). The last variable is relevant 
because option returns for short-term options are being predicted. All variables are 
positive and highly significant. To assess the economic magnitude of these four 
imbalance measures, we aggregate them into a single factor using coefficient estimates 
from the regression. One standard deviation change in this variable corresponds to a 1% 
change in expected option returns on the next day.  
To summarize the results, market-wide and individual order imbalances are the 
most significant predictors of future option returns out of all observed variables.  
3.6.2. Other predictors of option returns 
Although the primary attention of this paper is on the link between returns and 
order flow, this subsection examines other significant predictors of option returns. We 
dedicate only one subsection to these variables because they have a substantially smaller 
predictive ability than order imbalances.  
Our battery of controls includes more than 50 variables, many of which have not 
previously been considered in the literature. Table 3.9 reports the most significant control 
variables in the regression from Eq. (3.7). Column 3 reports coefficient estimates for the 
whole sample, while other columns examine particular subsamples. Column 3 reports the 
results for the subsample of two hundred stocks with most liquid options. Column 4 
studies a subsample of options with call and put bid prices exceeding 2 dollars. Column 5 
reports results for two-day-ahead returns. These three subsamples aim to examine how 
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market microstructure influences the return predictability. Finally, the last column reports 
individual regressions of option returns on a single variable and an intercept.  
Even among the variables reported in the table, few are economically significant 
and stable across different model specifications. In addition, several variables are 
significant if all controls are included but become insignificant in individual regressions. 
The remainder of the subsection examines significant variables one by one. 
Absolute stock return is a good predictor of next-day returns. One standard deviation 
change in this variable increases expected returns by 0.39%.15 That is, option prices 
“underreact” to changes in instantaneous volatility. This result is similar to the one found 
by Poteshman (2001) who documents that S&P index options underreact to unexpected 
changes in instantaneous volatility estimated from a stochastic volatility model. 
Specifically, he estimates a regression of a difference between changes in instantaneous 
volatility for long-term and short-term options on unexpected changes in instantaneous 
volatility. The coefficient is negative but insignificant. Poteshman interprets his findings 
as evidence of investor irrationality. Investors put too much weight on the prior beliefs 
and do not update them properly. It should be noted that our paper differs from 
Poteshman (2001) in several ways. Our methodology is less sophisticated, as we compute 
returns directly instead of relying on a specific model. Consequently, it is much easier to 
estimate the economic magnitude with our approach. Finally, we look at equity options 
while Poteshman examines S&P index options. 
Although it is tempting to blame investor irrationality for this return 
predictability, we suggest an alternative explanation. A large tick size in the options 
market may be the reason why option prices are “sticky” and unresponsive to small 
changes in volatility. To support this microstructure hypothesis in unreported results, we 
show that the coefficient for absolute returns becomes virtually zero after November 1, 
2009 (and February 2010). At that time, the majority of stocks were added to the penny 
pilot program reducing the options tick size from 5 cents to a penny. At the same time, 
the coefficient is as big as in the whole sample for the previous year starting on 
November 1, 2008. This difference-in-difference result provides some support for the 
microstructure explanation. Moreover, the predictive ability of absolute return is much 
                                                 
15 A related factor is median stock volume which is significant only when absolute return is omitted. 
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smaller for subsamples of liquid options and options with large price favoring the 
microstructure explanation. We leave for future research to fully explain the nature 
behind the absolute return predictability.  
Another variable with significant predictability is one-day change in ATM 
implied volatility. If implied volatility increases by one standard deviation of 4%, option 
returns become lower by 0.39% on the next day. The most likely explanation for this 
predictability is the “bid-ask midpoint bounce.” To illustrate the mechanism, consider a 
stylized example. If the option bid price is set abnormally low, the quote midpoint will 
also be low which translates into low implied volatility. The bid price and implied 
volatility revert to the normal levels on the next day; and positive option returns are 
recorded on this day because returns are computed based on the quote midpoints. 
However, no abnormal returns will be recorded if the ask price is used instead of the 
midpoint in this example. Thus, the decrease in implied volatility on day t-1 is reversed 
on day t and is mechanically related to the option returns on day t. To support this 
microstructure explanation, we demonstrate that the predictability is much smaller in the 
subsample of the two hundred most liquid stocks. Finally, there is no predictability 
between the change in implied volatility on day t-1 and the option returns on day t+1 
which is directly implied by the “midpoint bounce” hypothesis. 
Everything said about the change in implied volatility applies to the implied 
volatility as a predictor. It is also likely to be driven by microstructure reasons because its 
predictive ability disappears if day t+1 returns instead of day t returns are predicted. 
Predictive ability of lagged option returns is also mainly driven by the market 
microstructure. Surprisingly, it is not significant in the individual regression. 
Market maker net position in short-term options is another factor. Unfortunately, 
we do not have data on exact market maker positions. We estimate them by computing 
the cumulative signed volume (measured in millions of contracts) which is admittedly a 
noisy proxy because option exercises and transactions at other exchanges are not 
accounted for. Although this variable is statistically significant, it is economically small. 
This coefficient of 0.045 multiplied by the standard deviation of 0.01 yields only a 
0.045% return. 
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Jones and Shemesh (2010) show that weekend (Friday to Monday close) option 
returns are abnormally low. Confirming their findings, we also find that the Friday 
dummy is economically (but not statistically significant) even after the expiration-Friday 
dummy is included. In this case, the Friday-Monday returns are -0.7% on average. This 
estimate is slightly smaller than in Jones and Shemesh (2010) because they use data from 
1996 to 2007, while our sample period is 2005 to 2010. Although a more elaborate 
analysis is needed, part of the Friday effect can be microstructure driven. The reason for 
such concern is that the Friday effect disappears in the subsample of options with bid 
prices larger than 2 dollars.  
Boes, Drost, and Werker (2007) demonstrate that close-to-open jump risk is 
priced for S&P index options. We test whether this premium exists for equity options. 
The idea is that stocks for which most of the volatility happens during non-trading 
hours16 should have more negative option returns to compensate investors who are short 
gamma for inability to hedge during non-trading hours. We indeed find a negative 
coefficient that supports this story. Its economic magnitude varies from -0.1% for the 
whole sample to -0.3% for the subsample of the two hundred most liquid stocks. 
The fact that our results are consistent with other theories reported in the literature 
provides some support that our specification is reasonable. Overall, the examination of all 
these explanatory variables reconfirms the point that order imbalance is a major 
determinant of expected option returns. 
3.6.3. Robustness checks 
This section examines the robustness of the return predictability to changes in 
methodology and in different subsamples. The order imbalance from day t-1 predicts 
option returns on the next day t. Can it predict returns two days ahead on day t+1? 
Column 3 of Table 3.10 shows that indeed it can. Moreover, the coefficients are very 
similar to the baseline case reported in Column 2. The economic magnitude is only 
slightly smaller compared to a one-day forecast. Column 4 reports results for the day t+4 
returns (one week ahead). For this case, the market-wide imbalance remains highly 
                                                 
16 Specifically, we look at the difference between close-to-open volatility and time-scaled standard 
volatility. The time scaling is done to make the mean of the variable approximately zero. 
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significant, while the individual imbalances have smaller magnitudes. One standard 
deviation change in the predicted imbalance corresponds to 0.7% returns on day t+1 and 
0.58% returns on day t+4, which is smaller compared to 1% for day t. Thus, the return 
predictability exists for several days in the future and is not driven by market 
microstructure reasons. 
Straddle returns, which are used throughout this paper, depend on both call and 
put returns. Maybe only one of these two parts contributes to the “abnormal” returns. 
This hypothesis is tested in Column 5 which uses delta-hedged call returns instead of 
straddle returns. There is little difference between the coefficient estimates for call 
returns and for straddle returns. Thus, the results are robust to the way delta-hedged 
returns are computed.  
Our sample includes all equity options with at least some trading activity listed on 
ISE with a maximum of 1911 stocks on a given day. Many of these stocks have illiquid 
options which are traded only several times per day. A potential concern is that all the 
predictability is concentrated in stocks with illiquid options. We test this hypothesis on 
the subsample of the two hundred stocks with the most liquid options (based on option 
volume in the previous 250 days). Column 6 shows that coefficients for the order 
imbalance are very close to the baseline case at the same time abnormal returns around 
expiration become even more negative. Thus, we do not observe a significant difference 
between liquid and illiquid options. If anything, expiration returns are higher for larger 
stocks (7.1% for large vs. 5.7% for all). 
The last column in Table 3.10 reports the most important robustness check. The 
inventory hypothesis implies that during crises market makers are more risk-averse and 
cash-constrained. Thus, order imbalance should have a higher impact on prices during 
crises. Favorably, one of the biggest crises took place during the sample period. The 
crisis started in August 2007 in the subprime market and then spread to the rest of the 
economy and financial system. Markets finally calmed down by the end of January 2009. 
This timeline is confirmed by a visual examination of the TED spread, VIX index, and 
liquidity commonality in the options market—all three-time series closely follow each 
other. We control the crisis by including a dummy variable (n_crises) which is set to one 
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for the period August 2007–January 2009. The results are similar if VIX is employed 
instead of the crisis dummy. 
We choose a dummy variable as a way to control for the crisis for two reasons. 
First, VIX index, TED spread, and the liquidity commonality are highly correlated with 
short-term future volatility which in itself is a predictor of expected option returns. We 
want to close the latter channel and concentrate on the change in risk preferences. 
Second, the economic magnitude is much easier to assess for interactions with a dummy 
rather than with a continuous variable. The last column in Table 3.10 shows that the crisis 
dummy is positively related to option returns because market volatility increases during 
the crisis. Thus, option returns should be positive on average. The main coefficients of 
interest are interaction terms between the crisis dummy with market-wide and individual 
order imbalances. Both coefficients are highly economically significant. For example, 
market-wide order imbalance has about two times bigger price impact during the crisis 
compared to normal time.  
Overall, the robustness tests confirm that the results are stable across different 
subsamples and changes in methodology. 
3.7 Microstructure Method to Decompose Price 
Impact of Trades 
The results presented so far have been based mostly on daily data. This section develops 
a microstructure method that provides independent micro-level evidence supporting the 
inventory hypothesis. This test separates inventory and information price impacts and 
empirically shows that inventory has a larger price impact than information in the options 
market. 
A common way to separate inventory and information at the intraday level is to 
attribute permanent price changes to information and transitory to inventory price impact 
(e.g., Hasbrouck, 1991).17 However, several recent papers, including Seasholes and 
Hendershott (2007) as well as Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), demonstrate that 
the effect of inventory on prices can take days if not weeks to unwind. Thus, at the 
                                                 
17 Empirically, Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002), using the Hasbrouck (1991) approach, conclude that all 
information in the options market is contained in quote revisions and none in option trades. 
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intraday level, both inventory and information have a permanent impact on prices which 
cannot be separated by standard methods.  
We develop a simple method that is based on a completely different set of 
assumptions and is not subject to the above criticism. At its core is the idea of 
information being symmetric while inventory being asymmetric. The method assumes 
that all investors instantly receive equal information about a trade transaction, while only 
the market maker at the receiving exchange gets extra inventory. Option market 
microstructure fits the method assumptions particularly well. 
A detailed description of the framework follows. Consider three competitive 
exchanges/market makers AAA, BBB, and CCC that trade the same security in a modern 
fully electronic environment. Imagine that at a given moment, a buy order of size V* 
arrives to exchange AAA, and all three exchanges have been quoting the same ask price. 
Also, assume that the quoted size at the receiving exchange VAAA is bigger than trade size 
V*; otherwise, the price will move “mechanically.” All three market makers will 
instantly learn the same information about the transaction because in modern electronic 
markets information is standardized. Thus, the option price response to this trade iiiP∆  
from all market makers will contain the information component. We refer to this effect as 
the “information symmetry.” On the other hand, only market maker AAA gets extra 
inventory. Thus, only his price reaction AAAP∆  will contain the inventory component as 
well as information. We call this effect “inventory asymmetry.” 
These steps can be summarized in the following equations: 
)(
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    (3.8) 
where it
i
tt PPP −=∆ ∆+ is the change in price for i
th exchange between the transaction time 
t and time ( tt ∆+ ). )(InvPI  and )(InfPI  denote inventory and information price 
impacts. Alternatively, we can study the relative price impact defined as change in price 
divided by its level. The evaluation period is set to 5 seconds. On the one side, it gives 
market makers more than enough time to respond; on the other, it is small enough to 
avoid interference between multiple trades. 
These equations can be solved for the price impacts: 
109 
 
2/)()(
2/)()(
CCCBBB
CCCBBBAAA
PPInfPI
PPPInvPI
∆+∆=
∆+∆−∆=
   (3.9) 
The last two equations demonstrate that both price impacts can be estimated as 
simple averages on the subsample of trades with multiple exchanges quoting the best 
price. The method can be generalized to study price impacts conditional on trade and 
security characteristics. Method assumptions are summarized in the following list:  
1) Markets are transparent and have instant information dissemination. 
Information is standardized: everybody receives equal information about a 
transaction. 
2) Liquidity is provided primarily by market makers. That is, most of the liquidity 
providers are professionals and are concerned about inventory risk. 
3) Market makers do not share inventory with each other.  
4) Multiple market makers often quote the same NBBO price. 
The equity options market fits these assumptions well. First, in early 2003, all 
options exchanges were connected through the Linkage, and the NBBO rule was 
introduced. At the same time, investors got access to real-time information about the best 
prices at each exchange. In less than a second, every investor learns about any 
transaction. In the “good old days” of floor-based trading, market-makers on the 
exchange floor had better information about trades than other investors. However, this is 
not the case anymore in the modern electronic markets with anonymous trade 
counterparties. Information is highly standardized, and everybody gets a standard 
message with transaction information. Essentially, all option market making is electronic, 
and the prices are set by computer algorithms. Overall, the options market is at least as 
transparent and developed as the stock market. 
Second, market makers stand on the other side of most transactions.18 In the 
options market, market makers not only transfer liquidity in time but also across different 
options. With about a hundred different option contracts available for each underlying 
stock, it is unlikely for two investors to select the same option; thus, they are most likely 
to trade with a market maker. In addition, exchanges have rules granting lead market 
                                                 
18 OCC website has data on market maker versus other investor volume which confirm this point 
(http://www.theocc.com/webapps/onn-volume-search). 
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makers substantial competitive edge over other liquidity providers (e.g., the 60/40 NBBO 
order split rule19). These rules further strengthen the lead market makers’ position as the 
main liquidity providers and introduce additional barriers to entry. 
Third, market makers do not share inventory in the options market. This practice 
is common in some OTC markets where dealers can trade directly with each other. For 
example, Lyons (1997) shows that “hot potato” trading is common in the FX market. A 
large customer trade is followed by a sequence of smaller trades between dealers to share 
the inventory. In this case, all dealers will get some inventory, and their price responses 
to a trade transaction will contain both information and inventory components. Thus, the 
simple formulas outlined earlier will not work unless adjusted to include the inventory 
spillover. Luckily, the options market has no hot potato trading or other inventory 
sharing. One of the reasons is that all trade orders for all exchange-traded options must be 
exposed to the public through exchanges. This rule greatly reduces the potential for order 
internalization, a practice common in the equity world. Also, note that although it is 
common for a market-making firm to make markets in multiple stocks and at multiple 
exchanges, it makes market only at one exchange for any given stock.20 
Finally, options exchanges quote the same price most of the time because of the 
large tick size. For example, SEC report (2007, p. 8) shows that more than 75% of the 
time at least three exchanges quote the same NBBO bid price. During our sample period, 
the tick size was 5 cents for options priced below 3 dollars and 10 cents for options above 
this threshold. Overall, the options market satisfies all the method’s assumptions. 
  Our approach is close in spirit and objective to Vijh (1990) who studies the price 
impact of large option trades. He finds no price impact for a sample of 137 large option 
trades from CBOE in 1985. Since then, the option market has become many times more 
liquid. With a much bigger sample, we demonstrate that the price impact can be 
quantified and is significant. Another similarity between our papers is that both papers 
study price impact directly for a “clean” subsample of trades. On the other hand, even the 
                                                 
19 “Exchange Rule 6.76A: … When an LMM or DOMM is quoting on the book at the National Best Bid or 
Offer (“NBBO”), the LMM or DOMM receives a guaranteed allocation of 40% of the incoming order 
ahead of any other non-Customer interest ranked earlier in time.” SEC Release No. 34-62598 
20 Even if occasionally the same firm acts as market maker in the same stock on different exchanges, this 
biases against us while finding the results (big inventory price impact). 
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“strong filter” sample used in this paper constitutes more than 10% of the total number of 
trades, whereas Vijh uses a very small share of total volume. 
The sample is constructed in multiple steps. We start with a standard prescreening 
to eliminate illiquid and bizarre options. Trade transactions should satisfy the following 
conditions. 
• The remaining time to expiration T – t is between 10 and 400 calendar days, 
exclusive. 
• Absolute delta is between 0.2 and 0.8. That is, options with at least some 
“optionality” are selected. ATM options are the most liquid. 
• The transaction time is between 9:35 and 15:55. The first and last 5 minutes of 
trading are excluded to avoid open and close rotations.  
Dropping any of these filters does not change the results, and 15,298,816 out of 
28,127,906 trade transactions satisfy these conditions. 
The next step is to apply minimum conditions required by the method. We refer to 
them as “basic” filters. 
(a) At least two exchanges (including the receiving one) quote the transaction price; 
otherwise, Eq. (3.9) is not well defined. 
(b) Trade size is smaller than quoted size at the receiving exchange. This condition is 
set to avoid “mechanical” price impact at the receiving exchange. 
(c) Quoted size at the receiving exchange is at least 20 contracts. This condition helps 
to differentiate market makers from small liquidity providers such as retail 
investors. 
(d) Trade size should be at least 200 dollars to avoid ultra small trades. 
Condition (a) also serves another purpose. Since trade price equals to the NBBO price 
quoted by at least two exchanges, there is little ambiguity about trade direction. 
Conditions (b) and (c) make it less likely for the receiving exchange to move its quotes 
and if anything, work against us finding a significant inventory impact. Condition (a) 
reduces the sample size to 10,236,011 observations, and conditions (b) through (d) 
further reduce it to 7,368,445 trades. Thus, a significant portion of the initial sample 
satisfies all the basic filters.  
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 The basic filters are the minimum set of conditions required by the method. 
Another set of filters, which we refer to as “strong,” aims to make the sample as close as 
possible to the “ideal” experiment implied by the method. We present results for both 
basic and strong filters demonstrating that they are similar but paying more attention to 
the “strong” filter sample. The strong filters add the following conditions in addition to 
the basic filters: 
(e) At least three exchanges, including the receiving one, quote the transaction price. 
(f) Stock quote midpoint changes by no more than one penny during the evaluation 
period.  
(g) Trade size is at least twice as big as the combined size of all other option trades 
for a given stock during the evaluation period.  
Condition (e) insures that the quoted price is considered “right” by the majority of 
market makers. It also reduces the variance of information impact estimates because 
responses from more exchanges are used to measure the impact.  
Under the ideal experiment, there will be no new information during the 
evaluation period except for the option trade itself. However, even during 5 seconds, new 
information arrives to the market and alters the stock and option prices. Condition (f) 
tries to bring the setup close to the ideal experiment by considering only trade 
transactions accompanied by small absolute stock returns. Importantly, the filter does not 
create endogeneity because the options market is a price taker with respect to the 
underlying stock price as shown by Muravyev et al. (2011). In addition, limiting the 
sample to zero-return observations avoids econometric problems from the possible 
misestimation of the strong and non-linear relationship between stock and option quote 
changes. Luckily, stock prices usually do not change much in 5 seconds, and most of the 
observations pass this filter.  
 Moving to condition (g), from the ideal experiment perspective, there should not 
be other option trades during the evaluation period. Even trades in other option contracts 
may affect results, as inventory is managed on a portfolio basis. Condition (g) helps to 
avoid interference between multiple events by considering only trades which are much 
bigger than option volume in the evaluation window. It is essential for estimating price 
impact as a function of trade size. Actually, most of the selected observations have no 
113 
 
other option trades (2,741,510 out of 3,133,521). The strong filter sample has 3,133,521 
observations which constitute more than 10% of the total number of option trades. Panel 
B of Table 3.11 reports sample size at each screening stage. Observations from all stocks 
are pooled together and the analysis is done for the pooled sample. Price impacts and 
stock returns are adjusted to make the sign comparable across buy/sell and call/put 
groups. Specifically, the sign of the price impact for sell orders is reversed. Stock returns 
are multiplied by -1 for sell and for put groups. 
The results are presented for both basic and strong filters. Basic filters include 
only the minimum necessary conditions implied by the method, while strong filters try to 
approximate an ideal experiment.  
We start the results section with a visual comparison between information and 
inventory impacts. Figure 3.3 plots both impacts as a function of dollar trade size 
estimated by a kernel regression. The distribution of trade size is approximately 
exponential and has a mean of 2,800 and a median of 1,200 dollars. The main 
contribution of this graph is to show that inventory impact is always bigger (above) than 
information impact, sometimes by a factor of two. Therefore, this result reaffirms the 
main finding of this paper that the inventory channel plays a first order role in 
determining option returns. 
Importantly, contrary to previous literature (Vijh, 1990), we find substantial price 
impacts in the option market. The information impact is 0.2 cents and inventory is 0.5 
cents for an average trade, which is big if we take into account that an average option 
price is 4 dollars. That is, ten consecutive buy trades can change option price by 0.5%.  
The patterns are similar for both sets of filters, although the magnitudes are 
slightly bigger for the basic case. This should be expected because, as noted previously, 
non-zero stock returns or option trades during the evaluation period may bias the 
estimates for this case.  
The figure also provides other interesting insights. Both price impacts are 
monotonically increasing in trade size. Information impact is almost linear with only a 
little bit of concavity, whereas inventory impact is clearly concave. Information impact 
for small orders (1,000 dollars) is about four times smaller (0.1 vs. 0.4 cents) than for 
large orders (8,000 dollars). For the inventory impact, the increase is only twofold from 
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0.35 to 0.7 cents. The fact that information impact is monotonically increasing in trade 
size is at odds with the results of Anand and Chakravarty (2007) who find “stealth 
trading” in the options market. More precisely, they find that Hasbrouck information 
share is twice as high for mid-sized trades as for large trades (more than 99 contracts). 
There is little need for stealth trading in the options market since order flow is sparse and 
is spread across multiple contracts making it hard for informed traders to “hide” by 
splitting an order into mid-sized pieces. A possible explanation is that Anand and 
Chakravarty (2007) use data from 1999, when majority of option trading was done 
manually on the floor with no linkage between exchanges. 
A number of robustness checks insure the results are not driven by the specific 
filter choice. Figure 3.4 reports kernel regression estimates for some of the subsamples. 
Specifically, we look at the subsample of trades before the basic and strong filters are 
applied, and the results are similar. Next, we look at the strong sample with the number 
of quoting exchanges equal to two instead of being greater than two. In this case, there is 
one receiving and one non-receiving exchange making the setup symmetric. The third 
panel shows the price impacts for the strong filters with additional condition of absolute 
delta being between 0.4 and 0.6 with the idea of checking the results within a 
homogenous set of options. Finally, we check if changing the evaluation period from 5 to 
10 seconds will change anything. For all these subsamples, the inventory continues to 
have higher price impact than information. 
Visual examination is accompanied by a regression analysis in Table 3.12. The 
first two columns are for information and inventory price impacts which confirm the 
visual results from Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Large sample size is necessary to estimate the 
price impacts because the distribution for quote changes is discrete and highly skewed 
with the majority of trades having zero impact. This discreetness is caused by a large tick 
size of 5 cents. R-square is low for the same reason. Logarithm seems to be an 
appropriate functional form to capture the concavity of price impacts. 
The last column shows that the stock price instantly reacts to option trades. For 
example, a call option buy transaction of an average size will lead to a 0.05-cent increase 
in the stock quote midpoint. Although this predictability is highly statistically significant, 
it is economically small. The tick size of one penny in the stock market is 20 times bigger 
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than the price impact of an average option trade. Stock impact column is not included in 
the strong filter panel because stock returns are filtered for this case making this 
regression meaningless. 
The simplicity of the method makes it easy to study price impacts conditional on 
other variables such as trade size and direction as well as option characteristics including 
delta, time to expiration, and a call/put indicator. Panel B of Table 3.12 reports these 
conditional regressions. Coefficient for log-trade size has a similar value as in single 
variable regressions and is highly significant. For inventory impact, the other two 
significant factors are buy/sell indicator and absolute delta. Buy orders have about a 0.16 
cent bigger price impact than sell orders. The inventory impact increases by 0.1 cent if 
the options delta increases from 0.3 to 0.6. For the information impact, the most 
significant factor is stock returns with a coefficient of 0.21 (0.3 in the basic sample). This 
is not surprising since option prices are mechanically linked to the stock price. That is 
why it is important not only to control for stock returns in the regression but also to select 
a subsample with small stock returns as strong filters do. The last column shows that past 
stock returns are significant because they predict future stock returns. Other factors are 
insignificant. However, if we use the relative price impact instead of absolute (dollar) 
impact, then OTM and close-to-expiration options would have a greater relative price 
impact. This finding is broadly consistent with the results of Pan and Poteshman (2006) 
who find that the call-put volume ratio based on OTM put option trades have greater 
stock return predictability. Unlike Pan and Poteshman (2006), we do not find major 
differences in the price impact of buy and sell orders. Buy orders have significant 
positive information impact in the basic sample but it becomes insignificant in the strong 
sample.  
For the stock price impact, the most significant factor is lagged stock returns. 
About one-eighth of the stock price move is reversed in the next 5-second period. The 
second most significant factor is the option trade size. Time to expiration and absolute 
delta are also statistically significant but are much smaller economically. Price impact 
decreases by 0.008 cents for three-month versus one-month options. Similarly, changing 
option delta from 0.6 to 0.3 will increase price impact by 0.007 cents.    
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3.8 Summary and Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that inventory considerations play a first order role in 
determining expected option returns.21 On the way to this conclusion, the paper 
overcomes two main challenges. First, a naïve approach, which uses order imbalance and 
returns from the same day, runs into an obvious endogeneity problem. Separating a pure 
inventory component of observed order imbalance from fundamental and information 
components is even a bigger challenge. The paper introduces two identification strategies 
and a market microstructure test to overcome these problems. The cleanest strategy is the 
expiration rollover. Option expirations create exogenous variation in order imbalances 
and thus exogenous variation in market maker inventories as investors open new 
positions to replace positions in expiring options. A huge selling pressure is associated 
with a substantial drop in option prices during the expiration period. The expiration 
rollover adds to a not-so-large collection of price elasticity natural experiments such as 
index additions. The second identification strategy extends the results beyond expiration 
and examines time series and cross-sectional variation in returns. We use a 2-SLS 
regression that takes advantage of the fact that market-wide and individual order 
imbalances can be predicted by their values on the previous days which are plausibly 
exogenous. Past order imbalances predict future returns mostly through future order 
imbalances. While the predicted imbalance can explain up to 1% of daily returns, other 
control factors have substantially smaller predictive ability. Independent evidence 
supporting the inventory hypothesis comes from the microstructure test which shows that 
inventory has a larger price impact than information under all specifications. Both price 
impacts are economically large. They are also increasing and concave functions of trade 
size. Overall, this paper emphasizes the importance of including order flow as a state 
variable in the modern option pricing models. It also provides independent, clean 
evidence that inventory-driven order flow can have substantial effect on asset prices in 
general. 
                                                 
21 Alternatively, “noise” trading is the main determinant of the aggregate risk premium in equity options. 
117 
 
3.9 Figures and Tables 
Figure 3.1 Average option returns and order imbalance around expiration day. Daily 
option returns for short-term options are computed for a delta-neutral straddle portfolio (long) 
based on the call-put pair which is closest to at-the-money (ATM). Returns are based on quote 
midpoints from OptionMetrics. The volume-adjusted order imbalance is based on the difference 
between the number of buy and sell trades normalized by the average number of trades in the 
previous 30 days. The order imbalance is based on the ISE open/close data. Zero denotes first 
trading day after expiration which is usually Monday. 
 
 
 
Days Relative to Expiration (-1) 
 
118 
 
Figure 3.2 Intraday dynamics of order imbalances around expiration day. The order imbalance 
is computed as a difference between the number of buy and sell transactions normalized by the 
total number of trades in a given period. Each line corresponds to a different expiration group 
(less than 15 days, between 15 and 45 days, between 45 and 130, and finally more than 130 days). 
Each day is split into four equal time intervals of about 100 minutes each. Each vertical grid line 
corresponds to the first period of the day. Each point on the graph is an average of about 1,550 
observations. Expiration Friday is denoted “-1.”   
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Figure 3.3 Nonparametric estimates of inventory and information price impacts as a function of 
trade size. Price impact is measured as dollar price change between the transaction time and the 
end of the evaluation period of 5 seconds. Equations (3.9) are used to compute the price impacts. 
Price impact for sell orders is multiplied by -1 to make the sign comparable. The “basic” filters 
(Panel B) include only minimum necessary conditions implied by the method, while the “strong” 
filters (Panel A) try to approximate the ideal experiment suggested by the microstructure method. 
We employ a kernel regression using the Gaussian kernel with an adaptive width which is higher 
in the low-populated regions (big trade size). Confidence intervals are not reported because they 
are trivial with a large sample size. 
 
Panel A (“Strong” Filters) 
 
Panel B (“Basic” Filters) 
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Figure 3.4 Robustness checks for nonparametric estimates of inventory and information price 
impacts as a function of trade size. Price impacts are computed according to Eq. (3.9). Panel A 
reports the impacts for the subsample of trades before the “basic” and “strong” filters are applied. 
Panel B shows impacts for the strong filters with number of quoting exchanges equal to two 
instead of being greater than two. Panel C – strong filters with additional condition of absolute 
delta being between 0.4 and 0.6. Panel D – strong filters with the evaluation period of 10 seconds 
instead of 5 seconds. The basic filters include only minimum necessary conditions implied by the 
method while the strong filters try to approximate the ideal experiment suggested by the 
microstructure method. 
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics. Table reports mean, standard deviation, median as well as 10th and 
90th percentiles for selected variables. Options are divided into four days-to-expiration groups. 
Ultra short-term (“p=0”) with less than 13 calendar days to expiration; short-term (“p=1”) with on 
average 30-days; mid-term (“p=2”) with no more than 150 days; and long-term (“p=3”) with 
more than 150 days. Option returns (“Ret”) are computed for a delta-neutral straddle portfolio 
(long) based on the call-put pair which is closest to at-the-money (ATM). The order imbalance is 
based on the difference between the number of buy and sell trades normalized by the total number 
of trades on a given day (“OrdImb”) or by the average number of trades in the previous 30 days 
(“AdjOrdImb”) for a given expiration group (“(p=i)”). “MWOrdImb” and “OrdImbPut” are 
market-wide and put options order imbalances. “BidAsk(p=1)” is the dollar option bid-ask spread 
for short-term options. “OptVolume” is option volume measured in contracts. “IV30” is 30-days-
to-expiration implied volatility. “Skew60” is a logarithm ratio of OTM to ATM implied 
volatilities for 60-days-to-expiration options. “RNSkewness” is risk-neutral skewness. “diff(IV 
(p=1))” is one day change in short-term implied volatility. “IV60 - StdRet” is the difference 
between implied and historical volatilities. All variables are based on the ISE open/close and 
OptionMetrics data. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
 
# Obs (in 
1,000s) 
Mean Std.Dev. P10 Median P90 
Ret(p=0) 606 -0.010 0.505 -0.400 -0.059 0.431 
Ret(p=1) 1,735 0.000 0.096 -0.071 -0.013 0.077 
RetCall(p=1) 1,736 0.005 0.163 -0.102 -0.011 0.117 
Ret(p=2) 1,819 0.000 0.051 -0.038 -0.004 0.041 
Ret(p=3) 1,817 0.001 0.033 -0.025 -0.001 0.028 
OrdImb 1,813 -0.054 0.271 -0.400 -0.045 0.292 
AdjOrdImb 1,813 -0.047 0.478 -0.442 -0.033 0.326 
OrdImbPut 1,813 -0.017 0.297 -0.417 0.000 0.375 
MWOrdImb 1,771 -0.058 0.045 -0.115 -0.057 -0.003 
BidAsk(p=1), $ 1,805 0.196 0.225 0.050 0.150 0.350 
BidAsk(p=3), $ 1,829 0.335 0.410 0.100 0.200 0.600 
OptVolumeUSD, $ 1,841 22340 293928 84 1421 26348 
OptVolume, # 1,841 7295 48603 64 845 11917 
IV30 1,841 0.444 0.221 0.218 0.400 0.723 
IV30-IV30t-5 1,840 0.000 0.073 -0.066 0.000 0.065 
Skew60 1,841 0.109 0.108 0.018 0.098 0.208 
RNSkewness 1,841 -0.600 0.432 -1.090 -0.559 -0.154 
diff(IV(p=1)) 1,807 0.000 0.042 -0.034 -0.001 0.037 
IV60 - IV360 1,841 0.025 0.070 -0.027 0.011 0.091 
IV60-StdRet 1,841 -0.020 0.161 -0.165 0.004 0.100 
StkRet 1,841 0.000 0.032 -0.032 0.000 0.032 
AbsStkRet 1,841 0.021 0.024 0.002 0.014 0.047 
CloseStkPrice, $ 1,841 40.09 65.97 10.05 29.51 70.96 
logME 1,825 21.99 1.66 20.00 21.84 24.14 
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Table 3.2 Variation in option returns and order flow around the expiration day. Each cell 
reports an average across all stocks on a given day relative to the expiration day. “0, M” – 
denotes first trading day after expiration which is usually Monday. Variables marked (*) report 
values relative to a stock-year average. Options are divided into three time-to-expiration groups. 
Ultra short-term (p=0) with less than 13 calendar days to expiration; short-term (p=1) with on 
average 30-days; mid-term (p=2) with no more than 150 days; and long-term (p=3) with more 
than 150 days. Option returns (“Ret”) are computed for a delta-neutral straddle portfolio (long) 
based on the call-put pair which is closest to at-the-money (ATM). The order imbalance is based 
on the difference between the number of buy and sell trades normalized by the total number of 
trades on a given day (“OrdImb”) or by the average number of trades in the previous 30 days 
(“AdjOrdImb”) for a given expiration group (“(p=i)”). “OptVolume” is total dollar option 
volume. “BidAsk” is the dollar option bid-ask spread. “IV(p=1)” is short-term implied volatility. 
All variables are based on the ISE open/close and OptionMetrics data. All numbers are in 
percentage points. 
 
Panel A. Main Variables 
in %    Days relative to expiration Friday (-1) 
Variable -5 -4 -3 -2 -1, F 0, M 1 2 3 4 
Ret(p=1) -0.7 -0.1 0.6 0.6 -1.4 -3.5 -0.8 -0.3 0.5 -0.5 
OrdImb -5.4 -5.8 -5.9 -6.5 -10.3 -15.7 -10.3 -8.1 -6.1 -5.4 
AdjOrdImb -3.2 -3.9 -4.0 -4.9 -9.9 -24.3 -12.5 -7.7 -4.9 -4.2 
AdjOrdImb(p=0) 2.7 4.1 6.2 6.9 14.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
AdjOrdImb(p=1) -4.1 -4.4 -4.5 -5.6 -11.9 -29.1 -12.7 -7.6 -4.6 -4.1 
AdjOrdImb(p=2) -1.6 -2.5 -2.6 -3.2 -6.9 -15.0 -10.3 -6.6 -4.4 -4.2 
AdjOrdImb(p=3) -2.6 -3.4 -4.2 -4.6 -6.3 -10.8 -7.9 -6.2 -4.6 -3.1 
OrdImbPut -4.2 -4.3 -3.4 -3.9 -6.2 -7.0 -5.4 -3.6 -2.9 -2.8 
OptVolume * -8.6 12.8 7.7 12.0 15.1 4.6 5.2 2.1 -3.4 -9.5 
OptVolume(p=0)* -15.3 5.5 -5.2 -3.4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
OptVolume(p=1)* -27.7 -12.8 -9.4 -3.2 12.7 16.3 11.2 4.4 -1.6 -6.4 
OptVolume(p=2)* -21.9 -10.9 -10.4 -1.6 0.4 28.7 29.3 32.1 39.0 25.5 
OptVolume(p=3)* -5.2 2.5 8.0 5.5 -1.1 19.5 21.5 17.2 -8.2 -13.1 
Ret(p=0) -2.0 3.5 8.0 5.2 -44.9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Ret(p=2) -0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.4 -0.6 -1.7 -0.5 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 
Ret(p=3) -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 -0.3 -1.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.1 
IV(p=1)* 2.9 2.5 2.5 3.1 1.2 0.3 -0.8 -1.4 -1.8 -1.6 
 
Panel B. Alternative Hypotheses 
 
Variable -5 -4 -3 -2 -1, F 0, M 1 2 3 4 
BidAsk (p=1)* 0.9 -0.1 0.1 2.6 -1.5 -5.6 -6.1 -5.8 -6.6 -6.3 
BidAsk (p=2)* -1.4 -1.9 -1.1 3.5 1.1 -3.2 -5.4 -4.6 -1.4 -0.8 
BidAsk (p=3)* -2.4 -2.3 -1.0 4.3 3.2 1.0 -0.9 -0.4 2.7 2.1 
StkRet -0.13 0.07 0.04 -0.12 0.15 0.06 0.09 -0.10 -0.02 -0.12 
AbsStkRet 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 
Log(High/Low) 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.6 
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Table 3.3 Intraday option returns and order imbalances during the expiration period. For short-
term options, returns are computed for a delta-neutral straddle portfolio (long) for the call-put pair 
which is closest to at-the-money (ATM) at the beginning of the period. Quote rule is used to 
assign trade direction. The trade imbalance (volume imbalance) is computed as a difference 
between the number of buy and sell transactions (signed contract volume) normalized by the total 
number of trades (total contract volume) in a given period. Days to expiration are reported 
relative to the first day after expiration (“0,” usually Monday). Each day is split into five 
intervals: “c-to-o” – previous-day close to current-day open; “open” – first 5 minutes of trading; 
“1”,”2,” and “3” – equally spaced intervals of about 2 hours each. The table is based on the 
Nanex dataset which includes 39 stocks and ETFs for 882 trading days from April 2003 to 
October 2006. For the short-term options, each cell is based on an average of about 1500 
observations. All variables are in percentage points. 
 
Days to 
Expirati
on 
Time 
Period 
Short-Term Expiration Group (p=1) 
|Stock 
Return|, % Option 
Return, % 
Volume 
Imb. ,% 
Trade 
Imb. , % 
-3, W open 0.0 -1.5 -2.2 0.3 
-3 1 0.2 -2.9 -11.8 0.8 
-3 2 0.1 -3.6 -12.3 0.4 
-3 3 0.3 -0.3 -8.7 0.6 
-2, T c-to-o 0.1 0.6 
-2 open -0.2 -3.5 -3.3 0.3 
-2 1 -0.2 -6.3 -12.4 0.7 
-2 2 0.0 -6.7 -13.4 0.5 
-2 3 0.2 -4.5 -12.3 0.6 
-1, F c-to-o 0.0 0.6 
-1 open -0.4 -8.8 -8.6 0.3 
-1 1 -0.8 -11.2 -19.7 0.7 
-1 2 -0.5 -12.7 -21.3 0.5 
-1 3 -0.3 -10.7 -22.3 0.5 
0, M c-to-o -1.9 0.5 
0 open 0.0 -11.9 -13.3 0.3 
0 1 -2.0 -10.8 -24.4 0.8 
0 2 -0.8 -9.2 -23.5 0.4 
0 3 -0.1 -4.6 -17.7 0.5 
1, T c-to-o -0.3 0.5 
1 open -0.4 -6.8 -7.0 0.3 
1 1 -1.0 -5.2 -15.2 0.7 
1 2 -0.4 -5.3 -16.2 0.5 
1 3 0.5 -1.0 -12.5 0.7 
2, W c-to-o 0.7 0.6 
2 open -0.5 -1.4 -2.1 0.3 
2 1 0.0 -0.6 -10.3 0.8 
2 2 0.2 -1.5 -10.7 0.5 
2 3 0.5 3.7 -8.3 0.6 
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Table 3.4 First stage of two-stage least squares from Equations (3.6) and (3.7). We use three 
nested sets of instruments. The first contains only expiration dummies. The second adds two lags 
of the market-wide order imbalance. The third adds two lags of the individual order imbalance. 
“n0” is a dummy which corresponds to the first day after expiration, usually Monday (“n_1 
precedes n0”). The order imbalance is based on the difference between the number of buy and 
sell trades normalized by the total number of trades on a given day (“OrdImb”) or by the average 
number of trades in the previous 30 days (“AdjOrdImb”). MWOrdImb measures a market-wide 
order imbalance. Order imbalances are computed based on the ISE open/close data. All 
regressions include a battery of control variables. The absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors clustered by date. 
 
 
  
 
AdjOrdImbt   MWOrdImbt  
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
n_4 -0.018 -0.005 -0.005 -0.021 -0.010 -0.010 
 
(3.36) (1.04) (1.05) (4.44) (2.70) (2.74) 
n_3 -0.024 -0.007 -0.006 -0.021 -0.007 -0.007 
 
(3.91) (1.36) (1.26) (4.14) (1.82) (1.83) 
n_2 -0.030 -0.011 -0.010 -0.026 -0.012 -0.012 
 
(6.65) (2.63) (2.42) (7.22) (3.91) (3.92) 
n_1 -0.087 -0.063 -0.061 -0.065 -0.046 -0.046 
 
(12.94) (10.05) (9.55) (15.94) (13.00) (12.98) 
n0 -0.242 -0.194 -0.193 -0.113 -0.075 -0.075 
 
(17.78) (15.57) (15.24) (21.75) (14.57) (14.59) 
n1 -0.117 -0.029 -0.022 -0.063 0.009 0.009 
 
(10.66) (3.45) (2.67) (17.79) (2.14) (2.05) 
n2 -0.069 -0.003 0.001 -0.039 0.011 0.011 
 
(14.28) (0.47) (0.22) (11.39) (2.74) (2.68) 
n3 -0.036 0.003 0.006 -0.019 0.011 0.011 
 
(5.50) (0.50) (0.95) (4.83) (2.84) (2.80) 
n4 -0.027 -0.006 -0.005 -0.012 0.004 0.004 
 
(5.23) (1.32) (0.99) (3.04) (1.39) (1.33) 
MWOrdImbt-1  
0.654 0.561 
 
0.552 0.551 
  
(6.61) (5.70) 
 
(17.14) (17.10) 
MWOrdImbt-2  
0.211 0.118 
 
0.138 0.138 
  
(3.91) (2.15) 
 
(4.39) (4.36) 
OrdImbt-1   
0.178 
  
-0.001 
   
(30.55) 
  
(3.27) 
OrdImbt-2   
0.085 
  
0.000 
   
(38.21) 
  
(0.31) 
Other Controls + + + + + + 
R
2
 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.51 0.68 0.68 
N (in 1000s) 1,223 1,217 1,182 1,264 1,258 1,211 
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Table 3.5 Different versions of the second stage for two-stage least square regressions of short-
term option returns on the measures of order imbalance in Equations (3.6) and (3.7).  
it,i1,-tt2it,10it, εControls'MWOrdImbαAdjOrdImbααOptRet ++++= β  
We report both OLS and 2-SLS results. For the 2-SLS, three nested sets of instruments 
are used. The first set contains only expiration dummies. The second set contains two lags of the 
market-wide order imbalance as well as expiration dummies. The third set adds two lags of the 
individual order imbalance to the second set.  
Part A reports regressions of option returns on individual imbalance while in Part B the 
regression includes both individual and market-wide imbalances. 
Option returns (“Ret”) are computed for a delta-neutral straddle portfolio (long) based on 
the call-put pair which is closest to at-the-money (ATM) for options with approximately 30 days-
to-expiration. The order imbalance is based on the difference between the number of buy and sell 
trades normalized by the total number of trades on a given day (“OrdImb”) or by the average 
number of trades in the previous 30 days (“AdjOrdImb”). MWOrdImb is a market-wide order 
imbalance. Order imbalances are computed based on the ISE open/close data. All regressions 
include a battery of control variables but only the coefficients for imbalances are reported. The 
absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by date. 
 
 
 
OLS 
2-SLS 
  1 2 3 
Part A:     
0:α2 =      
1α , AdjOrdImbt 0.025 0.154 0.178 0.115 
  (32.18) (8.88) (10.71) (12.58) 
Part B: 
    
1α , AdjOrdImbt 0.022 0.020 -0.003 0.036 
 
(29.09) (0.31) (0.06) (7.88) 
2α , MWOrdImbt 0.500 0.261 0.323 0.258 
  (12.80) (2.07) (3.88) (10.30) 
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Table 3.6 Order imbalances explain “abnormal” expiration returns. Option returns from day t are 
regressed on expiration dummies, order imbalances, and explanatory variables from day t-1. The 
first two columns report option returns and the adjusted order imbalance around expiration. 
Column 4 adds lags of order imbalances and other controls to the return regression. Column 5 
reports the second stage of the 2-SLS of returns on order imbalances. Two lags for individual and 
market-wide imbalances are used as instruments in the first stage. Note that the order imbalances 
completely explain “abnormal” expiration returns. The last column shows that adding day t order 
imbalance makes day t-1 individual order imbalance economically insignificant. “n0” is a dummy 
which corresponds to the first day after expiration, usually Monday (“n_1 precedes n0”). Option 
returns are reported for short-term options (Rett [p=1]) with approximately 30 days-to-expiration. 
The returns are computed for a delta-neutral straddle portfolio (long) based on the call-put pair 
which is closest to at-the-money (ATM). The order imbalance is based on the difference between 
the number of buy and sell trades normalized by the total number of trades on a given day 
(“OrdImb”) or by the average number of trades in the previous 30 days (“AdjOrdImb”). 
MWOrdImb is a market-wide order imbalance. The absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors clustered by date. 
 
  Rett(p=1) AdjOrdImbt Rett(p=1) 
Rett(p=1) 
2-SLS 
Rett(p=1) 
n_4 -0.005 -0.014 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 
 
(1.79) (2.61) (1.16) (0.07) (0.92) 
n_3 0.002 -0.016 0.003 0.006 0.003 
 
(0.47) (2.75) (0.61) (1.57) (0.78) 
n_2 0.002 -0.025 0.004 0.007 0.004 
 
(0.39) (5.11) (0.79) (1.68) (0.94) 
n_1 -0.017 -0.073 -0.015 0.000 -0.013 
 
(5.30) (11.46) (4.26) (0.12) (3.93) 
n0 -0.040 -0.217 -0.023 0.003 -0.021 
 
(9.11) (17.84) (4.15) (0.49) (3.84) 
n1 -0.010 -0.100 0.008 0.006 0.008 
 
(3.41) (10.11) (1.67) (1.67) (1.87) 
n2 -0.006 -0.054 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 
(1.85) (12.02) (0.71) (1.05) (0.72) 
n3 0.002 -0.025 0.007 0.005 0.007 
 
(0.43) (3.72) (1.52) (1.40) (1.46) 
n4 -0.009 -0.017 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 
 
(2.06) (3.38) (1.18) (1.31) (1.29) 
OrdImb t-1   
0.008 
 
0.002 
   
(21.53) 
 
(4.09) 
MWOrdImbt-1   
0.195 
 
0.186 
   
(6.64) 
 
(7.04) 
IV_OrdImbt    
0.038 
 
    
(15.92) 
 
IV_MWOrdImbt    
0.290 
 
    
(8.07) 
 
OrdImbt     
0.041 
     
(45.28) 
Other Controls - - + + + 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.04 
N (in 1000s) 1,735 1,698 1,512 1,277 1,344 
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Table 3.7 An instrumental variable approach to identifying the channel for returns/order flow 
predictability. The table shows that order imbalance can predict future option returns through its 
ability to predict future imbalance rather than volatility. Columns 2 through 5 report the first stage 
of the 2-SLS regression. The last four columns report different versions of the second stage of 2-
SLS. We use six instruments: lag of market-wide order imbalance (MWOrdImb), two lags of 
individual imbalance (OrdImb), lag of order imbalance for short-term options (OrdImb(p=1)) as 
well as two volatility measures: absolute stock returns (AbsStkRet) and relative absolute returns 
(RelAbsStkRet). Option returns (“Ret”) are computed for a delta-neutral straddle portfolio (long) 
based on the call-put pair which is closest to at-the-money (ATM) for options with approximately 
30 days to expiration. The order imbalance is based on the difference between the number of buy 
and sell trades, normalized by the total number of trades on a given day (“OrdImb”) or by the 
average number of trades in the previous 30 days (“AdjOrdImb”). RelAbsStkRet is absolute stock 
returns normalized by its average over previous 50 days. All regressions include a battery of 
control variables. The absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors clustered by date. 
 
  1st Stage    2
d Stage  
  
AdjOrd 
Imbt 
MWOrd 
Imbt 
AbsStk 
Rett 
RelAbs 
StkRett 
 
Rett (p=1) 
          
MWOrdImb t-1 0.642 0.632 0.035 1.919      
 
(8.03) (24.10) (4.33) (6.06)  
    
OrdImb t-1 0.180 -0.001 0.000 0.014      
 
(30.86) (3.10) (1.70) (2.50)  
    
OrdImbt-2 0.088 0.001 0.000 0.022      
 
(38.41) (3.59) (2.12) (4.03)  
    
OrdImb(p=1) t-1 -0.010 0.001 0.000 0.020      
 
(3.13) (1.93) (2.52) (3.32)  
    
AbsStkRet t-1 0.181 0.006 0.038 -4.174      
 
(2.26) (0.19) (2.24) (8.76)  
    
RelAbsStkRet t-1 0.010 0.001 -0.001 0.094      
 
(5.56) (1.94) (2.83) (8.27)  
    
IV_AdjOrdImbt      0.078 0.043 0.043 0.044 
      (12.89) (15.76) (15.79) (12.83) 
IV_MWOrdImbt       0.279 0.279 0.300 
       (7.12) (7.11) (6.06) 
IV_AbsStkRett        0.000  
        (0.00)  
IV_RelAbs 
StkRett 
        -0.007 
         (0.71) 
Other Controls + + + +  + + + + 
R
2
 0.04 0.68 0.25 0.10  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
N (in 1000s) 1,186 1,215 1,221 1,221  1,175 1,169 1,169 1,169 
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Table 3.8 Option returns on  day t conditional on order imbalances and other variables from day 
t-1. Column 2 reports standard deviations to facilitate the computation of economic magnitude.  
Columns 3 to 5 gradually add order imbalances from day t-1. If all four measures of order 
imbalance are combined into one factor weighted with estimated coefficients (0.004*OrdImbt-
1+0.203* MWOrdImbt-1+ 0.003* OrdImbt-2+ 0.004* OrdImb(p=1)t-1) this factor will have standard 
deviation of 1%. Thus, one standard deviation change in the combined order imbalance changes 
expected returns on the next day by 1%. Short-term option returns are computed for a delta-
neutral straddle portfolio (long) based on the call-put pair which is closest to at-the-money 
(ATM). The order imbalance is based on the difference between the number of buy and sell 
trades normalized by the total number of trades on a given day (“OrdImb”) or by the average 
number of trades in the previous 30 days (“AdjOrdImb”). MWOrdImb is a market-wide order 
imbalance. We also report the most significant control variables. “IV(p=1)” is implied volatility 
for short-term options. “diff(IV(p=1)) t-1” is one-day change in short-term implied volatility. 
“AbsStkRet t-1” is absolute stock returns. “COStdRet -StdRet” is open-close volatility relative to 
close-to-close volatility. The absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by date. 
 
 
  
Std. 
Dev. 
Rett(p=1) Rett(p=1) Rett(p=1) 
OrdImbt-1 0.27 0.009 0.007 0.004 
  
(18.41) (16.67) (8.53) 
MWOrdImbt-1 0.04  
0.205 0.203 
 
  
(7.44) (7.33) 
OrdImbt-2 0.27   
0.003 
    
(5.30) 
OrdImb(p=1)t-1 0.28   
0.004 
    
(8.12) 
Rett-1(p=1) 0.10 -0.042 -0.045 -0.043 
  
(7.49) (8.28) (7.88) 
diff(IV(p=1)) t-1 0.04 -0.096 -0.106 -0.101 
  
(6.95) (7.80) (7.26) 
AbsStkRet t-1 0.02 0.179 0.180 0.174 
  
(6.47) (6.63) (6.40) 
IV(p=1) t-1 0.23 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 
  
(4.24) (4.10) (4.02) 
COStdRet -
StdRet 
0.03 -0.018 -0.024 -0.026 
 
(2.66) (3.54) (3.70) 
Other Controls 
 
+ + + 
R
 2
 
 
0.02 0.02 0.02 
N (in 1000s) 
 
1,256 1,256 1,209 
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Table 3.9 Other significant predictors of option returns. Regressions of future option returns on 
lagged explanation variables and order imbalances. Column 2 reports standard deviations to 
facilitate the computation of economic magnitude. Column 4 uses a subsample of 200 stocks with 
most liquid options (measured as dollar options volume over previous 250 days). Column 5 uses 
a subsample of options with the bid prices larger than 2 dollars. Column 6 reports regression for 
two-day-ahead option returns (day t+1) as a dependent variable. The last column reports 
individual regressions with only two covariates (intercept and the variable itself). Variables are 
described in Appendix B. “MMPos” is a proxy for net market maker position in million contracts. 
” RelOICall” is call options open interest relative to total. ”n_friday” is Friday dummy controlling 
for weekend returns. “AbsStkRet t-1” is absolute stock returns. “diff(IV(p=1)) t-1” is one-day 
change in short-term implied volatility. “BidAsk” is the dollar option bid-ask spread. 
“MeanStkVolume” is median stock volume in the previous 75-days. “IV60-StdRet” is volatility 
premium measured as different between 60-day ATM implied volatility and historical volatility. 
“IV(p=1)” is implied volatility for short-term options. “COStdRet -StdRet” is open-close 
volatility relative to close-to-close volatility. All variables have subscript “t-1” unless otherwise 
stated. The absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by date. 
 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
Rett 
(p=1) 
Rett (p=1) 
200Big 
Rett (p=1) 
Prc. > $2 
Rett+1 
(p=1) 
Rett (p=1) 
Individ. 
MMPos(p=1) 0.01 0.054 0.047 0.028 0.042 0.034 
  
(5.05) (4.82) (1.17) (3.93) (3.11) 
RelOICall(p=1) 0.18 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
  
(1.91) (0.85) (0.55) (3.06) (1.53) 
RelVolCall(p=1) 0.30 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.0 
  
(3.15) (1.59) (2.23) (2.14) (0.12) 
RelVolPutOTM(p=1) 0.25 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 
  
(2.54) (1.45) (1.75) (0.60) (2.09) 
n_friday 0.40 -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.013 
  
(2.07) (1.37) (0.11) (0.23) (4.31) 
AbsStkRet 0.02 0.162 0.118 0.101 0.070 0.129 
  
(6.00) (3.33) (2.57) (2.23) (5.57) 
Rett-1 (p=1) 0.10 -0.042 -0.032 -0.032 -0.004 -0.008 
  
(7.64) (3.54) (3.36) (0.54) (1.42) 
diff(IV(p=1)) 0.04 -0.096 -0.043 -0.058 -0.013 -0.072 
  
(7.09) (2.10) (2.91) (0.78) (4.88) 
BidAsk(p=1) 0.25 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.009 0.004 
  
(1.49) (2.90) (1.31) (4.20) (1.70) 
StkRett-2 0.03 0.071 0.094 0.132 0.021 0.025 
  
(2.50) (2.74) (3.19) (0.95) (0.91) 
StkRet6M 0.39 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 
  
(2.63) (2.35) (1.51) (2.02) (2.93) 
MeanStkVolume 0.28 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.010 
  
(3.56) (1.62) (2.02) (1.12) (3.89) 
IV60-StdRet 0.16 -0.003 -0.004 -0.010 -0.002 -0.005 
  
(0.93) (1.09) (1.89) (0.55) (1.18) 
IV(p=1) 0.23 -0.017 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 
  
(3.44) (1.17) (0.38) (0.69) (0.97) 
COStdRet - StdRet 0.03 -0.028 -0.089 -0.083 -0.019 -0.010 
  
(3.87) (2.33) (2.33) (2.67) (1.98) 
MeanOptVolumeUSD 2.12 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.0 
  
(0.64) (2.11) (0.20) (0.56) (1.07) 
Other Controls + + + + - 
R2 
 
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 
N (in 1000s) 
 
1,253 251 214 1,191 
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Table 3.10 Robustness tests. Regressions of future option returns on lagged explanation variables 
and order imbalances. Column 2 reports a baseline case with short-term option returns as a 
dependent variable. Columns 3 and 4 study option returns on day t+1 (two-days ahead) and day 
t+4 (one week ahead). Column 5 uses delta-neutral call returns instead of straddle returns. 
Column 6 uses a subsample of 200 stocks with most liquid options (measured as dollar options 
volume over previous 250 days). The last column studies changes during the 2008 crisis. 
“n_crises” is a dummy which equals to one between August 2007 and January 2009. “n0” is a 
dummy for the first day after expiration, usually Monday (“n_1” is expiration Friday). Option 
returns are computed for a delta-neutral straddle portfolio (long) based on the call-put pair which 
is closest to at-the-money (ATM). The order imbalance (“OrdImb”) is based on the difference 
between the number of buy and sell trades normalized by the total number of trades on a given 
day. MWOrdImb is a market-wide order imbalance. All regressions include a battery of control 
variables. The absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by date. 
 
  Rett(p=1) 
Rett+1 
(p=1) 
Rett+4 
(p=1) 
RetCallt 
(p=1) 
Rett 
(p=1) 
200Big 
Rett 
(p=1) 
n_2 0.005 -0.015 -0.002 0.005 0.003 0.005 
 
(1.20) (4.74) (0.74) (0.80) (0.74) (1.09) 
n_1 -0.013 -0.038 0.005 -0.020 -0.018 -0.014 
 
(4.05) (8.72) (1.26) (4.46) (4.70) (4.29) 
n0 -0.029 -0.002 0.010 -0.037 -0.031 -0.030 
 
(5.97) (0.67) (1.86) (5.44) (5.90) (6.20) 
n1 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.002 0.003 0.007 
 
(2.13) (2.51) (1.48) (0.39) (0.56) (1.62) 
n2 0.006 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.004 
 
(1.48) (2.51) (1.55) (1.06) (1.16) (1.11) 
OrdImbt-1 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.004 
 
(9.50) (3.58) (0.56) (7.43) (3.69) (7.68) 
MWOrdImbt-1 0.183 0.147 0.126 0.167 0.141 0.133 
 
(6.38) (4.78) (3.82) (3.91) (4.55) (4.57) 
OrdImbt-2 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 
 
(4.01) (4.28) (1.47) (3.92) (0.77) (4.03) 
OrdImb(p=1)t-1 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.005 
 
(10.22) (5.31) (2.89) (8.51) (4.75) (10.48) 
n_crises  
 
 
  
0.010 
 
 
 
 
  
(2.56) 
n_crises*OrdImbt-1   
 
  
0.002 
 
 
 
 
  
(2.12) 
n_crises*MWOrdImb  
 
 
  
0.109 
 
 
 
 
  
(2.07) 
Other Controls + + + + + + 
R
2
 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
N (in 1000s) 1,354 1,354 1,329 1,354 262 1,354 
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Table 3.11 Summary statistics for the microstructure test. Price impacts, option, and stock returns 
are measured as dollar price change between the transaction time and the end of the evaluation 
period of 5 seconds. All the dependent variables are measured in cents. Price impact and stock 
returns are adjusted to make the sign comparable across buy/sell and call/put groups. Equations 
(3.9) are used to compute the price impacts. “Basic” filters include only minimum necessary 
conditions implied by the method while “strong” filters try to come close to the ideal experiment 
suggested by the method. “Log(Volume)” is computed as logarithm of trade size measured in 
100s of dollars. "t-1” subscript denotes time 5 seconds before a trade transaction. Panel B reports 
sample size after each of the filters. 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
 
“Strong” Filters 
 
“Basic” Filters 
  Mean Std.Dev. 10% 50% 90%  
Mean Std.Dev. 
Inventory Impact, Cents 0.44 14.24 0.00 0.00 2.50 0.67 11.83 
Information Impact, Cents 0.20 14.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 11.64 
Volume, in 100s USD 45.0 155.8 3.3 12.0 90.0 42.7 145.6 
Log(Volume in 100s) 2.81 1.20 1.45 2.56 4.51 2.80 1.18 
Buy/Sell  Dummy         -0.16 0.99 -1.00 -1.00 1.00 -0.08 1.00 
Call/Put  Dummy                 0.35 0.94 -1.00 1.00 1.00 0.30 0.95 
Sqrt(Days-to-Expiration)       8.63 4.00 4.36 7.28 14.53 8.27 3.88 
AbsDelta            0.49 0.15 0.29 0.48 0.69 0.48 0.16 
Stock Returns, Cents             0.01 0.40 -0.50 0.00 0.50 0.04 1.01 
Option Returnst-1, Cents         0.16 16.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 84.16 
Stock Returns t-1, Cents          -0.02 0.75 -0.50 0.00 0.50 -0.10 1.17 
 
 
Panel B. Filters and Sample Size 
 
Number of Trade Transactions after Each Filter 
 
Total 28,127,906 
0.2 < |Delta| < 0.8 
10 < Days-to-Expiration < 400 
9:35 < Time < 15:55 
15,298,816 
Trade price = NBBO price, 
with at least 2 exchanges quoting it 
10,236,011 
"Basic Filters" 7,368,445 
"Strong Filters" 3,133,521 
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Table 3.12 Price impacts conditional on trade and option characteristics. Price impacts, option 
and stock returns are measured as the dollar price change between the transaction time and the 
end of the evaluation period of 5 seconds. All the dependent variables are measured in cents. 
Price impact and stock returns are adjusted to make the sign comparable across buy/sell and 
call/put groups. Equations (3.9) are used to compute the price impacts. “Basic” filters include 
only minimum necessary conditions implied by the method while “strong” filters try to come 
close to the ideal experiment suggested by the method. “Log(Volume)” is computed as logarithm 
of trade size measured in hundreds of dollars. "t-1” subscript means the time 5 seconds before a 
trade transaction. The absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors. 
 
 
Panel A 
 "Strong" Filters  "Basic" Filters 
  
Inventory 
Impact 
Information 
Impact  
Inventory 
Impact 
Information 
Impact 
Stock 
Returns 
Intercept           0.035 -0.132 
 
0.216 -0.175 -0.041 
(1.14) (-4.35) 
 
(13.47) (-11.03) (-43.18) 
Log(Volume in 100s) 0.146 0.118 
 
0.163 0.218 0.030 
(18.23) (14.84) 
 
(32.75) (44.08) (86.46) 
R-Square 0.02% 0.01% 
 
0.03% 0.05% 0.12% 
 
Panel B 
 "Strong" Filters  "Basic" Filters 
  
Inventory 
Impact 
Information 
Impact  
Inventory 
Impact 
Information 
Impact 
Stock 
Returns 
Intercept           0.239 -0.178  
0.335 -0.290 -0.011 
(10.44) (-7.94) 
 
(19.39) (-17.16) (-6.69) 
Log(Volume in 100s) 0.134 0.106  
0.135 0.180 0.025 
(13.6) (10.81) 
 
(24.84) (33.36) (70.86) 
Buy/Sell             0.163 0.020  
0.226 0.049 0.002 
(14.89) (1.84) 
 
(45.07) (10.0) (4.25) 
Call/Put                  0.023 -0.017  
0.007 -0.035 0.001 
(5.89) (-4.37) 
 
(2.11) (-10.37) (2.82) 
Sqrt(Days-toExp)           0.002 0.002  
0.003 0.005 -0.002 
(1.4) (1.89) 
 
(3.42) (6.91) (-24.38) 
AbsDelta            -0.351 0.135  
-0.146 0.319 -0.023 
(-7.32) (2.85) 
 
(-5.86) (13.18) (-8.49) 
Stock Returns              0.047 0.213  
0.026 0.300 
 
(13.83) (108.89) 
 
(4.45) (51.71) 
 
Option Returnst-1             0.002 0.000  
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(2.91) (2.65) 
 
(3.01) (2.2) (-2.65) 
Stock Returnst-1             -0.222 -0.205  
-0.250 -0.286 -0.123 
(-29.68) (-28.39) 
 
(-20.84) (-23.85) (-74.38) 
R2 0.04% 0.03%  
0.13% 0.22% 2.13% 
# Obs. 3,133,521 3,133,521  
7,368,445 7,368,445 7,368,445 
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Appendix A: Additional Results 
A.1 Introduction 
This appendix reports some additional results that supplement the results in the first 
essay.  Specifically, it includes: (a) a figure showing the frequency of primary sample 
disagreement events throughout the sample period; (b) detailed stock-by-stock results for the 
one-minute evaluation period that underlie the one-minute evaluation period results in Table 1.2; 
(c) the results of quantile regressions explaining quote changes at various quantiles during the 
disagreement events; and (d) the results of quantile regressions explaining signed volume at 
various quantiles during the disagreement events. 
A.2 Frequency of Primary Sample Disagreement Events. 
The primary sample disagreements occur on average more than twice per stock, per day. 
Figure A.1 shows smoothed estimates of the average numbers of {P>IP}-type (the solid red line) 
and {IP>P}-type events (the dashed blue line) per stock per day.  The estimates are constructed 
by counting the total (across stocks) number of events per day, dividing by the number of stocks 
and ETF’s in the sample on that day, and then smoothing the resulting time series by taking a 30-
day moving average.   The disagreement frequency falls from about four per day in the beginning 
of the sample period to less than one per day at the end, with an overall average of more than two 
per stock per day. There are two possible drivers for this trend. First, volatility as measured by 
the VIX was falling steadily from 25% in April 2003 to 12% in October 2006. Next, 
improvements in technology may have made it easier for option market makers to avoid price 
disagreements. 
A.3 Detailed Stock-by-Stock Results for the One-Minute 
Evaluation Period 
  Table A.1 presents the average quote changes during disagreement events and matched 
control events for each stock in the sample, using an evaluation period of one minute.  These 
detailed stock-by-stock results underline the summary results for the one-minute evaluation 
period in Table 1.2.  The left-hand half of Table A.1 presents the average changes in the option-
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implied bid, option-implied ask, and stock midpoint for both the treatment and control samples 
separately for each stock or ETF for the {P>IP}-type disagreements.   In the treatment sample, 
the average changes in the option-implied bid are positive for every stock and ETF.   The across-
stock average of the stock-by-stock average changes in the implied bid is 4.8 cents, and the 
minimum of the average changes across stocks is 2.4 cents.  For the control sample, the average 
changes in the implied bids are smaller for every stock and ETF, with the largest being 0.7 cents 
and the average being only 0.3 cents.  The average changes in the implied ask quotes is also 
positive for every stock in the treatment sample, with the average of the stock-by-stock averages 
change being 8.1 cents and the minimum across stocks being 3.3 cents, respectively.   For the 
control sample, the implied ask increases by an average of 2.7 cents, reflecting some spread 
widening.
1
  Thus, the average difference in the implied ask quote between the treatment and 
control samples is 5.4 cents, larger than the initial mispricing.  This average difference of 5.4 
cents is also large relative to the average price of less than two dollars for the at-the-money for 
call and put options that appear in the sample.
2
   
If the stock followed the options, the average change in the stock midpoints in the 
treatment sample would be negative, and less than the corresponding average changes for the 
control sample. Inconsistent with this hypothesis, the average changes in the stock midpoint are 
slightly positive for most stocks, with an overall average of 0.1 cents, and in all cases are greater 
than or equal to the average changes in the stock midpoint in the control sample.  Together with 
the corresponding results for the option-implied quotes, these results imply that for the {P>IP}-
type disagreements the options follow the stock and the stock does not follow the options. 
The right-hand half of the table presents the corresponding average quote changes for the 
{IP>P}-type disagreements.  The average changes in the option-implied bid and ask are now 
negative and less than the corresponding average changes in the control sample for every stock 
and ETF, implying that in this case also the options follow the stocks.  (Recall that for the 
{IP>P}-type disagreements the option-implied stock prices exceed the actual stock prices, so that 
if the options follow the stock the average changes in the option-implied bid and ask prices will 
                                                 
1
 Disagreements are more likely to occur when the option-implied bid-ask spread is smaller than average.  Because 
the option-implied bid-ask spread is used in identifying the matching observations in the control sample, the control 
sample includes observations of smaller than average option-implied bid-ask spread, and some spread widening is to 
be expected. 
2
 Through the put-call parity relationship S = C – P + PV(K), the change in the option-implied stock price S is equal 
to the change in the difference between the call and put prices C – P. 
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be negative.)   The overall average change in the implied bid is −7.7 cents, close to the 
magnitude of the overall average change in the implied ask of 8.1 cents for the {P>IP}-type 
disagreements, and the overall average change in the implied bid is −4.6 cents, close to the 
magnitude of the overall average change in the implied bid of 4.8 cents for the {P>IP}-type 
disagreements.  The overall average change in stock prices is zero and less than the overall 
average change in the control sample, inconsistent with the hypothesis that the stocks follow the 
options.  Overall, this table produces strong evidence that if prices disagree, the options market 
adjusts to eliminate mispricing, and the stock market does not adjust.  It seems worth 
emphasizing that the average changes in the option prices are large, and typically larger than the 
extent of the disagreement, while the average change in stock prices are close to zero.  To the 
extent that the average changes in stock prices are non-zero, the stock prices move to widen the 
disagreement rather than reduce it.
3
   
A.4 Quantile Regressions of Quote Changes 
The regressions equations (1.3)-(1.5) and the results in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 of that paper 
and the results in Table A.1 of this appendix allow for statistical inference about only the average 
and conditional average effects of the disagreement.  We provide evidence that the distributional 
shifts apparent in Figure 1.3 are statistically significant by estimating quantile regressions 
analogous to equations (1.3)-(1.5) for the implied bid, implied ask, and actual stock midpoint for 
both the {P>IP} and {IP>P}-type disagreements.   We report results only for specifications that 
include the vector of control variables X, and use the same control variables used in the 
conditional mean regressions for which results were reported in Table 1.3.  Because the quantile 
regressions are more demanding of the data and some of the stocks have relatively few events 
due to their early departures from the sample, we estimate the quantile regression for the pooled 
sample that combines the events for the 39 different stocks and ETFs.   
Table A.2 presents the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the disagreement 
dummy in regressions for the 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, and 90% quantiles, for the various 
regression models and both disagreement types.  For the {P>IP}-type disagreements (the left-
hand side of the table) the option-implied bid and ask are below the actual stock price, and 
                                                 
3
 The 3 cent change in the stock midpoint for MMM for the {IP>P}-type events is based on only 384 disagreement 
events (see Table 1.1), and is about equal to the average bid-ask spread for MMM. ( MMM was the highest price 
stock in our sample and the only stock in our sample with a spread consistently above one cent.)  
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increases in the implied ask are necessary to eliminate the disagreement.  For the implied ask 
regressions the coefficient on the dummy variable is at least 0.05 (five cents) for all except the 
10% quantile.   In the implied bid regressions the coefficient on the dummy variable is at least 
0.05 (five cents) for all except the 30% quantile.    The reported standard errors are very small 
and in many cases zero; they are based on 100 bootstrap iterations, and in many cases the same 
coefficient estimate is obtained in all 100 iterations. 
For the {IP>P}-type disagreements (the right-hand side of the table) the option-implied 
bid and ask are above the actual stock price and we focus on changes in the implied bid.   For 
these regressions the coefficient on the dummy variable is less than or equal to −0.05 for all 
except the 90% quantile, and again bootstrapped standard errors are either zero or close to  zero.  
In the implied ask regressions the dummy coefficient is −0.05 or smaller at all except the 70% 
quantiles.   These results are consistent with the shifts in the distributions shown visually in 
Panels A, B, D, and E of Figure 1.3 of the first essay, and demonstrate that the distribution shifts 
in those panels are statistically significant.  
In contrast, the quantile regressions for changes in the stock price provide no evidence 
that the stock follows the options.  For both the {P>IP} and {IP>P}-type disagreements the 
estimated coefficient on the dummy is either zero or close to zero at most of the quantiles.  To the 
extent that the estimated dummy coefficients are different from zero, they indicate that during the 
disagreement events at some quantiles the actual stock price continues moving away from the 
option-implied stock prices, not toward them.  This finding is consistent with the distributions of 
changes in stock prices shown in Panels C and F of Figure 1.3 of the first essay. 
A.5 Quantile Regressions Explaining Signed Volume During 
the Disagreement Events 
Table A.3 provides additional evidence about signed volume during the disagreement 
events by presenting coefficient estimates from quantile regressions predicting signed volume 
during both the {P>IP} and {IP>P}-type disagreements, based on a 60-second evaluation period.   
We use a pooled sample that combines both the treatment and control samples for all stocks, and 
capture the effect of the disagreement with a dummy variable D that takes the value of one for 
the disagreement events.  As with the previous quantile regressions predicting quote changes, we 
report results for a specification includes the vector of control variables X.   
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Table A.3 presents the coefficient estimates and asymptotic t-statistics for the 
disagreement dummy in regressions for the 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, and 90% quantiles of delta-
signed volume in all options, delta-signed volume in just the call-put pair that triggered the 
disagreement, and signed volume in the underlying stock.  For the {P>IP}-type disagreements 
(the left-hand side of the table), the regressions for signed delta-equivalent volume in all options 
shows that the disagreement causes large increases in volume at the 70% and 90% quantiles.  
The effects of the disagreement at the 70% and 90% quantile are 2,580 and 7,480 share 
equivalents.  The effect at the median is 950 delta-equivalent shares.  This effect at the median 
implies that more than half of the disagreement events display signed volume in the direction 
that will tend to push prices to close the disagreement.  Delta-equivalent volume in the call-put 
pair that triggered the disagreement is 1,000 and 3,740 shares at the 70% and 90% quantiles, and 
210 shares at the median.   For the {IP>P}-type disagreements (the right-hand side of the table) 
the delta-equivalent volumes are negative, and the 30% and 10% quantiles correspond to the 
70% and 90% quantiles of the {P>IP}-type disagreements.  For these regression the effects at the 
30% and 10% quantiles are similar the effects are found at the 70% and 90% quantiles for the 
{P>IP}-type disagreements.  
This finding that the effect of the disagreement on signed delta-equivalent option volume 
is highly skewed is unsurprising because there is no reason to expect that it will always be 
profitable to trade on or “arbitrage” the disagreement.  However, when trading on the 
disagreement is profitable, one expects arbitragers to trade large numbers of options.    
Turning to the quantile regressions for signed volume in the underlying stocks, the 
coefficients at the 10% and 90% percentiles have opposite signs, indicating that the disagreement 
events are associated with greater dispersion in signed volume.    At the median, for the {P>IP}-
type disagreements, the disagreement event increases stock signed volume by about 210 shares 
relative to the control events, consistent with the stock volume results in Table 1.6 and 
inconsistent with significant arbitrage selling of the stock.  For the {IP>P}-type disagreements, at 
the median the disagreement event decreases stock signed volume by about 30 shares.  This 
result is similar to that in Table 1.6, where the difference in medians was also small, though in 
Table 1.6 the effect of the disagreement was slightly positive rather than slightly negative. 
To summarize, signed option volume in the direction that tends to eliminate the 
disagreements occurs in more than half of the disagreement events.  In a significant fraction of 
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the events, the delta-equivalent signed option volume is large, consistent with “arbitrage” trading 
exploiting mispricing during the disagreement events.  There is no evidence of unusual signed 
volume in the underlying stocks. For stocks, the increase in signed volume is small and, if 
anything, is in a direction that increases mispricing.   
A.6 Results for Signed Volume in the Subsamples Used in 
Robustness Tests 
Table A.4 contains results for signed volume in the subsamples used in robustness tests 
discussed in Section 1.6 of the first essay.   
Column 2 of Table A.4 shows the estimates of the coefficient on the disagreement dummy 
in regressions explaining signed volume for the subset of disagreement events that are initiated 
by the options market.  The point estimates in column 2 of both Panels A and B indicate volume 
in the direction that tends to close the disagreements, consistent with the full sample results, 
though the magnitudes are not as large as in the full sample and in the results for “All Options” 
in Panel B the point estimate is small and not significantly different from zero.  The weaker 
evidence of option market volume tending to close the disagreements is unsurprising, because it 
is likely that at least some of these disagreements were caused by signed option volume in a 
direction that tended to open the disagreement.  If any of this volume carries over into the 
disagreement period it will tend to offset “arbitrage” trades in the direction that tends to close the 
disagreement.   
Column 3 shows the results for the subset of disagreement events that occur in the two 
trading days prior to earnings announcements.   The point estimates for signed option volume in 
this subsample are very similar to those for the full sample, though the t-statistics are smaller 
because of the smaller sample size. 
Column 4 headed “Pre-Event Return >0.3%” shows the conditional average signed 
volume for the subset of disagreement events for which the return (for the {P>IP}-type events) 
or its negative  (for the {IP>P}-type events) during the two minutes prior to the beginning of the 
disagreement event exceeded 0.3%.   The estimates for signed volume for this subsample are 
very similar to those for the full sample.  
 Column 5 addresses this hypothesis that more price discovery might have occurred in the 
options market during the second half of the sample period because the option market was more 
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liquid during that period by presenting results for the subset of disagreement events that occurred 
during and after 2004.  Signed delta-equivalent option volume during disagreement events was 
larger in this subsample than in the full sample, which is unsurprising given the increase in 
option trading volume during the sample period.  
Column 6 explores whether the results are different during periods of high option volume 
by looking at the subsample of price disagreement events that occurred on days in which option 
trading volume exceeded the 80
th
 percentile of daily option trading volume for that underlying 
stock.  They are notthe results for signed option volume during this subsample are similar to 
those in the full sample. 
Column 7 explores the possibility that the results might be different  following order 
imbalances in the stock market possibility by examining the subset of events for which the ratio 
of the signed stock market volume (or its negative, for the {IP>P}-type events) to total stock 
volume in the two minutes preceding the event exceeds 0.5.  The results show that signed option 
volume in this subsample is also similar to that in the full sample.  The point estimates for signed 
stock volume differ from those in the full sample, but are insignificant.   
Columns 8, 9, and 10 show results for the subsamples in which both the call and put 
prices used in the put-call parity are “trade confirmed,” both the call and put prices are “quote 
confirmed,” and for the combined case in which the call and put prices are either “trade 
confirmed” or “quote confirmed.”  In each case, we also use only correspondingly confirmed 
control observations. The coefficients for signed option volume are much larger than in the full 
sample case, with the coefficients for signed option volume in the disagreement pairs being more 
than two times larger than in the full sample case in Column 1. 
Column 11 headed “>10 sec duration”  considers the subsample of treatment events in 
which the option-implied quotes that triggered the disagreement do not change for at least 10 
seconds after the event is triggered. For this subsample the pair of options that triggered the 
disagreement shows slightly less signed volume than does the full sample, while in this 
subsample signed volume in all options is greater than in the full sample. 
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A.7 Figures and Tables 
Figure A.1 Frequency of primary sample disagreement events per stock per day.  The figure 
presents a smoothed estimate of the average number of events per day per stock during the sample period.  
The estimate of the number of events per day is constructed by counting the total (across stocks) number 
of events per day, dividing by the number of stocks in the sample on that day, and then smoothing the 
resulting time series by taking a 30-day moving average.   The red line is the smoothed estimate of the 
number of {P>IP}-type events in which the actual price exceeds the option-implied stock price, while the 
blue line is the smoothed estimate of the number of {IP>P}-type events.  
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Table A.1  Mean quote changes in the disagreement and control samples.  For each stock and ETF, the table presents the mean changes (in cents) 
of the option-implied bid quote, option-implied ask quote, and actual stock midpoint for the disagreement and the control samples, for both the {P>IP}-
type and {IP>P}-type disagreements.  The evaluation period is set to one minute.  The averages in the last row are equal-weighted averages of the 
stock/ETF averages.  The units of all variables are cents.  Ticker symbols indicated with * dropped before the end of the sample period. 
 
Ticker 
{P > IP}-Type Disagreements  {IP > P}-Type Disagreements 
Treatment Sample Control Sample  Treatment Sample Control Sample 
Implied 
Bid 
Implied 
Ask 
Stock 
Midpoint 
Implied 
Bid 
Implied 
Ask 
Stock 
Midpoint 
 Implied 
Bid 
Implied 
Ask 
Stock 
Midpoint 
Implied 
Bid 
Implied 
Ask 
Stock 
Midpoint 
AIG 6.1 11.4 -0.4 0.7 4.2 -0.4  -11.4 -5.9 0.4 -4.0 -0.3 0.5 
AMAT 4.4 6.1 0.2 0.2 1.9 -0.1  -5.8 -4.3 -0.2 -2.1 -0.3 0.0 
AMGN 5.9 10.5 -0.1 -0.1 3.4 -0.8  -10.4 -5.5 0.3 -3.7 0.2 0.7 
AMR 3.7 7.5 0.3 0.2 2.6 -0.1  -6.6 -2.9 0.4 -3.0 -0.2 -0.1 
AMZN 5.5 10.0 0.5 0.1 3.5 -0.5  -9.5 -4.9 -0.1 -3.3 0.1 0.7 
AOL* 4.3 6.7 -0.8 0.5 1.0 -0.2  -4.7 -4.4 -0.7 -1.6 -0.1 -0.2 
BMY 4.5 6.7 -0.2 0.5 1.8 0.2  -5.7 -4.1 -0.4 -1.9 -0.2 -0.2 
BRCM 4.6 9.3 -0.1 -0.1 3.3 -0.6  -9.3 -4.6 0.0 -3.4 0.2 0.6 
C 4.6 7.1 0.4 0.4 2.7 0.1  -6.4 -4.2 -0.2 -2.4 0.0 0.1 
COF 6.7 12.3 -0.1 0.6 4.4 -0.4  -12.3 -6.4 0.8 -4.1 -0.4 0.5 
CPN* 2.4 3.3 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.3  -4.8 -3.2 -1.2 -0.9 0.0 -0.1 
CSCO 4.8 5.9 0.2 0.3 1.6 -0.3  -6.1 -5.2 -0.3 -1.7 -0.5 0.2 
DELL 4.4 6.7 0.1 0.2 2.2 -0.3  -6.8 -4.6 -0.4 -2.3 -0.2 0.3 
DIA 5.2 15.6 -0.1 0.7 5.3 0.2  -14.5 -4.6 -0.2 -5.8 -1.2 -0.7 
EBAY 6.5 12.2 0.3 0.2 4.6 -0.6  -11.7 -5.9 0.4 -4.3 0.3 1.1 
EMC 4.2 5.3 0.0 0.3 1.2 0.1  -4.5 -4.3 -0.4 -1.5 -0.1 -0.1 
F 3.5 5.5 -0.1 0.3 1.2 -0.1  -5.3 -3.3 -0.6 -0.9 -0.2 0.1 
GE 4.3 5.6 0.0 0.5 1.6 0.2  -5.6 -4.8 -0.5 -1.6 -0.5 -0.2 
GM 4.1 7.7 0.3 0.7 2.8 0.0  -7.2 -3.6 -0.2 -2.6 -0.3 0.2 
HD 4.3 6.8 0.1 0.5 2.8 0.1  -6.8 -4.6 -0.3 -2.6 -0.3 0.0 
IBM 6.4 10.7 -0.9 0.4 4.2 -0.1  -11.3 -6.6 0.2 -3.9 -0.2 0.2 
INTC 4.7 5.3 0.1 0.4 1.5 -0.3  -5.8 -5.0 -0.1 -1.7 -0.7 0.3 
JPM 4.1 6.3 0.0 0.2 2.4 0.1  -6.4 -4.2 -0.4 -2.3 -0.1 0.0 
KLAC 4.8 9.8 -0.2 -0.3 4.0 -0.7  -10.2 -4.9 0.2 -4.0 0.2 0.7 
MMM 7.0 14.1 -0.3 0.7 5.5 -0.2  -11.9 -4.5 3.0 -4.7 0.2 0.6 
MO 5.2 10.4 0.3 0.4 2.9 -0.2  -9.3 -5.5 -0.1 -3.1 -0.4 -0.1 
MSFT 4.5 5.3 0.1 0.4 1.4 -0.4  -5.3 -4.6 -0.1 -1.4 -0.6 0.3 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
 
 
Ticker 
{P > IP}-Type Disagreements  {IP > P}-Type Disagreements 
Treatment Sample Control Sample  Treatment Sample Control Sample 
Implied 
Bid 
Implied 
Ask 
Stock 
Midpoint 
Implied 
Bid 
Implied 
Ask 
Stock 
Midpoint 
 Implied 
Bid 
Implie
d Ask 
Stock 
Midpoint 
Implied 
Bid 
Implied 
Ask 
Stock 
Midpoint 
MWD* 5.7 10.7 0.6 0.0 3.2 -0.5  -9.2 -4.6 -0.2 -3.5 -0.3 0.0 
NXTL* 4.3 6.5 0.3 0.4 2.3 -0.2  -6.7 -4.5 -0.5 -2.2 -0.3 0.2 
ORCL 4.1 5.1 -0.2 0.4 1.1 -0.3  -6.2 -4.4 -0.1 -1.1 0.0 0.3 
PFE 4.3 6.0 -0.1 0.6 2.2 0.0  -5.3 -3.9 0.1 -2.0 -0.5 0.0 
QCOM 5.5 9.5 0.2 0.3 3.5 -0.4  -9.3 -5.2 -0.2 -3.1 0.2 0.8 
QLGC 5.1 10.6 0.3 -0.1 3.6 -0.7  -9.9 -4.7 0.3 -4.0 -0.1 0.5 
QQQ* 4.5 5.9 0.2 0.6 1.5 0.1  -5.8 -4.6 -0.2 -1.6 -0.7 -0.2 
QQQQ 6.1 7.8 0.6 0.7 2.2 0.1  -7.7 -5.8 -0.2 -2.3 -0.6 0.2 
SBC* 4.6 6.1 0.2 -0.1 1.8 -0.1  -5.1 -3.3 0.3 -2.0 0.0 0.0 
SMH 4.6 7.1 0.5 0.6 3.2 0.4  -7.5 -4.9 -0.8 -3.5 -0.8 -0.4 
TYC 4.3 6.8 0.4 0.4 2.4 0.2  -5.4 -3.3 0.1 -2.3 -0.2 -0.1 
XLNX 4.6 8.3 0.0 -0.1 3.0 -0.5  -8.5 -4.7 -0.1 -3.2 0.0 0.5 
XOM 5.5 8.1 -0.2 0.6 2.7 -0.2  -7.4 -4.7 0.7 -2.6 -0.2 0.5 
Average 4.8 8.1 0.1 0.3 2.7 -0.2  -7.7 -4.6 0.0 -2.7 -0.2 0.2 
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Table A.2 Estimates of coefficients on the disagreement dummy in quantile regressions explaining quote changes, for various quantiles, 
using the primary sample.   The table presents the coefficient estimates on the disagreement dummy in quantile regressions explaining quote 
changes in specifications that include a constant, the disagreement dummy, and the three variables used in matching (the option-implied spread 
and the 2-minute and 10-second pre-event returns), and a fourth control variable equal to the order imbalance in the stock during the 2-minute pre-
event period.    Each coefficient estimate in the table is from a separate regression for the pooled sample. Only the coefficient for the disagreement 
dummy is reported. Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on 100 bootstrap iterations. There are 38,979 and 42,045 {P>IP}-type and {IP>P}-
type disagreements, respectively.  Because each disagreement event is matched to three control events, the total number of observations is four 
times the number of disagreement events. 
 
 
 {P > IP}-Type Disagreements  {IP>P}-Type Disagreements 
Quantile: 10% 30% 50% 70% 90%  10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
Implied 
Bid 
4.8 0.0 5.0 7.5 5.6  -5.0 -5.1 -10.0 -5.0 0.0 
(0.01) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.06)   (0.04) (0.01) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Implied 
Ask 
0.0 5.0 10.0 5.3 6.7  -5.0 -7.5 -5.0 0.0 -4.7 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.01) (0.04)   (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Actual 
Stock 
Midpoint 
-0.2 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.6  -1.4 -1.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.3 
(0.01) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.01) 
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Table A.3 Estimates of the coefficient on the disagreement dummy in quantile regressions explaining signed volume, for various quantiles, 
using the primary sample.   The table presents the coefficient estimates on the disagreement dummy in quantile regressions explaining delta-
equivalent signed volume (for the options) or signed volume (for the stock) in specifications that include a constant, the disagreement dummy, and 
the three variables used in matching (the option-implied spread and the 2-minute and 10-second pre-event returns), and a fourth control variable 
equal to the order imbalance in the stock during the 2-minute pre-event period.  Only the coefficient for disagreement dummy is reported, and each 
cell in the table is from a separate regression for the pooled sample using an evaluation period of one minute. Signed volume in the underlying 
stocks is based on the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm, while a version of the quote rule is used to estimate the direction of options trades. The 
delta-equivalent volume is computed using the estimates of signed option volume and the options deltas from Option Metrics.  “All Options” 
include all option pairs for a given underlying stock, while the “Disagreement Pair” includes only volume in the option pair that triggered the 
disagreement event. The columns headed “Mean” and “Median” report the mean and median, respectively, of the 39 stock-by-stock values. The 
columns headed “4-th”, and “36-th” report the 4-th and 36-th largest of the signed volumes for the 39 stocks.  The units are round lots of 100 
shares, so that “1” means 100 shares.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on 100 bootstrap iterations. There are 38,979 and 42,045 {P>IP}-
type and {IP>P}-type disagreements, respectively.  Because each disagreement event is matched to three control events, the total number of 
observations is four times the number of disagreement events. 
 
 
 {P>IP}-Type Disagreements  {IP>P}-Type Disagreements 
Quantile: 10% 30% 50% 70% 90%  10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
All Options 
-3.8 0.7 9.5 25.8 74.8  -74.1 -23.9 -8.9 -0.6 2.3 
(0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.19)  (0.19) (0.05) (0.02) (0.0) (0.08) 
Disagreement 
Pair 
-2.9 0.0 2.1 10.0 37.4   -36.1 -9.9 -2.2 0.0 3.3 
(0.02) (0.0) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09)   (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.0) (0.02) 
Stock 
-84.1 -13.1 2.1 15.0 49.4  -42.6 -10.4 -0.3 12.7 59.6 
(0.55) (0.11) (0.07) (0.13) (0.43)   (0.40) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.45) 
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Table A.4  Signed volume in various subsamples.  Panels A and B show coefficient estimates for the {P>IP} and {IP>P}-type 
disagreement events, respectively.  In each panel, each column reports the coefficient estimates on the disagreement dummy and the associated t-
statistics (in parentheses) for regressions of either the delta-equivalent signed option volume in a set of options or the signed stock volume on a 
constant and the disagreement dummy for a separate subsample identified by the column heading.  The results in the rows labeled “All Options” 
use as the left-hand side variable the total delta-equivalent signed volume in all option pairs for a given underlying stock.  The results in the rows 
labeled “Disagreement Pair” use only the delta-equivalent signed option volume for the option pair that triggered the disagreement event, while the 
rows labeled “Stock” use the signed volume in the underlying stock. In each subsample, all observations are pooled together and a single 
regression is estimated.  The table also reports the median disagreement duration, in seconds, and the number of treatment sample events.  Because 
each disagreement event is matched with three control events, the total number of observations is four times the number of treatment events.  The 
evaluation period is 30 seconds, and the t-statistics are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
 
The various subsamples are identical to those used in Table 1.11.  As in Table 1.11, results for the full sample are provided in column 1 for 
comparison.  
 
Panel A: {P>IP}-Type Disagreements 
   
 
     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
  
Full 
Sample 
Option-
Initiated 
2 Pre-
Earnings 
days 
Pre-Event 
Return 
>0.3% 
Year 
>2004  
Option 
Volume > 
80
th
 %-tile 
Pre-Event 
Order 
Imbalance 
Trade 
Conf. 
Exch. 
Conf. 
Trade or 
Exch. 
>10  Sec. 
Duration 
All Options 
26.3 18.6 17.6 24.1 35.3 30.0 25.6 67.9 49.9 44.5 31.2 
(12.0) (4.3) (2.1) (4.2) (6.5) (9.7) (4.8) (8.1) (3.7) (8.2) (11.4) 
Disagreement 
Pair 
12.6 8.7 16.6 9.8 20.2 14.3 14.2 42.4 36.5 28.0 15.1 
(18.3) (4.9) (4.1) (6.7) (13.7) (13.1) (6.5) (12.8) (9.4) (16.6) (13.9) 
Stock 
-16.5 -37.9 -8.2 -27.1 -22.3 -36.9 10.7 -23.6 -24.6 -22.0 -1.3 
 (-3.6)  (-2.8)  (-0.6)  (-3.0)  (-2.5)  (-3.9) (0.6)  (-1.5)  (-1.2)  (-2.4)  (-0.2) 
Median 
Duration 
8.0 5.1 5.8 5.0 3.4 6.5 15.0 17.7 9.4 8.9 30.3 
No. of 
Treatment 
Events 
38,979 4,745 1,517 10,161 12,868 10,095 4,916 5,402 4,228 13,734 17,765 
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Table A.4 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: {IP>P}-Type Disagreements          
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
  
Full 
Sample 
Option-
Initiated 
2 Pre-
Earnings 
Days 
Pre-Event 
Return  
< -0.3% 
Year 
>2004 
Option 
Volume > 
80
th
 %-tile 
Pre-Event 
Order 
Imbalance 
Trade 
Conf. 
Exch. 
Conf. 
Trade or 
Exch. 
>10 Sec. 
Duration 
All Options 
-25.7 -1.6 -23.8 -25.1 -44.0 -20.1 -23.4 -68.2 -64.3 -47.1 -26.1 
 (-13.7)  (-0.3)  (-4.7)  (-10.2)  (-9.8)  (-5.0)  (-2.8)  (-7.3)  (-9.1)  (-11.0)  (-9.9) 
Disagreement 
Pair 
-12.9 -5.7 -11.4 -9.7 -22.0 -10.7 -12.2 -44.3 -31.5 -27.5 -13.3 
 (-12.0)  (-2.6)  (-6.0)  (-10.1)  (-7.4)  (-8.7)  (-7.0)  (-6.7)  (-12.7)  (-9.8)  (-15.2) 
Stock 
5.0 7.0 31.0 9.1 4.4 -0.8 49.0 19.5 4.5 8.6 4.9 
(1.1) (0.5) (2.5) (1.4) (0.6)  (-0.1) (1.9) (0.9) (0.3) (0.9) (0.6) 
Median 
Duration 
7.9 5.1 6.1 5.1 3.2 6.4 16.0 16.8 9.4 9.1 30.6 
No. of  
Treatment 
Events 
42,045 4,714 1,487 11,344 13,832 10,706 3,807 6,154 4,714 15,141 19,045 
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Appendix B: Variable Description 
Name Description Computation 
Option returns 
  
Ret(p=0) Straddle returns for expiring options (T-t < 13) 
 
Ret(p=1) Straddle returns for short-term options See Eq.(3.1) 
RetCall(p=1) Call option returns for short-term options See Eq.(3.1) 
Ret(p=3) Straddle returns for long-term options See Eq.(3.1) 
Order imbalance   
OrdImb Order imbalance  See Eq.(3.2) 
OrdImb(p=1) Order imbalance for short-term options See Eq.(3.2) 
OrdImbt-1 Order imbalance on the previous day See Eq.(3.2) 
OrdImbPut Order imbalance for put options See Eq.(3.2) 
MWOrdImb Market-wide order imbalance See Eq.(3.4) 
AdjOrdImb Volume-adjusted order imbalance See Eq.(3.3) 
Dummy variables 
  
n_1 Expiration day (Friday) 1, if t = expiration 
n0 Post-expiration day (Monday) 1, if t-1 = expiration 
nead0 Pre-earnings announcement day (pre-EAD) 1, if t+1 = EAD 
nead1 Earnings announcement day (EAD) 1, if t = EAD 
n_friday Friday dummy 1, if t = Friday 
n_crises Crisis dummy 
1, if August 1, 2007 < date < 
Febuary 1, 2009 
Stock market 
  
StkRet Stock returns 
 
AbsStkRet Absolute stock returns |StkRet| 
RelAbsStkRet 
Absolute stock returns normalized by its average over the 
previous 50 days  
Log(Open/Closet-1) Close-to-open ratio log(Opent / Closet-1) 
Log(High/Low) High-low ratio log(Hight / Lowt) 
RelLog(High/Low) 
High-low ratio normalized by its average over the 
previous 50 days  
Close Price Close price 
 
logME Logarithm of market capitalization 
 
StkVol Stock volume in dollars 
 
MeanStkVolume Stock volume in dollars, a 75-day moving median 
 
Momentum Stock price relative to its 250-day moving median 
 
250 *StdRet 
e)MedianCloslog(Close/  
StkRet1W One-week stock returns 
 
StkRet1M One-month stock returns 
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StkRet6M Six-month stock returns 
 
Stock volatility 
  
StdRet 
Stock returns volatility (based on a 50-day moving 
average) 
Mean{ log(Closet / Closet-1)
2 
} 
COStdRet 
Close-to-open volatility (based on a 50-day moving 
average) 
})/{log( 21−tt CloseOpenMean  
HLStdRet High-low volatility (based on a 50-day moving average) 
})/{log(
4log2
1 2LowHighMean
 
AbsStdRet 
Absolute returns volatility (based on a 50-day moving 
average) 
)Re(
2
tAbsStkMeanπ  
Implied volatility/options market  
IV30 ATM implied volatility for 30-day options 
 
IV60 ATM implied volatility for 60-day options 
 
IV60d25 
Implied volatility for 60-day put options with delta of  
-0.25  
IV360 ATM implied volatility for one-year options 
 
IV360d25 
Implied volatility for one-year put options with delta of  
-0.25  
IV(p=1) Average implied volatility for short-term options 
 
diff(IV(p=1)) One-day change in short-term implied volatility IV(p=1) - IV(p=1)t-1 
IV30 - IV30t-1 One-day change in implied volatility IV30 - IV30t-1 
IV30 - IV30t-5 One-week change in implied volatility IV30 - IV30t-5 
IV30 - IV30t-25 One-month change in implied volatility IV30 - IV30t-25 
Skew60 Volatility skew for 60-day options log(IV60d25/IV60) 
RNVolatility 
Risk neutral volatility as  in Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan 
(2003), 50 days to expiration 
See Bakshi et al. (2003)  
RNSkewness 
Risk neutral skewness as  in Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan 
(2003), 50 days to expiration 
See Bakshi et al. (2003) 
RNKurtosis 
Risk neutral kurtosis as in Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan 
(2003), 50 days to expiration 
See Bakshi et al. (2003) 
IV60 - IV360 
Volatility time slope defined as the difference between  
60-day and 360-day implied volatilities 
IV60 - IV360 
IV60-StdRet 
Volatility premium defined as the difference between  
60-day implied volatility and stock volatility 
IV60 - StdRet 
COStdRet-StdRet Close-to-open relative to close-to-close volatility 2*COStdRet - StdRet 
VolCone(IV30) 
Volatility cone, 30-day IV relative to its average over 
previous year 
(IV30-Median(IV30, 250-
days))/ (Range(IV30,250-
days)/1.349) 
IdioIV30 Idiosyncratic volatility proxy 30-dayIV
2
 - VIX
2
 
VIX CBOE VIX (S&P500 30-day implied volatility) 
 
BidAsk(p=1) Average bid-ask spread for ATM  short-term options 
 
MMPos(p=1) 
Net market maker position for short-term options, in 
million contracts 
Cumulative sum of signed 
volume 
Option volume 
  
OptVolumeUSD Option volume in dollars 
 
OptVolume Option volume measured in contracts 
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MeanOIUSD Logarithm of open interest, a 250-day moving average 
 
MeanOptVolumeUS
D 
Logarithm of option dollar volume, a 250-day moving 
average  
RelVolUsd (p=1) 
Dollar volume for short-term options relative to its  
520-day median 
Log(OptVolUsd(p=1)) - 
Median(LogOptVolUsd(p=1)) 
RelOICall(p=1) 
Open interest for short-term call options relative to total 
short-term open interest 
 OICall(p=1)/OI(p=1) 
RelOICallITM(p=1) 
Open interest for short-term ITM call options relative to 
total short-term open interest 
 OICallITM(p=1)/OI(p=1)  
RelOIPutOTM(p=1) 
Open interest for short-term OTM put options relative to 
total short-term open interest 
 OIPutOTM(p=1)/OI(p=1)  
RelVolCall(p=1) 
Volume for the short-term call options relative to total 
short-term volume 
 
OptVolCall(p=1)/OptVol(p=1)  
RelVolCalITM(p=1) 
Volume for the short-term ITM call options relative to 
total short-term volume 
 
OptVolCall(p=1)/OptVol(p=1) 
RelVolPutOTM 
(p=1) 
Volume for the short-term OTM put options relative to 
total short-term volume 
 
OptVolCall(p=1)/OptVol(p=1)  
Vol/OI(p=1) Volume relative to open interest for short-term options  OptVol(p=1)/OI(p=1)  
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